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THE EFFECTS OF COPING STRATEGIES UPON THE EXPRESSION OF FEAR
ABSTRACT
Glogower et al. (l978) have suggested that coping self­
statements (css) form the major therapeutic component of cognitive 
restructuring therapies. However, to date there has been no 
consensus in the literature about the nature of effective CSS.
Indeed, many studies which have examined the effects of cognitive 
therapies have failed to adequately describe the CSS component 
of the therapies. The initial focus of this thesis was on two 
coping strategies which have been described (Meichenbaum, 1971;
Evans, 1977). Both strategies encourage fearful subjects to 
cope with the physiological concomitants of fear on the assumption 
that fear is mediated by their perceptions of such concomitants.
However, the emphasis of these strategies is quite different;
Evans' strategy encourages subjects to nassively accept the 
physiological concomitants of fear (PCs) while Meichenbaium's 
encourages subjects to actively cope with this aspect of fear by 
self-instructing to relax and keep calm (AIS). It was found that 
the former strategy (PCS) had a beneficial effect upon fear of 
spiders but lead to an increase in fear for a group of speech-anxious 
subjects. The ACS had a significant fear-reducing effect upon 
speech anxiety. In addition, it was found that fearful public 
speakers who devised their own strategies experienced a reduction 
in fear. The possible interpretation of these findings prompted an 
investigation of the relationship between locus of control orientation 
and the expression of fear. It was found that externality was 
positively correlated with fear of many of the items on the FSS III 
(Wolpe, 1973) including the item 'Speaking in Public’. However, when 
actua lly presenting a speech it was found that fearful internals 
expressed significantly more fear than fearful externals. Interpretations 
of this finding are discussed along with possible implications for therapy. 
A practically convenient procedure for investigating speech anxiety is 
described. An investigation of the recognition of the non-verbal 
expression of speech anxiety is also reported.
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c h a p t e r 1 - INTRODUCTION
Defining characteristics of phobias
At first sight, and especially following comparison with other 
symptoms of psychopathology, the general text portrays the phobia 
as one of the more tangible as well as circumscribed of abnormal 
behaviours. This view is reinforced by many definitions of phobias 
which rest at a descriptive level. For example, Beck (1976) has 
couched his definition of phobias in seemingly straightforward 
language :
'Fear of a situation/object that, by social consensus and 
the person's own intellectual appraisal when away from 
the situation, is disproportionate to the probability and 
degree of harm inherent in that situation.' (p 159)
However, this phenomenon becomes rapidly more complex when an 
attempt is made to understand the nature of such fears, and their potential 
impact upon the lives and the psychological well-being of the people 
who have them. Again at a descriptive level it is apparent that 
phobics not only experience excessive fear in certain situations, 
but for many of them the avoidance which tends to accompany this fear 
ultimately brings distress and unhappiness. This puzzling 'self- 
perpetuating and self-defeating' behaviour has been referred to by 
Mowrer (l950) as the 'neurotic paradox'; paradoxical in the sense that 
it is contrary to the tenets of most philosophical and psychological 
theories which emphasize the hedonistic nature of man (Eysenck, 1979).
As Mowrer points out :
'Common sense holds that a normal, sensible man, or even a 
beast to the limits of his intelligence, will weigh and balance 
the consequences of his acts; if the net effect is favourable, 
the action producing it will be perpetuated, and if the net 
effect is unfavourable, the action producing it will be inhibited.
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abandoned. In neurosis, however, one sees actions which 
have predominantly unfavourable consequences, yet they 
persist over a period of months, years, or a lifetime.'
Mowrer, 1950, p 486).
The complex nature of fear and its possible impact upon the 
phobic in terms of self-defeating and persistent behaviour is 
illustrated in a case study presented by Rachman (1968).
'A medical student complained of an intense fear of authority 
figures and examination situations. He described his feelings 
in the presence of authority figures (his teachers, senior 
colleagues, policemen, etc.) as one of total fear, sometimes 
bordering on panic. He reported that he was quite unable to 
cope with these people, and that when it was impossible for 
him to avoid a direct meeting with them, he felt extremely 
frightened and trembled openly. In his case, the autonomic 
reactions were primarily sweating, muscular tension, palpitations 
and a strong flush. In addition, the muscular tension quite 
often centred on the muscles of the throat region, and this 
prevented him from speaking normally in the presence of authority 
figures. His motor reaction was one of avoidance. Whenever and 
wher^ever possible, he avoided coming into contact with his 
teachers and senior colleagues. This unadaptive behaviour was 
interfering with his medical education, apart from the heavy 
burden which it imposed on him in day-to-day matters.' (p 5 ).
Two points of interest are clearly illustrated by this case. 
Firstly, it underscores Mowrer's observation of the self-defeating 
and disruptive nature of excessive fear. Secondly, it suggests that 
although the word 'fear' is used without difficulty in everyday 
language and in definitions (e.g. Beck ibid), the fearful response is 
a complex one, manifest in a number of physiological, subjective and
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behavioural ways. Both of these points are discussed below; firstly, 
the complexity of fear and its measurement will be considered.
Rachman's case, like many others in the literature, leaves little 
room to doubt the notion that fear is a complex phenomenon which may 
be expressed and measured in many different ways. The many operational 
definitions of these expressions and their measurement can be found 
elsewhere (e.g. Cimenero, Calhoun and Adams, 1977; Nay, 1977; Sartory 
and Lader, 1978), and therefore only a brief overview will be given 
here. As suggested above these expressions may be regarded as res_onses 
in one of three response systems : gross motor/behavioural, physiological, 
verbal/subjective.
Gross Motor/Behavioural Responses;
A variety of operational definitions have been used in the literature 
for gross motor or behavioural expressions of fear, although most 
typically they have involved the exposure of subjects to a phobic 
stimulus. This exposure has either been in a temporal sense (e.g. a 
subject may be requested to remain in a situation until fear becomes 
unbearable), or in terms of physical proximity (i.e. bringing the 
feared object toward the subject or instructing the subject to approach 
and/or inter-act with the stimulus) (e.g. Lang and Lazovik, 1963;
Leitenberg, 1976; Ost, 1978). Other definitions of the behavioural 
expression of fear have included ; the disruption of feeding behaviour 
(e.g. Mowrer and Viek, 1948); the disruption of speech (e.g. Mahl, 1956); and 
the bodily movements and facial expression of fearful public speakers 
(e.g. Lamb, 1978; Paul, 1966).
Verbal Responses;
Hugdahl (l98l) has suggested that the verbal-cognitive component 
of fear has been conceived of in the literature in at least three 
different ways: i) as a verbal overall rating of subjective feelings, 
typically using a 'fear-thermometer', but without specification of the
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source of the ratings (e.g. Sartory et. al. 1977; Grey et al, 1979);
ii) secondly, as 'worrying and brooding' about the forthcoming fear 
provoking event. Hugdahl suggests this may include negative thoughts 
about being unable to cope instrumentally with the situation, and
iii) Thirdly, the cognitive-verbal component may mean those changes 
of mood and feelings of unreality, uncontrollability, guilt, self­
blame, etc., when exposed to a phobic stimulus, or when thinking about 
the stimulus. (Hugdahl, 198l).
A fourth conceptualization which might be added to this list 
involves those verbal responses expressed during fearful interactions 
which reflect the perception of autonomic arousal, i.e. "I felt my 
heart racing."
Physiological responses;
A variety of physiological responses to phobic stimuli may be 
measured and analysed in a variety of ways although data interpretation 
in not always easy or conclusive (Rachman, 1978). However, some 
researchers (e.g. Sartory and Lader, 1978) have suggested that measures 
of cardiovascular activity may be more reliably measured and readily 
interpreted.
Our understanding of the nature of fear therefore is best pursued 
in terms of the measurement of responses in those response-systems.
However, such an understanding is further complicated by the observations 
that the measures of responses in these systems can co-vary, vary 
inversely, or vary independently, (e.g. Lacey, 1967; Lang and Lazovik, 1963; 
Hodgson and Rachman, 1974; Rachman and Hodgson, 1974; Sartory, Rachman 
and Grey, 1977). In response to such observations, Lang (1968, 1971,
1978) proposed a 'Three-systems Model' of fear. He argued that fear 
can no longer be viewed as a 'lump', a unitary phenomenon which may be 
measured in different ways, or encompassed by the indices in one system. 
Rather fear must be viewed as a set of loosely coupled and partially
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independent components which may be reflected to varying degrees 
by the responses in the three response systems. This conceptualization 
has been more recently supported in the writings of Rachman (1976,
1978) and Eysenck (1976). Indeed Rachman and Hodgson (l974) have 
gone on to generate a number of hypotheses pertaining to the 
relationship between indices of fear, although little research (see 
Sartory et. al. 1977; Grey et al, 1979) has been done to date to test 
these.
It is interesting to note that this conceptualisation of fear 
contrasts with the attribution theory of emotion proposed by Schachter 
(1964) and which stresses the interdependence of the indices of 
emotional expression. Inhhis formulation, physiological arousal, or 
the perception of arousal, whether illusory or veridical (Valins, 1970) 
is seen as necessary, although not sufficient for the expression of 
emotion in other systems. These contrasting conceptualisations have 
been discussed critically elsewhere (Hugdahl, 198l) and will not be 
discussed further at this point, although it will become apparent that 
they have different implications for the theories of aetiology of phobias 
and approaches to treatment.
In summary then, it is apparent that adequate models of phobias 
must account for the complexity of the expression of fear, which 
includes an understanding of the relationship between the responses 
indexing fear, and the persistence and seemingly self-defeating nature 
of these responses.
Several other characteristics of phobias must also be considered 
if a full understanding is to be gained. These include selectivity, 
age of onset and sex differences.
Selectivity;
Selectivity refers to the observation that the set of potentially 
phobic stimuli is seemingly non-arbitrary.
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'They comprise a relatively non-arbitrary and limited 
set of objects; agoraphobia, fear of specific animals, insect 
phobias, fear of heights, fear of the dark, and so forth.
All these are relatively common phobias, and only rarely, if ever, 
do we have pyjama phobias, grass pho^bias, electric outlet 
phobias, hammer phobias, even though these things are likely 
to be associated with trauma in our world'. (Seligman, 1971).
Age of Onset:
Marks (1969) has suggested that the onset of phobias is also 
non-random, each 'syndrome' (e.g. animal phobias, agoraphobia) having 
a characteristic age of onset.
Sex Differences:
Hersen (1973) has reported that college-age females report more 
intense fears than males on fear survey schedules. In addition, Geer 
(196$) has presented data which show that women in American colleges 
reported significantly higher levels of fear than males for eight 
of the fifty-one Items on a fear survey schedule, while the reverse 
was true for two of the items. In a more recent study involving students 
in an English college (Kartsounis, Mervyn-Smith and Pickersgill, I983) 
it was found that females reported significantly higher levels of fear 
than males for sixteen of the eighty-eight items of Wolpe's (1973)
Fear Survey Schedule (FSS-lll). Whether such fears are qualita.Vwe.Xy 
and/or quant,bc\hvt\y different from those experienced by individuals 
seeking clinical interventions remains to be seen although the observed 
sex differences are consistent with the preponderance of women amongst 
phobic patients (Marks, 1969).
Models of Phobic Behaviour:
Watson and Rayner's Model:
Watson and Rayner's (l920) model of phobic behaviour is incomplete 
and by now is of purely historical interest. However, their ideas were
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fundamental to future theoretical developments and also generated 
a good deal of research. Therefore, a discussion of this model will 
place these future developments within an historical perspective.
Watson and Rayner’s contention was that neurotic disorders were 
essentially conditioned emotional responses, the process of conditioning 
being entirely Pavlovian in nature. In support of this proposal these 
researchers reported a case study of an eleven-month old boy in whom 
they conditioned a fear of rats (Watson & Hayner 1920). The study is by now 
famous and has been frequently cited and described, however, the 
description bears repetition.
The conditioning procedure involved Watson striking a steel bar 
whenever the infant reached out for a rat. The subsequent expression 
of fear in the infant to the rat, but in the absence of the noise created 
by the striking of the bar, Watson argued, could be explained in terms 
of Pavlovian conditioning. He postulated that the once neutral stimulus 
(rat) following contiguous pairing with the loud noise (unconditioned 
stimulus) came to elicit the same response (conditioned response) as 
the noise, but in its absence. Watson and Rayner also reported that 
following this procedure the boy displayed fear reactions to other furry 
animals (dogs and rabbits) and to furry objects (e.g. fur coat) and 
although these stimuli were not used in the original conditioning 
process, such generalisation is predicted from Pavlov’s work with dogs 
(Pavlov, 1927). The process'of classical conditioning then, appears 
highly relevant for the acquisition of irrational fears. To state this 
simple model in a single sentence
’Phobic reactions may develop by means of such 
conditioning where, as a result of pairing a 
traumatic event evoking fear with a neutral 
environmental stimulus, the latter acquires the 
ability to elicit conditioned fear.’ (Meyer and Crisp, 1970)
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However, several points of criticism can be made of both Watson 
and Rayner's research and theory. Firstly, it is apparent that the 
case study offers little support for the theoretical model. As Harris 
(1979) has recently pointed out;
'Critical reading of Watson and Rayner's (l920) report reveals 
little evidence that Albert developed a rat phobia or even 
that animals consistently evoked his fear.' (p 154).
Watson and Rayner also report that the response which was 
conditioned began to extinguish and required additional trials to 
maintain it. Therefore, the study failed to demonstrate the persistence 
of phobic behaviour. Indeed, in theoretical terms, there is no reason why 
Watson and Rayner should have expected a conditioned response to 
persist, given Pavlov's (l927) description of the phenomenon of 
extinction based upon his experimental observations.
In short then, the model fails to explain the persistence of 
phobic behaviour, and the case study offers little evidence that phobic 
responses can be acquired via Pavlovian conditioning.
The Two-stage Theory of Fear and Avoidance;
An attempt to solve the theoretical problem of the persistence of 
phobic behaviour was made with the introduction of the Two-Stage theory 
of fear and avoidance (Mowrer, 1939). This theory was based upon a 
critical appraisal of the ideas of Freud, James, Watson and Pavlov, and 
has had a great influence upon theorising on this subject. It held 
the central notion that anxiety could act as a drive and hence as a 
motivational state. Mowrer's position is illustrated by the following 
quotation ;
'A so-called 'traumatic' (painful) stimulus (arising 
either from external injury, of whatever kind, or from 
severe organic need) impinges upon the organism and produces 
a more or less violent defense (striving) reaction.
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Furthermore, such a stimulus-response sequence is usually 
preceded or accompanied by originally 'indifferent* stimuli 
which, however after one or more temporally contiguous 
associations with the traumatic stimulus, begin to be 
perceived as 'danger signals', i.e. acquire the capacity 
to elicit an 'anxiety' reaction. This latter reaction, which 
may or may not be grossly observable, has two outstanding 
characteristics: (i) it creates or, perhaps more accurately, 
consists of a state of heightened tension (or 'attention') 
and a more or less specific readiness for (expectation of) the 
impending traumatic stimulus, and ii) by virtue of the fact 
that such a state of tension is itself a form of discomfort, 
it adaptively motivates the organism to escape from the danger 
situation, thereby lessening the intensity of the tension 
(anxiety) and also probably decreasing the chances of encountering 
the traumatic stimulus. In short, anxiety (fear) is the 
conditioned form of the pain reaction, which has the highly 
useful function of motivating and reinforcing behaviour that 
tends to avoid or prevent the recurrence of the pain-producing 
(unconditioned) stimulus.' (Mowrer, 1939» p 554 - 555).
Acquired fear then, was seen as a motive to avoid, and its presence 
ensured continued avoidance, the avoidance response being reinforced by 
the reduction of fear. Although Mowrer's model has undergone various 
modifications since 1939 (e.g. Miller,1951; Mowrer, I960; Eysenck and 
Rachman, 1965), the essential notion of fear as a motivator has remained.
Evidence to support this theory is discussed below. It has been 
drawn from five main sources (Eysenck and Rachman, 1965) : research on 
the induction of fear in animals ; the development of anxiety states in 
combat soldiers; experiments on the induction of fear in a small number 
of children; clinical observations (e.g. dental phobias) and an experiment
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on the effects of traumatic stimulation in adults.
Animal Studies;
The literature is replete with reports describing the phenomenon 
of 'experimental neurosis' in animals (see reviews by Broadhurst, I960, 
1962; Wolpe, 1958.). Some of these studies, such as those conducted 
by Miller (e.g. Miller, 1948),demonstrate that persistent avoidance 
of an initially innocuous stimulus (e.g. a tone) can be induced in 
rats by formerly exposing them to pairings of the neutral stimulus 
(cs) and an aversive stimulus (UCS) such as an electric shock. This 
observed avoidance, which is seen as analogous to human phobic avoidance, 
is interpreted in terms of fear as an acquired drive, specifically, 
avoidance is thought to index a classically conditioned fear response 
which reduces in intensity with avoidance, thus reinforcing and maintaining 
that avoidance. Interestingly, however, direct measurement of the 
presumed classically conditioned fear response is not usually made in 
these studies (Evans, 1976), although it is apparent (Evans, 1976) that 
classically conditioned autonomic nervous system responses are readily 
produced in animals.
The main thrust of this literature prompted Rachman (l976) to 
conclude :
'There is little room for doubt about the facility with 
which fear reactions can be conditioned - at least in animals 
tested under laboratory conditions.'
Combat Neurosis ;
The observations (e.g. Flanagan, 1948; Gillespie, 1945; Grinker 
and Spiegel, 1945; Lewis and Engle, 1954) that intense fear can result 
fro@ traumatic stimulation in combat have also been seen as evidence 
in support of a conditioning model of phobias (Rachman, 1978). One 
example of these observations, cited by Grinker and Spiegel (l945) 
suggests that the intense fear reactions they observed in pilots
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engaged in combat were precipitated by a single catastrophic event,
or by repeated experiences of severe,long-lasting,fear-provoking missions.
Induction of Fear in Children:
Several researchers (Bregman, 1934; English, 1929; Valentine, 1946) 
have attempted to replicate the findings of Watson and Rayner, although 
they have met with mixed success. For example, English reported three 
instances of attempts to induce fear in a child. The first replicated 
Watson and Rayner's finding using a black stuffed cat as the conditioned 
stimulus (cs) and similarly the third was successful when the conditioned 
stimulus was a shoe. However, in the second of these three cases,
English failed to produce a conditioning effect using a wooden duck 
as the CS, although it was noted that this failure could be attributed 
to the failure of the unconditioned stimulus (UCS) (striking a large 
metal bar) to elicit any fear: without an effective UCS conditioning
cannot be expected.
In Bregman's study, fifteen children (aged from eight to sixteen 
months) were used as subjects and exposed to various pairings of two 
types of UCS; negative (a loud bell) or positive (a rattle) with a 
variety of conditioned stimuli; wooden shapes and coloured cloths.
He reported that the negative UCS was effective in eliciting fear from 
the children, although the conditioned stimuli were not. Therefore 
these findings do not support two-stage model of fear acquisition.
Valentine's (1946^ findings offer only mixed support for the model.
He succeeded in producing a fear (albeit an unstable one) of a 
caterpillar in a two-year old child but failed to make her fear a pair 
of opera glasses.
The Effects of Traumatic Stimulation in Adults:
Some well controlled studies with humans suggest that avoidance 
conditioning, using 'traumatic' shock as theUCS,is possible (Turner and 
Solomon, 1962). However, few studies have examined the induction in humans
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of strong autonomic responses characteristic of fear. One study to do 
so was conducted by Campbell, Sanderson and Laverty (1964).
These researchers recorded heart rate, respiration, muscle tension 
and electro-dermal activity in a small number of alcoholics while 
subjecting them to an extremely unpleasant conditioning procedure.
The conditioned stimulus consisted of a tone which was paired with the 
effects of succinylcholine (UCS), a muscle relaxant which left them 
conscious but suspended respiration for about one hundred seconds.
The CS was presented throughout this respiratory paralysis for the 
experimental group, while two control groups received either the drug 
or the tone on its own. After one conditioning trial subjects were 
allowed to recover for five minutes and then asked to describe their 
experiences. Host drugged subjects believed they were dying.
Subsequently, all subjects were given sixty extinction trials 
during which the tone was presented alone. Interestingly, these 
researchers observed increases in these measured responses from the 
conditioning to the extinction phase for the experimental group and 
continued responding without decrement during the extinction trials. 
Indeed, on one of the trials further increases in the magnitude of all 
responses were observed. In short, these researchers had conditioned 
physiological responses which were not only resistant to extinction but 
showed increases in magnitude with repeated exposure to the conditioned 
stimulus.
Criticism of the Two-Stage Theory:
Despite this apparent wealth of evidence in support of the two- 
stage model of fear acquisition and avoidance, it became apparent that 
it could not adequately account for the observed characteristics of 
phobias (Eysenck, 1979). Indeed, it will be noted below that it fails 
to explain some of the observations discussed above which are presumed to 
support it. The criticisms of this model will be discussed under the 
following headings: persistence of phobic behaviour, selectivity, and
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single trial learning.
Persistence of Phobias
The basic premise of the Two-Stage theory is :
1) After a conditioned stimulus is paired with an aversive unconditioned 
stimulus (such as electric shock) the CS alone comes to elicit the 
conditioned fear response.
2) This conditioned fear response motivates avoidance. When this 
avoidance response is made the CS terminates, fear is reduced, and 
this reduction serves to reinforce and maintain the avoidance response.
At first sight the animal literature, as suggested above, would 
seem to provide useful support for this model, the observation of 
continued avoidance in rats apparently paralleling the persistence 
Of human phobias. For example, Solomon and Wynne (l954) observed :
'In return for a few intense shocks during acquisition 
of avoidance, dogs give back as many as six hundred and fifty 
avoidances, without showing any sign of extinction,'
This observation seems to be common in the Libsfature (see Razran 
1956 for a review; Seligman and Campbell, 1965). However, several 
researchers (Kamin, Brimer and Black, 1963; Starr and Mineka, 197?) 
have suggested that animals proficient at avoidance responding no longer 
appear very fearful of the CS. Indeed, some researchers have observed 
that such animals may actually look nonchalant before and after the 
onset of the CS and 'make avoidance responses with aplomb' (Seligman 
and Johnston , 1973). The findings of Church and Black (l95S) reinforce 
these observations. They reported that classically conditioned heart 
rate changes (presumed to be a conditioned fear response) in dogs 
largely extinguished within ten extinction trials, with substantial 
extinction occurring after the first shock omission.
These observations appear to raise serious theoretical problems 
for Mowrer's model, and cast some doubt upon the presumed parallel
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between avoiding animals in these experimental conditions and fearful 
avoidance in humans. Firstly, the question arises ; "If the fear 
response has extinguished in these animals then what is motivating 
avoidance ?" Perhaps one possible explanation is that the conditioned 
fear response has not extinguished but remains unobserved, although our 
present state of knowledge is reflected by a statement from Rescorla 
and Solomon (196?) summarising an extensive review of the literature :
'In summary, we have not yet identified any peripheral 
CRs which are necessary to mediate avoidance behaviour.'
Their solution to this problem was to suggest that the conditioned 
fear response exists as a c^ntraj. state, and thus avoidance is mediated 
by a central nervous system response rather than an autonomic nervous 
system response. Such a solution also fails however, because it 
overlooks the most crucial issue. If a conditioned response either 
peripheral or central were present in these animals then it would 
violate the Pavlovian law of extinction. What appears to be observed 
in these studies is consistent with Pavlovian laws, namely the extinction 
of a conditioned response which occurs with repeated exposure to an 
unreinforced conditioned stimulus.
In summary then, Mowrer's Two-Stage theory of fear acquisition 
and avoidance cannot account for the persistence of avoidance in animals 
as the literature seems to provide no evidence of the persistence of a 
conditioned fear response which is required to motivate such avoidance.
If such a response w-re observed it would violate Pavlovian laws of 
extinction. The model also fails to account for the persistence of 
fearful avoidance in humans for similar reasons; it does not explain 
the persistence of a fear response (presumed to motivate avoidance) 
which if classically conditioned should extinguish with repeated 
exposure to an unreinforced conditioned stimulus.
Selectivity;
Mowrer's theory also fails to account for the observation that
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the range of possible phobic stimuli would appear to be non-arbitrary 
(Seligman, 1971 ). Parenthetically, this non-arbitrary nature of
phobic stimuli may be reflected in the studies, summerized above, 
which attempted to induce fears in children, (Bregman, 1934; English,
1929; Valentine, 1946). Implicit in the two-stage theory is the premise 
of equipotentiality, a premise fairly central in Pavlov's conceptualisation 
of classical conditioning.
'Any natural phenomenon chosen at will may be 
converted into a conditioned stimulus, any visual stimulus, 
and desired sound, any odour and the stimulation of any 
part of the sldn. ' (Pavlov, 1927, p 86).
Single Trial Learning;
The Campbell et al (1964 ) study described above, suggests that 
conditioning can occur from a single trial, however it appears that 
single-trial conditioning is very rare in the laboratory (Kamin, 1969; 
Seligman, 1968). Similarly, single-trial conditioning involving 
trauma is rare in real life.
'There is usually no history of a clearly traumatic 
onset of human phobias.' (Marks, 1977)
An exception to this may be the combat fears discussed above.
However, most typically, when phobics do report single incidents of 
onset (Melville, 1977) the experience rarely seems traumatic. Such 
observations have been regarded as presenting problems for Mowrer's 
model :
'.... it is by no means clear how events that usually do not 
appear very traumatic in tie life of the patient can lead to 
such very clear-cut consequences.' (Eysenck, 1979 p 157)»
In short, it seems that in the laboratory very intense UCS 
(i.e. Campbell et al, 1964) are required for single - trial learning, 
however this does not seem to be true for the genesis of phobias.
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assuming they are conditioned.
Modifications of Mowrer's Two-Stage Theory;
The inability of the two-stage theory to adequately account for 
these various observations has prompted several researchers to suggest 
theoretical modifications. For example, several solutions have been 
offered, within the framework of the model, to account for the observed 
persistence of apparently fearless avoidance in animals. They have 
included : conservation of anxiety (Solomon and Wynne, 1954); automatisation 
(Kimble and Perlmuter, 1970); and safety-signal reinforcement (Gray, 1971; 
Howrer, I960; Rescorla and Lolordo, 196$). These concepts have been 
critically discussed elsewhere (Seligman and Johnston , 1973) and need 
not be discussed further here, for the present discussion is not 
concerned with the inability of Mowrer’s model to explain the behaviour 
of avoiding rats, but the persistence of fearful avoidance in humans; 
a point which needs to be stressed as the two lines of enquiry have been 
confused in the literature (Mineka, 1979).
Preparedness :
The observation that phobic stimuli appear to be non-random (an 
observation which violates the classical conditioning premise of 
equipotentiality), prompted Seligman (l970, 197l) to propose the concept 
of'preparedness'. This concept suggests that the most frequently 
experienced phobias are attached to stimuli which once threatened the 
survival of our ancestors, and which are now acquired via a,genetic 
predisposition. This genetic predisposition he argues, means that fears 
of 'prepared' stimuli such as snakes and spiders (presumed to be of 
evolutionary significance to our ancestors) are more readily acquired 
than fears of 'non-prepared' stimuli (e.g. shoes, cloth). Furthermore, 
fears of prepared simuli, he suggests, are more resistant to extinction 
than fears of unprepared stimuli.
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'Phobias are highly prepared to be learned by humans, 
and, like other highly prepared relationships, they are 
selective and resistant to extinction, learned even with 
degraded input and probably non-cognitive.' (seligman, 1971 
P 321).
It is interesting to note that Seligman's views are not 
entirely new. For example, Valentine (1945) in a discussion of 
the inconsistencies to be found in the literature on the induction 
of fears in children, speculated that little Albert's rat fear 
(Watson and Rayner, 1920) was
'....readily established partly because there was an 
existing innate tendency, though as yet unawakened, to 
fear the rat.'
Similarly Eysenck (l979) has suggested that the concept of 
preparedness explains the findings of Bregman (l934) and English 
(1929).
Another problem which may be explained by this concept is the 
choice of conditioned phobic stimuli. When a person experiences 
a traumatic event, or even a series of subtraumatic events, he may 
be surrounded by many possible conditioned stimuli; the question 
arises ; "Why does the spider become the phobic stimulus and not 
the bath plug ?" Seligman's concept suggests that this 'choice' 
would be determined by innate preparedness. Indeed, he suggests 
that fears of certain objects or situations seem to be 'so close to 
the surface' that when they serve as conditioned stimuli they acquire 
the fear-provoking qualities of the unconditioned stimuli far more 
readily than other stimuli. Trauma such as that caused by an injection 
of Scoline (Campbell et al, 1964 ) is not required for such learning.
The concept of preparedness also offers some explanation for the 
likely temporal imprecision of the CSyUCS pairing in real life. 
Typically, in the laboratory, CS - UCS intervals are of critical
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importance for conditioning to occur. However, in real life 
such precision is unlikely. Therefore, Seligman suggests that 
learning with a prepared CS can occur with severely degraded input, 
which in typical laboratory circumstances with a non-prepared CS 
would lead to failure.
In summary, Seligman's preparedness concept offers plausible 
theoretical solutions for several problems encountered by Mowrer's 
two-stage theory. Specifically, these problems are : the selectivity 
of phobic stimuli , the absence of a traumatic UCS, the temporal 
imprecision of the CS-UCS pairing, and the resistance of the conditioned 
fear response to extinction.
Seliman's hypotheses have generated a good deal of research, 
much of it conducted by Ohman and his colleagues. (Hugaahl, 1978;
Ohman, 1979; Ohman, Erikson, Fredriksen, Hugdahl and Olofssor^ 1974;
Ohman, Erikson and Lofberg, 1975; Ohman, Fredrikson and Hugdahl, 1978a, 
1978b; Ohman, Fredrikson, Hugdahl, Rimmo, 1976.) Before discussing 
the findings of these studies it will prove useful to describe Ohman's 
usual experimental paradigm as there seems to be some confusion in 
the literature about it (Eysenck, 1979).
Typically, Ohman's general approach was to present to normal 
non-phobic college students pairs of visual conditioned stimuli 
(slides). For each subject one of these CS (this would be counterbalanced) 
would be paired with an aversive unconditioned stimulus (mild electric 
shocks or loud noises), and at the same time autonomic activity was 
monitored (skin conductance and vasomotor responses), (Ohman, 1979).
The type of conditioned stimulus varied from study to study. However 
the general theme is a comparison of the conditionability and resistance 
to extinction of 'prepared' (e.g. snakes and spiders) and 'unprepared' 
stimuli (e.g. flowers and mushrooms).
The main finding of these studies is interesting (Ohman, 1979).
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In short, it was found that autonomic responses were readily acquired 
to both fear-relevant (prepared) and irrelevant (non-prepared) 
conditioned stimuli when they were paired with the UCS. This 
finding appears to be inconsistent with Seligman's preparedness 
concept, although the precision of CS - UCS pairing when the CS is 
fear-irrelevant may have facilitated the acquisition of responses 
to these stimuli," However,these studies do show differential rates 
of extinction to these different conditioned stimuli. Specifically, 
responses to the fear-relevant stimuli were significantly more 
resistant to extinction when compared with the responses evoked by 
the fear-irrelevant stimuli. (Responses to both unreinforced fear­
relevant and irrelevant stimuli showed rapid habituation with 
continued presentation of these stimuli.' In reference to this 
finding Ohman (l979) has stated :
'In fact, we have repeatedly failed to find any 
reliable evidence of extinction to phobic stimuli, in 
spite of relatively long extinction trials. Thus, our 
data deviates from what would be expected from traditional 
learning theory and are similar to phobias in this respect.'
(p 120)
However, these results are consistent with the notion that some 
phobic stimuli are prepared, although they tell us little about the 
nature of that preparedness. It could be argued that they reflect 
differences in previous learning history,rather than biological 
predisposition as Seligman suggests. For instance, it is highly 
likely that these subjects had been exposed to unreinforced stimuli 
such as flowers and mushrooms on numerous occasions, while exposure 
to spiders and snakes is less likely, and indeed, fear is more likely 
to be associated with these latter stimuli in Western societies.
In an attempt to control for subjects' learning histories
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Hodes, Ohman and Lang (l977) conducted a study using three classes 
of stimuli; (i) phylogenetically fear-relevant stimuli (i.e. snakes 
and spiders);(ii) ontogenetically fear-relevant stimuli (i.e. 
revolvers and rifles); and (iii) fear-irrelevant stimuli (i.e. 
household objects). The UCS was a loud complex noise, and the 
standard experimental paradigm described above was used. The 
preparedness theory would predict that subjects presented with 
stimuli in class (i) would show superiority of response acquisition 
compared to subjects exposed to the other types of stimuli (classes
(ii) and (iii) ) and also greater resistance to extinction.
Consistent with the findings of the studies discussed above, these 
researchers found that there were significant acquisition effects for 
the reinforced conditioned stimuli, regardless of the stimulation 
class. However, the pattern of extinction of these responses was 
in line with the preparedness theory: those conditioned responses 
evoked by the phylogenetically fear-relevant stimuli showed greater 
resistance to extinction compared with the responses evoked by the 
other two classes of stimuli. Ohman (l979) has suggested that :
'This result ... indicates that there might be some
evolutionary specificity to the effects observed with 
potentially phobic CS.'
Ohman's caption is warranted. It is clear that these researchers 
selected stimuli (rifles and revolvers) that are dangerous to modern 
man but were not dangerous to pre-technological man, and stimuli 
(snakes and spiders) which, we might assume, have evolutionary 
significance. However, they also differ in other respects which 
may have influenced the response. Again it might be
argued that the level of pre-exposure to these stimuli varied from 
class to class. It seems plausible to suggest that the subjects 
used in the study would have been exposed many more times to rifles
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(via television) and household items, than to spiders and snakes.
This point is important given the findings which suggest that 
nonreinforced pre-exposure to a CS significantly interferes with 
subsequent conditioning to that stimulus (MacEintosh, 1974).
Extinction may also be influenced. Of course, with regard to 
rifles or revolvers we might reflect that exposure is often 
reinforced, people are regularly shot on television. However, 
the rifle or revolver does not do the shooting but the sinister 
gangster who is operating it. Stumbling upon a rifle in a dark 
alley may evoke little fear compared to stumbling upon a man with 
a gun. The argument, essentially, is that guns per se are not 
dangerous; as inanimate objects they pose no more threat than a 
broom. This is a second point; Ohman used two classes of inanimate 
objects and one class of living creatures.
An illuminating experiment within this paradigm might involve 
the use of snakes and toads as stimuli. Both are living creatures 
and as types of both are venomous, they are, in evolutionary terms, 
potentially phobic stimuli. Assuming comparable pre-exposure, 
the preparedness theory would predict that both stimuli would elicit 
responses equally resistant to extinction. However, if there is a 
cultural influence upon conditionability and the persistence of 
these conditioned responses, we might expect that responses 
elicited by snakes show greater resistance to extinction, as snakes 
would appear to be more readily associated with harm and fear.
It would seem that further research is required to determine 
the defining characteristics of those stimuli which elicit an 
autonomic response resistant to extinction. At present, the most 
cautious interpretation of this research is that stimuli which 
are more likely to be associated with phobias are more likely, in 
the laboratory, to elicit a conditioned response with greater resistance
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to extinction than responses elicited by other types of stimuli.
Such an interpretation is consistent with the notion that humans 
may be more prepared or predisposed to acquiring fears of certain 
stimuli through conditioning, although the nature of that preparedness 
is still unclear.
Two recent papers which have reported observations of phobic 
patients are also particularly pertinent to the preparedness concept. 
One of these (Rachman and Seligman, 1976) described treatment 
programmes with two patients, one with a fear of chocolate,the 
other with a fear of vegetables and plants. It seems reasonable 
to assume that these fears are nonprepared or evolutionally neutral 
and therefore according to the preparedness concept they should be very 
responsive to treatment or,specifically, minimally resistant to 
extinction, However, this was not the case. The chocolate phobic 
failed to respond favourably to 'an intensive course of behavioural 
treatment that normally achieves a success rate of between 70 and 80^' 
(p 336), while the second patient made little progress over forty-eight 
hours of therapy in which systematic desensitisation and modelling, 
amongst other procedures, were used.
In the second paper De Silva, Rachman and Seligman (l977) 
reported the findings of a retrospective study of a large number of 
phobias treated over a five year period. The most important findings 
were that assumed preparedness was unrelated to the ease of acquisition 
of the fear and to therapeutic outcome. These researchers concluded 
that the failure to find a systematic relationship between evolutionary 
criteria of preparedness and either acquisition or therapeutic outcome 
poses serious problems for the preparedness concept.
It would seem then, that at present the preparedness concept, 
although intuitively appealing (Torgersen, 1979), does not reliably 
define those stimuli which may become phobic stimuli, or those phobias 
which are readily modifiable. Therefore, it does not help to solve the
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problems of selectivity, persistence or ease of acquisition (i.e. 
single trial learning), without becoming dangerouslycircular: 
prepared fears are those which are most résistent to modification. 
Incubation;
Eysenck, (1968, 1976, 1979) has also turned his attention to 
the persistence of phobias and the bKcoretical problem this 
observation poses for the two-stage theory. He argues for an 
extension of the theory to include two concepts; Seligman's (l97l) 
preparedness concept and the notion of incubation. He defines 
incubation as the process by which conditioned fear responses not 
only fail to extinguish, but increase with repeated exposure to 
an unreinforced conditioned stimulus. His explanation of this 
process is discussed below, however, it should be noted firstly, 
that there is some disagreement in the literature about whether this 
phenomenon exists at all. For example, McAllister and McAllister 
(1967) concluded a review of this field by suggesting that :
'Although the incubation of fear hypothesis has been 
tested in a wide variety of situations, the phenomenon has 
yet to be convincingly demonstrated.' (pl89)
More recently, Bersh (1979) has critically reviewed the few studies 
upon which Eysenck has based his arguments and found them to be 
methodologically flawed. His criticisms have also been echoed by 
other researchers who have offered alternative interpretations of 
these findings (e.g. Evans, 1976; Kimmel, 1979; Levis, 1979; 
McAllister and McAllister, 1979; Mineka, 1979). To quote Bersh (1979) 
'In general ... experimental evidence for incubation due to 
CS is not substantial. At best, incubation must be regarded 
in the words of Rohrbaugh and Riccio (l970) as an 'exceptional 
outcome' in the laboratory. The clinic appears to offer more 
frequent cases of enhancement of 'anxiety/fear', during
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treatments based upon exposure to 'fear-provoking’ 
stimuli, but the circumstances do not readily pemiit 
a determination of the precise basis for the effect 
or a clear identification of the variables which influence 
its occurrence,'
As Bersh (l979) suggests the clinic may produce evidence 
of incubation and indeed, Eysenck (l979) has not overlooked 
this possibility. However, the evidence produced to date is 
anecdotal and relies upon subjective report of fear for evidence 
of incubation. Given the observations of low correlations between 
measures of the various indices of fear (Lang, 1968; Rachman and 
Hodgson, 1974) caution must be exercised in assuming that subjective 
reports reflect changes in conditioned physiological responses. 
Similar caution must also be exercised when interpreting observations 
of avoidance behaviour (Solomon, Kamin and Wynne, 1953; Solomon and 
Wynne, 1954; Maatsh, 1959) in terms of the incubation of conditioned 
fear responses.
However, if it is assumed that the phenomenon of incubation can 
be shown to be reliably reproducible, then how does Eysenck propose 
to account for its occurrence ? He suggests (l979) that under 
certain circumstances the CS not only elicits a conditioned response 
(o r ) which has drive properties, but that this OR produces a aocwe 
response (n r ) :
'Traditionally we would denote these HRs as response 
produced stimuli, in the sense that measurable autonomic 
responses, such as changes in heart rate.,., are experienced 
by the organism as (^nteroceptive stimuli... It is not the 
CR itself that acts as reinforcer, but rather the response- 
produced stimuli; not the autonomic, hormonal and muscular 
reactions themselves but rather the experience of fear/anxiety
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based upon them. In sofar as the CR-produced stimuli 
are identical with the US-produced stimuli, it seems . 
automatic that they will be reinforcing in exactly the 
same manner, in so far as they are different they will 
also act as reinforcers to the extent that they are painful 
and aversive.' (pl6o).
These KRs, Eysenck argues, come by classical conditioning to 
evoke more fear, thus producing a positive feedback and 
enhancement of fear. He suggests the notion 'somewhat resembles 
Seneca's famous saying about having nothing to fear but fear 
itself.'
In order to explain the observations of both extinction 
and incubation of conditioned responses, Eysenck argues that both 
processes are occurring simultaneously. Usually, he suggests 
the extinction process is stronger than incubation and thus 
extinction of the conditioned response eventually occurs with 
the repeated presentation of an unreinforced C.S. However, under 
certain circumstances the extinction process may be weaker than 
the CS-NR process (described above) and observable incubation 
will result. The two variables which determine this net effect 
are the intensity of the UCS during conditioning and the duration 
of each unreinforced presentation of the conditioned stimulus.
The former variable determines the strength and therefore the 
reinforcement potential of the conditioned response; the latter 
variable • determines whether a non-reinforced conditioned stimulus 
has a net reinforcement or extinction effect. The strength of the 
CR, he argues, decreases progressively during exposure to an 
unreinforced conditio ned stimulus and if the CR strength is above 
the critical point at the time of CS-termination, the CS increases 
CR strength, i.e. incubation occurs. However, if CR strength is
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is below the critical point at the time of CS termination, the 
CS produces a decrement in CR strength, i.e. extinction occurs. 
Furthermore, the net strengthening effect of the CS increases 
with the degree to which CR strength exceeds the critical le.ve1 
at the time of CS termination)while the net weakening effect of 
the CS increases with the degree to which CR strength falls below 
the critical level.
In summary, Eysenck's (l979) model of fear acquisition and 
avoidance represents the most recent attempt to explain human 
phobias within a traditional learning theory framework. It includes 
both the concepts of incubation and preparedness, the former of which' 
has been criticised at both a theoretical and empirical level 
(Bersh, 1979), while the latter at present seems in danger of 
being circular (Gray, 1979). However, these concepts are likely 
to generate a good deal more research, which hopefully will increase 
our understanding of phobias. In the mean time, the debate 
surrounding conditioning models of phobias is likely to continue 
(Eysenck, 1979, 1980).
Criticisms of Conditioning Models;
There still exist, hoeever, issues which have not been fully 
discussed above, and which need to be addressed if a conditioning 
model of phobias in any form is to be tenable. These issues, which 
are central to a conditioning model, include the elusiveness of the 
unconditioned stimulus and the nature of the conditioned response.
The Elusiveness of the Unconditioned Stimulus;
Eysenck (1979) has suggested that: 'the rhetoric of 
conditioning paradigms does not always map easily into the 
realities of the experimental situation' and Marks (l979) has 
added : '....and maps hardly at all onto the realities of the 
clinical situation'. For example, in laboratory studies the
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UCS is easily defined (e.g. electric shock), however, such 
clearly defined UCS in real life are distinctly rare (Courney 
and O'Connor, 1971; Lautsch, 1971). In the majority of cases there 
is some sort of insidious onset without any single event that could 
be called 'traumatic' even by lenient standards (Marks, 1969; Melville, 
1977; Rachman, 1968). It is possible though, that people with 
prepared phobias (Seligman, 1970) may never be able to report a 
traumatic onset to their fears as such trauma never actually occurred.• 
However, Rachman and Seligman (1976) have reported that phobias with 
non-prepared or contra-prepared fears also fail to report a traumatic 
onset, a finding inconsistent with the preparedness theory:
'Prepared fears can be conditioned even with degraded 
input, that is with non-optimal CS-U'CS intervals, single­
trial conditioning, and relatively weak U,CS; with non-prepared 
fear this is not so,' (Eysenck, 1979).
Interestingly, Rachman and Seligman (1976) also describe the 
non-prepared fear of one of their cases as growing in intensity 
over the course of several years. This might have been what 
Eysenck has described as incubation, and if so some accoiunt of 
traumatic onset might seem more likely as he argues that incubation 
occurs 'when the UCS is exceptionally strong'.
In short, it appears that for a variety of fears there is little 
evidence of a conditoning experience. To suggest that this reflects a. 
UCS of a sub-traumatic nature (i.e. degraded input) would appear 
to make the UCS more elusive and the hypothesis of a UCS-cS pairing 
at the onset of phobias less accessible to an empirical test. Moreover it 
must also be noted that to date there would appear to be no evidence 
of conditioning in humans without an awareness of the UCS-CS contingency 
(Brewer, 1974» Dawson, et al 1979). Parenthetically, it must be 
pointed out that phobics' retrospective reports of traumatic onset 
of their fears do not provide incontrovertible proof that those
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fears were acquired through classical conditioning.
The Nature of the Conditioned Response;
The most fundamental premise of conditioning models of 
phobias, is that phobic behaviour (i.e. avoidance and subjective 
report) is mediated by a conditioned fear response. Such a 
response is generally presumed (Eysenck, 1979) to be physiological 
in nature and indeed, it is apparent that phobic stimuli can 
elicit physiological responses from subjects in the laboratory (Ohman, 
1979) and phobics in the clinic (see Sartory and Lader, 1978). 
Importantly, however, the implication of this premise is that 
fear is a unitary concept necessarily reflected by physiological 
responses (Hugdahl, I981), Such an implication is consistent 
with some models of emotion (e.g. Fehr and Stern, 1970; Schachter, 
19éU), although it seems at odds with a 'Three-Systems* 
conceptualisation of fear (Lang, 1971), which suggests that 
fear is best construed as a set of loosely coupled components, 
rather than a unitary concept. The observations (Lang 1971 ) 
which prompted this conceptualisation would seem to threaten 
the notion that a conditioned fear response is necessary for 
persistent subjectively fearful avoidance or that fearful 
avoidance is a necessary consequence of a conditioned fear response. 
This is not to say that this conceptualisation renders a conditioning 
model untenable, although it is necessary for future models to take 
account of the observed discordance between various indices of fear; 
a reformulation of both the aetiology and maintenance of phobias 
within such a framework may be required. It may also be necessary 
for conditioning theorists to concede that phobias may be acquired 
and maintained in other ways (Rachman, 1977).
Summary and Conclusions
An adequate theory of phobias must take account of a number
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of defining characteristics, these are : i) The complexity of 
fearful responses (Lang, 197l); ii) The persistence of these 
responses despite their seeming self-defeating nature (Movrer, 1939); 
iii) The random nature of phobic stimuli; iv) The role of age in 
determining the onset of phobias, and v) The difference between the 
sexes in reported fearfulness.
To date conditioning models of fear acquisition and avoidance have 
focussed upon the acquisition of conditioned fear responses (Watson 
and Rayner, 1920), the acquisition and persistence of conditioned 
fear (Mowrer, 1939) and more recently, the persistence of conditioned 
fear and the non-random nature of phobic stimuli (Eysenck, 1979).
The most recent of these models (Eysenck, 1979) attempts to rectify 
some of the theoretical shortcomings of the previous theories while 
maintaining the central premise that fear can be a classically conditioned 
response which has drive properties. It does so by drawing upon two 
concepts ; 'Preparedness* (Seligman, 1970) and 'Incubation* (Eysenck,
1979). The former concept proposes that humans are genetically 
predisposed to acquire fears more readily to certain stimuli (i.e. those 
of evolutionary significance.); and that once acquired these responses are 
resistant to extinction. The latter concept proposes that under certain 
circumstances conditioned responses will not only fail to extinguish but 
increase in magnitude with repeated exposure to an unreinforced conditioned 
stimulus. However, neither of these concepts has been received uncritically 
(e.g. Bersh, 1979 on Incubation; Gray, 1979, on Preparedness), while 
pertinent research has either been inconclusive (Ohman, 1979) or yet to 
be done (McAllister and McAllister, 1979).
To date the characteristics of age related onset and sex differences 
have not been seriously considered within a traditional learning theory 
framework, but perhaps most importantly the complex nature of fear 
(Lang, 1971) has been overlooked.
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Given the observations (Lang, 197l) that simple linear 
relationships between the indices of fear do not exist, it is now 
generally accepted (Sartory et al. 1977) that fear is best 
construed as a construct of loosely coupled and partially independent 
components. However, a conditioning model assumes that fear is a 
unitary phenomenon (Hugdahl, 198l) reflected necessarily by a 
simple relationship between physiological responses and avoidance.
This apparent conflict between these conceptualisations of 
fear is seen as having different implications for conditioning models 
of phobias. Some researchers (Hugdahl, 198l) have suggested that it 
renders conditioning models untenable, while others (Rachman, 1977) 
have more cautiously suggested that the complexity of fear responses 
in phobias may reflect several modes of acquisition i
'If the analysis of the three components  ^ are applied 
to the pathways to fear acquisition we can hazard the 
speculation that in fears acquired by a conditioning process, 
the components which will be most markedly involved are the 
psychophysiological and behavioural, with the subjective 
component playing a minor role. In the case of fears 
transmitted indirectly (i.e. vicariously or informationally) 
one might expect the subjective aspect to be predominant 
and the psychophysiological changes and behavioural effects 
to be comparatively minor.' (p 385)
Finally, it seems reasonable to conclude, as Rachman suggests, 
that a conditioning model in some form may be able to account 
for the aetiology and maintenance of some fears but not others. 
Therefore, it seems reasonable at present to speculate about other 
possible explanations of phobias. Some of these are considered in 
the following chapters.
1 Behavioural, Physiological, Subjective.
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CHAPTER 2
TEE ROLE OF COGNITIONS IN THE AETIOLOGY AND MAINTENANCE OF PHOBIAS
The problems generated by theories developed within a traditional 
learning theory framework, have prompted several researchers to consider 
the possible role of cognitive mediation in the acquisition of fear and 
avoidance in animals, (i.e. Hilgard and Marquis, 1940; Osgood, 1950; 
Ritchie, 1951; Seligman and Johnston, 1973.)
Ritchie, for example, was quick to recognise that the observed 
(e.g. Solomon and Wynne, 1954 ) high resistance of avoidance responses
to extinction would present a problem for the S-R reinforcement theories. 
As an alternative to these theories he sug ested that the extinction 
data could readily be explained in terms of Tolmanian 3-3 expectancies.
He proposed that an animal in a traditional one-way shuttlebox avoidance 
situation expects to be shocked in the goal box,and during the extinction 
an asymptotically avoiding animal will avoid before his expected shock 
arrives, so this expectancy willnever be disconfirmed.
More recently, Seligman and Johnston (l973) have proposed a 
cognitive theory of avoidance learning in animals based upon the ideas 
of Irwin (l97l) and like Ritchie, with clear origins in the work of 
Telman (l932).
They suggest that avoidance learning can be explained by resort 
to two concepts ; one cognitive, the other emotional. The emotional 
component, they propose, is based upon a classically conditioned fear 
response which may be considered to be eitkr peripheral or central in 
nature. However, unlike the two-stage theory (Mowrer, 1939) this response, 
or more specifically its reduction, is not required to reinforce and 
maintain avoidance. I4aintenance of avoidance is a function of the 
cognitive component. This component makes use of pairs of act-outcome 
expectancies and a corresponding preference between outcomesÎ
'In our theory, an expectancy is a hypothetical construct:
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a state of the organism which represents (stores
information about) contingencies between responses and
outcomes in a given situation. The general form of this
three-term expectancy is S ; rEO, which is read: it is
expected that in given situation (s) a given response (r)
leads to an outcome (o). A preference is also a hypothetical
construct: a state of the organism which controls the
choice of response on the basis of outcomes expected. The
general form of the preference is 0^ PO^ which is read; one
outcome (C\) is preferred to another outcome (Ci).'l Seligman and Johns toTA,
 ^ 1973)
With resort to these two clearly defined components, Seligman 
and Johnston account for avoidance learning in animals in the 
following way: when a conditioned stimulus is paired with shock, 
a fear response is classically conditioned; this is the emotional 
component. With subsequent presentations of the unreinforced CS 
this response, in accord with Pavlovian laws, will extinguish.
However, the animals continued avoidance will be maintained by 
the expectation that shock follows the CS and a preference for not 
experiencing shock; this is the cognitive component. As the animal 
learns to avoid shock, the contingency of CS - no shock (if the shock 
is omitted) is never sampled and therefore the expectancy generated 
by the initial CS-UCS pairings is never disconfirmed.
These researchers discuss in some depth the data their theory 
explains, some it fails to account for, and its implications. However, 
these arguments are not relevant to this discussion. What is of 
relevance is, the possibility that concepts such as preferences and 
outcome expectancies might prove useful in explaining the aetiology 
and maintenance of fearful avoidance in humans.
A Qbgnitive Model of Phobias :
Seligman and Johnston's theory proposes that the classical
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conditioning procedure generates an expectancy. Specifically, 
the organism expects the UCS to follow the CS if no response is 
made. They do state, however :
'We are not offering a new analysis of the classical 
conditioning process. In particular, we are not asserting 
that it is mediated by expectations of any kind.' (p 96)
In this statement of neutrality theee authors leave open for 
debate two basic possibilities, a) Classical conditioning is an 
automatic unconscious process, with awareness of the CS-ÜCS contingency 
being an epiphenomenon, or b) awareness of the contingency may play 
a necessary causal role in coniitioning.
It is interesting to note that Seligman and Johnston did not 
turn their attention to these possibilities, for they have certain 
implications for their theory. Assuming the truth of the first 
possibility, the implication appears to be that the physiological 
component of fear (c r ) and avoidance are the product of independent 
mechanisms: the first some automatic reflex, the second an expectancy. 
The first then, can extinguish in accord with Pavlovian laws while 
the second can persist. However, if it is assumed that awareness of 
the CS-Wcs contingency is a necessary prerequisite for conditioning 
to occur, then the implication is that both the physiological and 
behavioural components of fear are a function of the same hypothetical 
construct, namely, the expectation that the UCS follows the CS. If 
this is the case, the question arises ; \fhy does avoidance persist 
and fear (the physiological component) extinguish ? If the expectancy 
of shock persists, as Seligman and Johnston suggest it does in avoidance 
learning, then it follows that both avoidance and physiological responses 
should persist.
For their explanation of the persistence of fearless avoidance 
in animals to be tenable, the first of the two possibilities must hold.
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However, the persistence of fearful avoidance in humans (phobias) 
would be more adequately explained by the second possibility. 
Specifically, we might speculate that some human phobias have their 
origins in the experience of Cj-ucs pairings which generate the 
expectancy that UCS will follow CS. Given that the individual has 
a preference for not experiencing the UCS, this expectancy will 
mediate between the CS and the fear response. Such fearful avoidance 
would persist as long as the individual entertains such expectancies 
and preferences.
Several predictions follow from this 'cognitive conditioning 
model'. Firstly, the central tenet of this suggestion is that an 
awareness of the cs-ucs contingency (i.e. an expectation that the 
UCS will follow the Cs), is necessary for establishing and maintaining 
conditioned fear responses. Given this assumption we would expect 
that phobics would be able to describe a conditioning experience as 
the onset of their fears, and also the expectation which maintains 
their fear response to the phobic stimulus.
With regard to the central assumption stated above, there appears 
to be some controversy in the literature about the role of awareness 
of the CS-'U.CS contingency in acquiring conditioned responses. In 
1975 Martin and Levey suggested :
'On the whole, current opinion is that verbalised 
awareness of stimulus relationships is not necessary for 
conditioning to occur, even though a strong causal relationship 
has been established between cognitive variables and the rate 
of classical conditioning and extinction.* (p 284).
7n the same year Brewer (l974) argued that awareness of stimulus 
contingencies is an important and perhaps essential aspect in 
establishing human conditioned responses. In his review of the literature 
he suggested that there was no convincing evidence for conditioning 
without awareness. This argument has more recently been supported by
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several other researchers. (Grings,1979; Dawson, Catania,
Schell and Grings, 1979; Dawson and Furedy, 1976; Ohman, 1979.)
For example, Dawson et al interpreted their recent findings thus :
'The present results, when considered in combination 
with the previous results, clearly implicate the importance 
of cognitive factors in the establishment of human 
autonomic classical conditioning. It appears essential 
therefore, to better understand the specific sequence 
of cognitive processes which occur during classical 
conditioning.'
However, whether or not conditioned responses can be acquired 
to phobic stimuli without awareness^is a question which must still 
be answered empirically. It would be interesting to examine this 
question using the experimental paradigm described by Dawson et al,
(which was designed to test for a 'pure' non-cognitive level of 
learning), and potentially phobic CS (i.e. snakes, spiders).
The findings of Dawson et al's study and the logic of the cognitive 
model discussed above, would suggest that responses to the phobic 
CS would only be acquired if subjects could verbalise an awareness 
of the CS-WCS contingency.
If, for the moment, it is assumed that awareness of the CSrdCS 
contingency is necessary for the acquisition of conditioned fear 
responses, then what of the other predictions detailed above ?
Firstly, the prediction that phobics would be able to describe a 
conditioning experience as the onset of their fear. î'^rks (l969) 
has suggested that most phobias are characterised by an insidious 
onset with no evidence of a UCS. However, both Rimm et al (l977) 
and Murray and Foote (l979) have reported that some of the fearful 
students they questioned ascribed their fears to conditioning 
experiences. More recently, Ost and Hugdahl (l98l) reported that
1 This is one of the predictions of Seligman's (l97l) preparedness concept,
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over 50% of their patient sample described conditioning experiences 
to which they attributed their fears. It must be noted that these 
observations do not prove that conditioning experiences caused the 
fears of these subjects, although they are consistent with such an 
interpretation.
The second prediction, namely that phobics would be able to 
describe the expectations which maintain their fear, receives some 
support from Beck (1976). Based mostly upon his clinical observations, 
he has argued that :
'....when patients... with phobias are questioned carefully, 
it becomes apparent that they....are afraid not of a 
particular situation or object in itself, but of the consequences 
of their being in the situation or in contact with the object.
A person with a phobia of heights indicates that he is afraid 
of falling, a person with a phobia of social situations 
states that he is afraid he will be humiliated or rejected.'
(p 167)
Beck also suggests that in many of these instances, the onset 
of the patients' fear and expectations, involved some sort of trauma 
being associated with the phobic stimulus. Such observations are 
consistent with the notion that fears are maintained by expectations 
of harm which were possibly generated by a conditioning experience 
(i.e. phobic stimulus plus trauma). However, an alternative 
interpretation is possible. Specifically, it could be argued that 
these patients' 'expectations* are post hoc rationalisations of 
their fears.
It would seem then, that no convincing evidence exists to suggest 
that some phobias are a function of expectations of harm which result 
from a conditioning experience. Therefore at present such a notion 
must remain a plausible possibility.
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Phobias and the Transmission of Information:
The failure of traditional conditioning models (see Chapter I) 
to adequately account for all phobias, has also prompted Rachman 
(1976) to suggest that researchers acknowledge two possible alternative 
'pathways* to fear.
Acquisition through instruction;
The first alternative proposes that fears can be transmitted and 
acquired via information giving and/or instruction. This possibility, 
Rachman suggests,has been 'strangely overlooked - despite the fact 
that it is obvious, or perhaps because it is too obvious' (p 193). 
Information giving he argues, is an inherent part of child-rearing, 
carried on by parents and peers in an almost unceasing fashion, 
probably providing the basis for many of the commonly encountered 
fears of everyday life.
One advantage of such a theory is that it is flexible enough
to account for the fact that people display fears of situations and
objects which they have never encountered. Furthermore, it enables
us to explain some, but by no means all, of the failures to acquire
fear in situations where it might, according to conditioning theory, 
(Eysenck, 1979) have been expected to arise. Not only might individuals 
learn by information and instruction which stimuli to fear, but also 
l e a m  to distinguish those stimuli which are not to be feared.
Such a process may account for the observation of the non-random nature 
of phobic stimuli. It also seems reasonable to suggest that such a 
means of fear acquisition is of particular value for survival. For 
example, there is little opportunity for learning directly that 
snakes or venomous toads are dangerous, indeed if we did have to rely 
upon direct experience it might be our last.
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When considering the evidence to support this theory Rachman 
(1978a) suggests :
'Persuasive evidence, if persuasion is needed, should 
not be difficult to collect. In theory it is a simple 
matter of demonstrating that people who begin with no fear 
of object X display signs of such a fear shortly after being 
informed that X is dangerous. The following two examples are 
chosen from a host of possibilities in the hope that they
are both clear and convincing. In the first of our hypothetical
experiments, a group of trainee laboratory workers are 
introduced to specimens, and animals in a pathology laboratory. 
After confirming the absence of significant fear, half of the 
trainees are informed (correctly) that direct contact with 
specific contaminated animals and specimens is dangerous and 
may cause them to acquire lethal diseases. At least a degree 
of fear will be transmitted in this way.' (p 194).
Such work would clearly prove illuminating, however, several 
studies already exist which lend support to the notion that phobias
may be acquired through the transmission of information. These
studies fall into two categories: those which asked subjects to 
describe the onset of their fears retrospective studies - and those 
which illustrate the physiological effect of instructions which create 
an expectancy of aversive stimulation - instructed conditioning studies 
Retrospective Studies:
In their study, Murray and Foote (l979) analysed the responses 
of sixty snake phobic (snake avoiders) undergraduates to a twenty-item 
(7 point scale) que':.tionnaire which consisted of two parts. The first 
ten questions dealt with the components of fear of snakes, while the 
second part concerned the origin of this fear. They interpreted their
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data to suggest that direct conditioning did not seem to account
for the majority of snake fears. Instead, the results seemed to
suggest that different observational or instructional experiences
were responsible for the acquisition of their fears.
The second part of this study shed some light upon the nature
of these experiences. These researchers administered the same
questionnaire to a second sample of one hundred and seventeen
undergraduates, thirty-five of whom vrere classified  ^ as high-fear
subjects and eighty-two as low-fear subjects in relation to snakes.
In this sample of subjects they found little evidence of personal
experience with snakes. Indeed the correlational analysis (r = -.25)
suggests that the more experience people have with snakes the less
they fear them. However, those subjects who described their
experience as frightening tended, not surprisingly perhaps, to be
generally more fearful of snakes (r = .53)* Of greater interest is
the nature of these frightening experiences; most of them were
described as startling, while none involved being touched or harmed
by a snake. Indeed, only three of the total sample reported having
been bitten by a snake and all of them were in the low-fear group.
Again Murray and Foote interpreted this data as offering little
support for the notion that snake fears were acquired by direct
conditioning experiences. Instead the responses of these subjects
suggest (consistent with those of the first sample), that fear of
snakes may be acquired through a variety of observational and
instructional experiences vhich communicate negative information
about snakes. For example, they found positive correlations between
2
a general fear of snakes and items on their questionnaire such as ;
1 This classification was determined on the basis of their scores 
on a ’snake fear questionnaire'.
2 Determined by the snake questionnaire.
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'snake stories' (r = .34), and parental warnings about snakes and 
similar negative information from films, television, books and 
newspapers (r = .32).
Rimm et al (l97?) similarly asked snake phobic students about 
possible learning experiences. Their results also suggest that snake 
fears may be acquired through instruction/information, although in 
contrast to Murray and Foote's finding, the percentage of their 
sample reporting such an onset ' as small. Among forty-five subjects 
interviewed, sixteen attributed their fear to direct experience, 
thirteen could recall no experience, nine reported no specific 
experiences, three reported vicarious experiences and four reported 
verbal instructions. Interestingly then, almost half of the sample 
(twenty-two) wei-^  unable to account for their fears in terms of 
learning experiences, while twenty-three subjects were able to do so. 
Among this latter group, conditioning experiences were more often 
described vs 30^) than indirect experiences. Unfortunately,
these researchers gave no details of these experiences.
More recently, Ost and Hugdahl (l98l) asked a sample of 
phobic patients about the onset of their fears. They too found that 
a number of this sample, albeit a small minority (lO.4>0 reported 
that they acquired their fears through instruction or verbal information.
In conclusion, these findings are consistent with Rachman's (l976) 
suggestion that some fears may be acquired via information giving and 
instruction. However, we should be cautious about over-emphasising 
the value of such retrospective reports. It is possible that these 
researchers have been tapping post hoc rationalisations of fearfulness.
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Instructed Conditioning Studies:
The hypothesis (Rachman, 1976) that phobias may be acquired via 
instructions^ also receives some indirect support from research 
demonstrating the physiological effects of instructions which 
create an expectab'\oAof aversive stimulation*
The experimental paradigm usually employed in these studies, 
involves attaching recording electrodes and a 'shock* electrode 
to the subject and telling him that every time the light comes on 
he will be shocked. Using such an 'informed pairing design*, 
researchers have sho/n that instruction alone is sufficient in 
producing a conditioned physiological response to a neutral 
stimulus (e.g. Deane, 1969; Epstein and Clarke, 1970) and that such 
responses (gSR) are similar to those acquired by subjects who had 
actually received electric shock as the UCS (Bridger and Mandel, 
1964). Furthermore, these studies (e.g. Epstein and Clarke, 1970) 
have shown that subjects' conditioned responses are a function of 
the intensity of the aversive stimulus which they expected to follow 
the CS.
It seems reasonable to speculate then, that the fearful 
responses observed in human phobics could have been acquired in a 
similar way. Specifically, through instruction which creates an 
expectation that aversive stimulation will follow phobic stimulus.
However, Bridger and Mandel's (I964) findings suggest that 
this experimental procedure does not provide a useful analogy for 
the maintenance of phobias. In their study a conditioned GSR was 
acquired by groups of subjects via instruction or direct conditioning 
(i.e. CS+ threat of shock versus CS + shock). In the second phase 
of the study the conditioned stimulus was presented after the shock 
electrode had been removed. During this extinction phase these 
researchers observed a gradual extinction of response in those
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subjects who had received shock, whereas snihjects wnder threat 
of shock showed almost immediate extisictloa. A second s fcuiüij 
by Bridger and Handel (1965) confirsaed these findings even when, 
suspicious subjects in the shock grouip, who thouight that they 
might still receive shocks via the G32 electrodes were removed 
firoQ the analysis. Several other researchers have jreported 
similar findings (e.g. Chatterjee and Erikson, 1962; Uotteman, 
Schoenfeld and Bersh, 1952; Wilson, 1968). Such findings are at 
odds with the common clinical observation that phobias are lisüially 
insensitive to rational arguments about the reality of ezpcsure to 
phobic stimuli. Telling phobics that exposure will not lead to harm, 
i.e. 'informed unpairirtg', does not lead to the extinction of phobic 
responses (e.g. Leitenberg, 1976; E-îarks, 1969). However, a more 
recent study by Rugdahl (l9T3) suggests that instructions can 
create a physiological response résistant to an inicmed unpairing 
extinction procedure; the crucial element appears to he the nature 
of the conditioned stimulus. In his study neutral and potentially 
phobic CS (i.e. spiders and snakes) were presented to subjects and 
paired with either threat of shock, or a shock ïïCS- Subsequently, 
subjects were informed that presentations of the CS would not he 
followed by shock (i.e. extinction phase). The results show that the 
Instructions had a differential effect upon the extinction of conditioned 
skin conductance responses. Specifically, responses to the potentially 
phobic CS showed greater resistance to extinction than those elicited 
by the neutral C3> regardless of how the response was established.
We might tentatively conclude from lugdahl's findings, that the 
tranifflisiion of information through instruction which creates an 
expectation of harm following exposure to a potentially phobic stimulus, 
may result in phobic behaviour. However, it must be noted that the 
criticismi levelled at Ohman's studies (see Chapter l) also apply to
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Hugdahl'a work. Specifically, Hugdahl suggests that the observed 
differential extinction rates, reflect the potentially phobic nature 
of one class of CS (i.e. snakes and spiders). However, while it is 
apparent that these stimuli (snakes and spiders versus circles and 
triangles) do differ in terms of their potential as phobic stimuli, 
they also differ in other respects. Respects which may have 
influenced subjects' prior learning histories and which may also 
account for Hugdahl's findings (Bandura, 1977; Delprato, 1980).
For instance, Bandura (l977) points out :
'In every day life, houses and faces are repeatedly 
correlated with neutral and positive experiences as well 
as with negative ones, whereas references to snakes ai-e
almost uniformly negative,' (p 76).
Similarly, circles and triangles are likely to have been 
correlated with neutral experiences for Hugdahl's subjects, whereas 
as Bandura suggests, snakes and probably spiders may have acquired 
more negative connotations. Such prior experience may have influenced 
the observed extinction rates in Hugdahl's study. Parenthetically, 
it must be stressed that the suggestion is not that phobias are 
culturally or socially determined, rather than biologically prepared, 
but simply that prior experience of these stimuli may have influenced
the observed rates of extinction. A further point is that the degree
of prior exposure to these stimuli is likely to have been different for 
these subjects and again, a possible influential factor in the 
extinction of conditioned responses. Finally, it is apparent that these 
stimuli also differed in an obvious, but perhaps important respect: 
circles and triangles are inanimate shapesj spiders and snakes are 
living creatures.
The recent findings of McNally (l98l) also suggest caution in
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interpreting Hugdahl's results. In his study, McNally presented 
subjects with two fear-relevant stimuli; a picture of a snake and 
a picture of a spider. The first phase of the experiment involved 
pairing one of these stimuli with a shock UCS for each subject.
They were told that only one stimulus would be reinforced. Following 
a series of twelve discrimination learning trials, subjects were 
informed that the CS-UCS contingency would be reversed: specifically, 
that shock would no longer follow the previously reinforced stimulus 
but might follow the previously unreinforced stimulus. Actually no 
further shocks were delivered. This instructional manipulation 
produced an immediate reversal of the conditioned electrodemal 
response curve. In short, subjects began to respond to the stimulus 
which they expected might be followed by shock, while responses to 
the previously reinforced stimulus extinguished.
McNally suggests that these findings are inconsistent with those 
reported by Hugdahl and inconsistent with the hypothesis that responses 
conditioned to fear-relevant stimuli are insensitive to cognitive 
manipulations.
The implication of the findings appears to be that physiological 
responses acquired in laboratory conditions are not similar to those 
persistent responses which characterise phobias. Under certain 
circumstances (i.e. the reversal procedure used by McNally) conditioned 
responses to potentially phobic stimuli do extinguish following cognitive 
manipulations, while phobic behaviour appears to be insensitive to 
such simple instructions.
In conclusion, it seems apparent that although a theory of fear 
acquisition based upon instruction is intuitively appealing, there is 
no direct evidence to support it. The studies discussed above suggest 
beyond little doubt that physiological responses can be acquired 
through instruction. However, the inconsistent findings (i.e. Hugdahl,
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1978; McNally, 198l) related to the rate of extinction of these 
responses, casts some doubt upon the notion that they are 
comparable to those experienced by phobics. Continued research 
within the instructed conditioning paradigm will prove interesting 
and hopefully shed some light upon the apparent contradictions 
between the findings of McNally and Hugdahl. Similarly, research 
along the lines suggested by Rachman (ibid) would prove illuminating, 
although for ethical reasons will most probably not be conducted.
The Vicarious Transmission of Fear:
The other 'pathway' to fear which Rachman (1978a) suggests researchers 
should acknowledge, is the vicarious transmission of fear.
'The significant advances made in our understanding of 
processes of observational learning and modelling made it 
plain that we acquire much of our behaviour, including 
emotional responses, by vicarious experiences. It is 
probable that fears can be acquired either directly or 
vicariously....' (p 189)
More specifically he proposes that individuals may acquire 
fears and phobias of once neutral stimuli through the observation 
of the threatening, painful or fear-provoking effect of these 
stimuli on others. However, at present, the evidence to support 
such an intuitively appealing notion is indirect and anecdotal.
It comes from retrospective studies, clinical observations, and 
experiments investigating the phenomenon of vicarious classical 
conditioning.
Retrospective Studies:
The evidence which suggests that phobias may be acquired through 
observation is sparse. However, some retrospective studies (Murray 
and Foote, 1979; Ost and Hugdahl, 1981; Rimm et al. 1977) have been 
conduc ted which offer some support for this notion.
In their study, Murray and Foote questioned subjects about
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the origins of their fear of snakes. They found that a group 
of snake phobics reported significantly more observations of 
another person being frightened or harmed by a snake, than a 
group of low fear subjects. Furthermore, their analyses show 
a significant positive correlation (r =*26) between the degree 
of snake fear reported and the number of such observational 
experiences. Rimm et al also questioned snake-fearful subjects 
about the onset of their fears. They found that a small number 
of their sample (three out of forty-five) attributed their fears 
to an observation of someone being harmed by a snake. In a 
more recent study, Ost and Hugdahl (198I) reported that 17^ 
of a sample of one hundred and six phobic patients, recalled 
vicarious experiences as initiating their fears.
These findings then, are consistent with the notion 
(Rachman, ibid) that phobias can be acquired vicariously.
However, it must be noted that alternative interpretations of 
these data are possible. For example, it is possible that some 
phobics, in the absence of a ready explanation, attribute their 
fears post hoc to particular vicarious experiences.
Clinical Observations:
Some anecdotal evidence reported by clinicians is also 
consistent with the notion of phobias being acquired vicariously. 
For exemple, Wolpe (198I) recently reported:
'People may fear worms, flying insects, doctors or 
hospitals because they have observed a parent consistently 
show fear to these things. A family I encountered had 
three adolescent daughters with widespread fears of 
insects from watching their mother go into a panic every 
time she saw one.' (p 37)
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¥hile such reports are interesting and probably similar 
to the observations made by many clinicians, the support they 
offer for a theory of fear acquisition through observation 
should not be over-emphasized*
Vicarious Classical Conditioning;
In laboratory investigations of vicarious classical 
conditioning (e.g. Berger, 1962; Bandura and Rosenthal, 1966), 
a subject typically observes a model undergoing an 'aversive' 
conditioning procedure. Specifically, the model is presented with 
a neutral stimulus and shortly afterwards displays pain cues, 
supposedly in response to unconditioned aversive stimulation, while 
the subject watches. The main thrust of the research findings 
is that the conditioned stimulus alone comes to elicit a conditioned 
physiological response from the observer, even though he has not 
experienced aversive stimulation directly.
Such findings seem to be consistent with the notion that the 
physiological concomita^.nts of fear may be acquired vicariously. 
However, further research is needed to determine whether physiological 
responses acquired in this fashion are resistant to extinction, and 
therefore,similar to those observed in phobics. Furthermore, research 
is needed to determine whether subjective and behavioural fear 
responses can be acquired vicariously and similarly, whether they 
show resistance to extinction.
Another issue, which need only be mentioned briefly here, 
concerns the mechanisms by which responses are acquired vicariously. 
The implication of Rachman's (l978a) suggestion is that the vicarious 
transmission and acquisition of fear involves the transmission of 
information about the phobic stimulus. So for example, we might 
speculate that the observation of seeing someone appear frightened 
when being bitten by a dog, conveys to the observer the information
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that being bitten by a dog is a frightening experience. If 
such an expectation is entertained by the observer it may 
generate fear upon subsequent exposure to dogs. However, it 
could be argued that the acquisition of conditioned physiological 
responses through observation can be explained in terms of 
conditioning independent of cognitive mediation. Indeed, this 
seems to be the suggestion in Bandura's (1965) discussion of 
vicarious classical conditioning.
In short, there is a need to determine the degree of 
similarity between responses acquired vicariously in the laboratory 
and those observed in phobics. Furthermore, there is a need to 
explore  ^ the mechanisms by which these responses are acquired.
Attribution of Physiological Arousal and the Aetiology of Phobias 
Another suggestion which implicates the role of cognitive 
mediation in the acquisition of phobias, has been offered by 
Asso and Beech (l975). They suggest that phobias may be acquired 
through a process of attribution when the individual is already 
in an adverse state :
'bhen individuals experience spontaneous surges of 
physiological arousal, which are not prompted by environmental 
events, they may attribute the experienced disturbance to 
some cue external to themselves.'
Unfortunately, the study reported by these researchers does 
not test the hypothesis that phobias may be acquired in such a way, 
although the notion, which has clear origins in the work of Schachter 
and his colleagues (e.g. Schachter and Singer, 1962; Schachter, 1966) 
deserves some attention.
1 Bandura's (l977) model of observational learning may provide 
a useful conceptual framework for such research.
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Summary and Conclusions;
The apparent failure (Rachman, 1976) of theories developed 
within a traditional learning theory framework (see Chapter l), to 
adequately account forthe acquisition and maintenance of all fears, 
has prompted several researchers to offer alternative explanations 
(e.g. Rachman, 1978a). Those described in the present chapter share 
a common theme; specifically, they implicate the role of cognitions 
in both the aetiology and maintenance of fears, although they offer 
different explanations for how these cognitions are generated.
The proposal which evolved from Seligman and Johnston’s 
(1973) ideas was that some phobias may be maintained by an 
expectation that harm will accrue from exposure to the phobic 
stimulus. It was argued that this fear-generating expectation may 
result from a direct conditioning experience, i.e. phobic stimulus 
plus trauma. In contrast, Rachman (l97S) has suggested that fears 
may be transmitted and acquired indirectly through instruction 
and observation, although similarly these proposals implicate the 
role of expectations in maintaining fears acquired in this fashion. 
Lastly, the suggestion (Asso and Beech, 1975) that phobias may be 
acquired through a process of attributing physiological arousal 
to phobic stimuli, also necessarily implies the involvement of 
cognitive processes.
A discussion of relevant research findings andclinical 
observations, suggests that there is no convincing evidence to 
support these proposals, although the evidence to date is 
consistent with these ideas. Therefore, it must be concluded that 
at the present time, these proposals must remain plausible possibilities.
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CHAPTER 3
COGNITIONS AîTD THE MAINTENANCE OF PHOBIC BBHAVICUR;
The conditioning models of fear acquisition and maintenance 
discussed in the first chapter, may be seen to reflect a long 
philosophical tradition which has discounted the possible role of 
cognitions in emotional behaviour (Averill, 1974).
Averill (l974) suggests that this influential philosophy has 
its origins in the ideas of the Greek philosopher Anaxagoras.
In his discussions of the concepts of mind and body, Anaxagoras 
conceived of the mind largely as an agent of rationality  ^ and 
described it as without passion. Emotional reactions on the other 
hand, were seen as unpremeditated, intuitive and impulsive. They 
were then, regarded as antithetical to rational behaviour and 
therefore pertaining to the physical (body) aspect of the human 
organism and consequently non-cognitive.
This particular theme is seen to 'trail through the centuries' 
(Brett, 1962) incorporated in the philosophies of Plato, Aristotle 
and Descartes. (See Averill, 1974, for a discussion of these 
philosophies.)
More recently, this conceptualisation of emotions has been 
apparent in the writings of Fehr and Stern (l970), James (I890), 
Lange (I885), and Wenger (l950). They have also argued that
1 'Rationality being the weighing of evidence by appeals to 
general principles and according to standards of inference; 
standards which may be explicit, e.g. rules of logic, or 
which may be largely implicit and unformulated but nonetheless 
recognisable.' (Averill, 1974)
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emotional reactions are primarily physical (in terms of ANS 
activity), with the subjective experience of these reactions being 
purely tangential. Similarly, the most prominent theories of 
phobias (Eysenck, 1979) stress the central role of ANS activity 
in mediating phobic responses and place no reliance upon 
cognitions.
However, several writers have suggested that phobias are 
cognitively mediated (e.g. Beck, 1976; Ellis, 1977; Meichenbaum,
1977; Rachman, 1978). Those proposals which implicate the role 
of cognitions in both the acquisition and maintenance of phobias 
were discussed in the previous chapter (i.e. Rachman, 1973; Seligman 
and Johnston, 1973). In this chapter the views of Ellis, Beck 
and keichenbaum will be considered. These writers have emphasized 
the role of cognitions in maintaining phobias and have offered 
sug estions about the nature of these mediating cognitions.
Interestingly, the theories proposed by these writers rest 
upon a premise which can also be traced back to an early philosopher:
'Men are disturbed not by things, but by the views 
they take of them.' (Epictetus, quoted by Meichenbaum,
1977, p 183)
Such a conceptualisation is also reflected albeit in a more 
sophisticated way, in more recent discussions of the psychology of 
emotions (e.g. Arnold, I960; Lazarus, 1968).
Ellis' Rational Emotive Therapy;
Ellis (1977) has recently enumerated seventeen imprecisely 
stated hypotheses generated by his rational emotive therapy. However, 
the major premise of this theory of emotional disturbance, which has 
been central to Ellis's ideas for over twenty years (Ellis, 1958; 1962), 
is that thinking mediates emotional states ;
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'In terms of the RET of emotion and personality,
A (an activating event or activating experience) does not 
exclusively cause C (an emotional consequence) in the gut.
B (people's beliefs about A) more importantly and more 
directly contribute to (or 'cause') C .  (Ellis, 1977, p 3)*
More specifically, Ellis (l977) asserts that irrational 
or maladaptive beliefs or thoughts, produce the negative affect 
characteristic of neuroses such as phobias. Conversely, rational 
thoughts are seen to result in positive emotional states. By 
irrational beliefs, Ellis (l977) means those thoughts which are 
either empirically false, or of such a nature that they cannot 
be empiric€\W'_/ verified. Parenthetically, it is interesting to note 
that Ellis (1977) believes that humans have a biological predispositicn 
toward irrationality. He also suggests that individ'^oAsj given this 
predisposition, may acquire patterns of irrational self-verbalisations 
and beliefs, by imitating the overt verbal behaviour^ of significant 
others. Such an idea is not too dissimilar from Rachman’s (1978) 
notion that fears can be acquired through instruction.
In terms of phobic behaviour, Ellis (1962) stresses the critical 
mediational role of catastrophizing; simply stated, one says to 
oneself that something terrible is going to happen and then experiences 
fear and avoidance. The following example more clearly illustrates 
Ellis' position. Consider the dog phobic who sees a dog in the street. 
This is a simple observation of an environmental stimulus which may 
be accompanied by the self-verbalisation: 'There is a dog in my path.' 
The second self-verbalisation may be an inferential statement with 
regard to this observation: 'That dog is likely to bite me.' The third 
thought would be an evaluative conclusion; 'That would be horrible.'
In Ellis's scheme of things irrational thinking (where thinking 
is equated with self-verbalisations), is seen in the inference (dogs
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do not usually bite people) and in the conclusion (being bitten 
by a dog, while somewhat painful, is not horrible). He also assumes 
that fear originates not with the observation, but with the inference 
and the catastrophic evaluative conclusion.
Empirical Support for Ellis' RET of phobias;
Ellis' ideas have received a good deal of attention from a 
number of researchers (Ellis, 1977). Some of this research has 
focused upon the basic assumption that emotions are mediated by 
self-verbalisations, while other researchers have examined the 
relationship between specific cognitions and particular affective 
states. The research relevant to a cognitive mediational model 
of phobias is discussed below. Consistent with the^e lines of 
enquiry, it is presented under the following headings: correlational 
studies; studies examining the physiological correlates of self­
verbalisations; and studies examining the effects of self-verbalisations 
on mood.
Correlational Studies:
A series of studies conducted by David Rimm and his colleagues 
(Ri,mm, 1973; Rimm, Saunders and h'estel, 1975) appear to offer some 
support for the notion that phobias are cognitively mediated. They 
found that when it was suggested to subjects that they are engaging 
in fear-provoking thoughts in the phobic situation, most, with some 
prompting, were able to provide reports of self-verbalisations having 
a content which would be expected to evoke fear. However, such evidence 
by no means constitutes incontrovertible proof that self-verbalisations 
mediate phobic behaviour. Indeed, the fact that subjects reported 
self-verbalisations may reflect nothing more than the obvious demand 
characteristics of these studies.
In a more recent study Rimm, Janda, Lancaster, Nahl and Dittmar 
(1977) attempted to minimise such effects. They asked subjects to
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imagine themselves approaching and confronting the phobic situation.
While subjects were engaged in this activity they were simply asked 
whether they were experiencing any thoughts or images and if so, to 
relate the content. Their analysis of th^se data revealed that 
significantly more subjects reported self-verbalisations than did not. 
These self-verbalisations were categorised as follows : 'objective 
description', 'catastrophizing', 'thoughts of avoidance', 'labelling 
of emotion', and 'not classified'. Subsequent analyses revealed that 
the content of those self-verbalisations reported while'imagining 
approach' did not distinguish between subjects. However, those 
reported while subjects were imagining being in the phobic situation 
did. Specifically, all but three of the reports fell into three of 
the categories : ^catastrophizing' (l9); 'thoughts of avoidance' (25); 
and 'labelling of emotion' (14). A definitive interpretations of these 
data are difficult, although Rimm et al s^rggest :
'The most obvious conclusion is that phobic subjects 
imagining themselves in phobic situations typically do 
not engage in self-verbalisations which are of a veridical 
or objective nature.'
In terms of Ellis' Rational Emotive Theory, it is interesting 
to note that while 'catastrophizing' (e.g. 'I am going to fall') 
was not infrequent, such thoughts clearly did not predominate. A 
comparable number of subjects reported self-verbalisations which 
do not readily fit into Ellis' simple mediational model. Parenthetically, 
it is interesting that Rimm et al. do not regard emotional-labelling 
self-verbalisations (e.g. 'I am afraid') as being of a veridical 
nature.
One final point of interest to emerge from Rimm et al's study 
concerns the nature of the relationship between self-verbalisations 
and fear. These researchers asked their subjects whether, in real
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life, the thought or fear came first when they w ere exposed to 
the phobic stimulus. Twenty-three of the subjects reported worrying 
first, eighteen reported feeling fear first and four reported that 
affect and cognitions occurred concurrently. Evidence then that 
cognitions invariably, or even usually, precede negative effect 
in fearful subjects was not found.
A more recent study by Lohr and Rea (l93l) also failed to 
find any clear-cut relationship between fear of speaking in public 
and irrational beliefs. They did find a statistically significant 
correlation (r = .23) between 'demand for approval' and fear of 
public speaking, although as they point out the percentage of the 
variance accounted for is minimal. It must also be noted that this 
'belief' failed to distinguish between high and low fe^r public 
speakers.
In conclusion, it is apparent that these research findings 
do not consistently support the contention that particular self­
verbalisations are related to phobias. Furthermore, when 
catastrophizing self-verbalizations have been related to fear, the 
nature of that relationship has not been clear (Rimm et al. ibid)
There is certainly no convincing evidence for Ellis' (1962) 
suggestion that such thoughts cause fear.
Studies Examining the Physiological Correlates of Self-Verbalisations :
Ellis' basic assumption that self-verbalisations can elicit 
emotional responses has been more directly examined in several studies 
(Craighead, Kimball and Rehak, 1979; Rimm and Litvak, 1969; Rogers and 
Craighead, 1977; Russell and Brandsma, 1974). The general strategy 
typically involves asking subjects (usually from non-clinical 
populations) to engage in negative or irrational self-verbalisations.
At the same time physiological responses to these seIf-verbalisations 
are monitored and recorded. Subsequently, these responses are compared
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to those elicited by neutral self-verbalisations, positive 
self-verbalisations or both.
Of these studies, two offer some support for the notion that 
negative self-verbalisations elicit a greater emotional response 
than neutral self-verbalisations (i.e. Rimm and Litvak, 1969;
Russell and Brandsma, 1974).
In their study, Rimm and Litvak presented experimental group 
subjects with negative sentence triads of the form; observation 
(e.g. *My grades may not be good enough this semester’). Inference 
('I might fail out of school') and Conclusion ('That would be awful').
A control group similarly received sentence triads but of a neutral
nature, e.g. 'Inventors are imaginative.... Edison was an inventor....
therefore he was imaginative.' ^ comparison of subjects' physiological
responses to these sentence triads, revealed a significantly greater 
respiration rate and depth for the experimental group, although GSR 
failed to distinguish between the groups. Of more interest however, 
is the failure to find differential responses to the sentence type 
for experimental group subjects. This finding is contrary to Ellis' 
prediction that emotional arousal is a function of inferential and 
conclusive self-verbalisations.
More recently, the findings of Craighead, Kimball and Rehak (1978) 
failed to support the pivotal assumption of RET, namely, that negative 
self-verbalisations elicit emotional arousal. In the first of three 
experiments these researchers instructed two groups of subjects to 
visualise scenes of social rejection. One of these groups contained 
students who had scored extremely high on the social approval scale 
of the irrational beliefs test (Jones, 1968), while the other group 
consisted of low scorers. While imagining their scenes the high- 
irrational subjects emitted significantly more negative self-referent 
statements than their low-irrational counterparts. However, contrary
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to predictions from the RET model, no differences were obtained 
in terms of positive self-statements, self-report of emotional 
arousal, or physiological arousal.
The findings reported by Rogers and Craighead also challenge 
the notion that a simple causal relationship exists between 
negative self-verbalisations and emotional reactions. In this 
study, subjects cognitively rehearsed self-referent statements 
while physiological responses were monitored. The self-statements 
had been chosen to reflect identified problems and were either 
positively or negatively valenced. In addition, the self-statements 
varied in the extent of their discrepancy from the subjects' personal 
beliefs about themselves. The important finding from this investigation 
was that there were no differences between either positively or 
negatively valenced self-statements and neutral self-statements on 
any physiological response (heart rate, finger pulse volume, skin 
conductance). The only significant finding was an interaction between 
valence and discrepancy of self-statements, which was reflected in the 
measure of skin conductance. Specifically, negative self-statements 
of moderate discrepancy generated grec\Ver arousal than moderately 
discrepant but positive self-statements. Rogers and Craighead concluded 
that the relationship between cognitions and emotional arousal is 
more complex than that proposed by Ellis. They also extended this 
conclusion to their critical review of the literature.
due to the inconsistent and unreplicated findings 
among these studies, the simple generalisation that 
experimentally induced self-verbalisations have definite 
emotion-arousing effects has not been empirically demonstrated.'
In terms of phobias then, it would seem that there is no direct 
or indirect evidence to support the notion that the supposed self­
statements entertained by phobics (Ellis, 1977) elicit physiological 
responses indicative of fear.
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Studies Examining the Effects of Self-Verbalisations on Mood;
A number of studies have also used the basic experimental 
design described above, to evaluate the effect of self-verbalisations 
On mood state (e.g. Craighead, Kimball and Rehak, 1979; Veiton, 1968). 
For example, Velton, who originally developed this experimental 
procedure (Velton, 1968) had subjects read self-referent statements 
that varied in content, reflecting either elation, depression or 
neutrality. He found that such a procedure had a significant effect 
upon measures of reaction time and writing speed which, he presumed, 
reflected mood state. Indeed, a post-experimental questionnaire 
supported such an interpretation, suggesting that the depression and 
elation treatments had respectively induced depression and elation. 
More recent findings (see Rimm and Master, 1979, for a review) also 
seem to be consistent with the notion that self-verbalisations can 
produce a depressed mood. However, Craighead et al were unable to 
show differences in reported moods between high- and low-irrational 
subjects following visualisation of social rejection scenes, although 
the former group emitted significantly more negative self-referent 
statements.
The reason for such apparent inconsistencies in the literature 
is not altogether clear, although the bulk of the evidence does 
suggest that negative self-verbalisations may induce a depressed mood. 
However, to date there is no evidence to suggest that self­
verbalisations produce subjective anxiety or fear.
In conclusion, Ellis’ (1962) notion that phobic behaviour is 
mediated by catastrophizing self-verbalisations has not been supported 
by research findirgs. It is apparent (Rimm et al. ibid) that such 
self-verbalisations are not invariably or even usually entertained 
by phobics when o^V^^there is no evidence to suggest that they 
may cause subjective or physiological responses indicative of fear.
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Beck’s Theory of phobias;
Beck (1976) has suggested that a good deal of theorising 
about phobias has been misguided by a common assumption which 
is illustrated in a statement by Friedman (l959) ;
’A phobia is a fear which becomes attached to 
objects or situations which objectively are not a source 
of danger, or, more precisely are knoivn by the individual 
not to be a source of danger.’ (p 293).
Beck (1976) does agree that when the phobic is away from the 
phobic stimulus he believes it to be relatively harmless (see 
chapter 1, page l). However, he argues that as the phobic 
approaches the phobic stimulus, the idea of its dangerousness 
becomes progressively greater until it completely dominates 
his appraisal of that stimulus;
'His belief switches from the concept 'it is 
harmless' to the concept, 'it is dangerous' '(Beck,
1976, p 164.)
To support this suggestion that phobics have a 'dual belief 
system’, Beck draws upon his own clinical observations ;
'I have tested this observation many times by asking 
phobic patients to estimate the probabilities of harm.
At a distance from the phobic situation, for example, a 
patient may state that the possibility of harm is almost 
zero. As he approaches the situation, the odds change.
He goes to 10 per cent, to 50 per cent, and finally in 
the situation, he may believe 100 per cent that harm 
will occur.’ (p 164).
Those observations are interesting and add to our 
knowledge of phobias. They are also consistent with Beck’s 
contention, which like Ellis, states that phobics are not afraid 
of a particular object per se, but the consequences of being
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exposed to that situation or object# The consequence being,
Beck suggests, physical or psychological harm. So for example, 
a person with a fear of heights is afraid of falling, while an 
individual with a fear of social situations is afraid of humiliation, 
or rejection.
Beck also suggests that many of his patients' expectations 
of harm can be explained in terms of a traumatic experience 
involving the phobic stimulus ;
'The traumatic phobias illuminate the conceptual 
processes involved in the formation of fears. As a 
result of the traumatic experience, the person radically 
revises his estimate of the dangerous potential of the 
situation or object. He now conceives as harmful a 
situation previously regarded as relatively innocuous.'
(p 184).
The similarity between Beck's ideas and the model of phobic 
behaviour which developed from Seligman and Johnston's (1973) 
cognitive theory of avoidance behaviour, is readily apparent 
(see Chapter 2).
However, it must be stressed that Beck's anecdotal evidence 
should not be overemphasized. Indeed, his observations do not 
necessarily imply the simple causal relationship between fear 
and expectations of harm (i.e. expectations of harm - fear) 
which he suggests. For instance, it is possible that an increase 
in the experience of fear (expressed physiologically and subjectively) 
influences expectations of harm.
Imagery and Phobic behaviour;
A further aspect of Beck's theorizing which deserves some 
attention, is his suggestion (Beck, 1976) that imagery may play 
a role in the maintenance of phobias. He argues that the phobic.
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instead of self-verbalising his expectation of harm, may experience 
it in imagery form. So for example, a person with a fear of 
heights may imagine falling when close to a cliff's edge, and then 
experience fear.
Interestingly, there is some evidence (May and Johnson, 1973) 
which suggests that self-generated images of words of an affective 
nature, produce physiological changes and subjective reports of 
emotional experience. However, to date there is no empirical 
evidence to suggest that phobics generate fear-provoking images of 
impending harm when exposed to the phobic stimulus.
Meichenbaum*3 S peculations upon the Role of Cognitions in the 
Maintenance of Phobias;
Self-verbalisations (or 'internal dialogue') are also central 
to Meichenbaum's (l977) ideas about the maintenance and modification 
of maladaptive behaviours such as phobias. However, his suggestions 
about the nature of these mediating cognitions are somewhat different 
to those of Beck and Ellis. He has similarly argued that appraisals 
of external stimuli may have physiological effects, however, he 
suggests that it may be the subsequent appraisal of these internal 
events (i.e. physiological responses) which determines behaviour : 
'The present theory postulates that it is not the 
physiological arousal per se that is debilitating but rather 
what the client says to himself about that arousal that 
determines his eventual reactions.' (Meichenbaum, 1977,
p 208).
Simply stated, the suggestion appears to be that some phobics 
are afraid of being afro^ld. However, to date there is little more 
than casual observations (Meichenbaum, 1972; Wine, 1970, 197l) to 
support Meichenbaum's contention. One typical example, cited by 
Meichenbaum, involved the self-verbalisations of a test-anxious 
subject;
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' "I'm really nervous; I'm sweating; others 
will see it; I can't handle this." ' (Meichenbaum,
1977, p 208).
In conclusion, Meichenbaum's suggestion must remain an 
intuitively appealing possibility until more convincing research 
is carried out.
Summary and Conclusions;
The arguments of Ellis, Beck and Meichenbaum have been presented 
which suggest that phobic behaviour is mediated by cognitions which 
have been variously labelled ; irrational beliefs; self-verbalisations; 
imagery; internal dialogue. Ihile their arguments do not exhaust all 
those presented in favour ofthis notion (e.g. Bandura, 1977) they do 
represent the mainstream of thought. Their ideas also form the basis 
for much of the clinical work with phobics which is referred to as 
cognitive behaviour therapy.
The research which their ideas have generated has been discussed 
in relation to phobias. It fails to provide convincing support for 
the notion that appraisals of internal or external stimuli (in the f o m  
of self-v.rbalisations or imagery) precede or cause the physiological, 
behavioural or subjective correlates of fear.
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CHAPTER 4
THE KODIFICATION OF FE/.RFIJL BEHAVIOUR THROUGH COGNITIVE INTERVENTIONS ;
Several writers, most notably Beck ( 1976)., Ellis (1977) and 
Keichenbaum (1977) have argued that phobias are mediated by self- 
verbalisations of one sort or another. However, the conclusion 
reached in the previous chapter was that there is no convincing 
evidence to support this notion. To date, the empirical evidence 
suggests t:.at cognitions do not invariably, or even usually, precede 
fearful behaviour (e.g. Rimm et al. ibid ). Furthermore, when 
cognitions can be seen to precede fearful behaviour (e.g. Beck,
1976) their role in producing this behaviour is not altogether 
clear.
Despite this gap in our knowledge, the idea that cognitions 
mediate both adaptive and maladaptive behaviours (e.g. phobias) 
has assumed a central role in the development of a number of varied 
clinical interventions (e.g. Beck, 1976; Ellis, 1977; Goldfried, 1977; 
Meichenbaum, 1977). These interventions have been fully described 
by their originators and by other writers (Rachman and Wilson, 1961; 
Rimm and Masters, 1979), who have also discussed the various 
conceptual and procedural differences between them,
A detailed discussion of this literature is not warranted here. 
Relevant issues will be considered only where they have a direct 
bearing upon the main focus of this chapter, namely the controlled 
outcome research  ^ which has evaluated the efficacy of various 
interventions upon particular behaviours, i.e. rat, snake, spider 
and public speaking fears. Furthermore, much of this outcome 
research does not readily fall into these therapeutic categories 
(e.g. Ellis’ rational emotive therapy or Meichenbaum's self-
1 A more extensive review of the outcome literature has been provided 
by Barrios,and Shigetomi,(l980);Rachman and Wilson (198I); and 
Rimm and Masters (1979).
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instructional training), described in the general texts and 
therefore requires specific description.
In this review, several major questions are considered : 
firstly - "Do cognitive interventions significantly influence 
these targeted behaviours ? Specifically, do they reduce snake, 
rat, spider and public speaking fears ?" Secondly, "What is the 
nature and composition of effective interventions ?" Thirdly,
"Do these effective interventions shed any light upon the mechanisms 
of their effect ?"
The Effects of Cognitive Interventions upon Snake, liat and Insect Fears 
The first half of this chapter will deal with those studies which 
have examined the effects of various cognitive interventions upon 
snake, rate and spider feurs. These studies are not r adily 
classified in terms of the interventions investigated, therefore, 
for ease they will be discussed under the following headings :
Studies presenting cognitive interventions via instruction, and
Studies presenting cognitive manipulations via models.
Studies Presenting Cognitive Interventions via Instruction;
Severals tudies have examined the efficacy of cognitive
interventions which have been presented to fearful subjects via 
instruction. (D'Zurilla, Wilson and Nelson, 1975; hvans, 1977; 
Meichenbaum and Cameron, 1975; Odom, Nelson and Wein, 1978; Tori 
and Ward, 1975; Wein, Nelson and Odom, 1975).
In their studies. Tori and Worell (l975) assigned snake-phobic 
college students to one of five groups : 'specific cognitive*;
'general cognitive'; 'high expectancy'; 'counter conditioning'; and 
a no-treatment control group. On post-test and follow-up assessments 
of approach behaviour and subjective reports of fear, these 
researchers found the two cognitive and 'high-expectancy' groups 
to be significantly superior to the other two groups, but not
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different from each other. They concluded that subjects' 
reductions in fear and avoidance behaviour were a function of 
being exposed to 'a set of sensible and structured scientific 
procedures which convinced them that they would be able to 
approach the feared object with greater equanimity.* They 
suggested that such procedures created an expectancy of therapeutic 
effect and a demand to show increased approach behaviour on a 
snake 3AT and also to report less subjective fear.
However, while such non-specific variables may have 
influenced the behaviour of subjects in all of the treatment groups, 
because they were not procedurally isolated the magnitude of their 
effect cannot be determined. For instance, the behavioural change 
of the 'high-expectancy* subjects may be just as readily attributable 
to a number of other procedures which comprised this condition, i.e. 
instructions and practice in relaxation and imagery of pleasant 
scenes. Similarly, subjects in the 'cognitive* conditions were 
exposed to a number of procedures which may have been responsible for 
the observed reduction in their fearfulness. These treatments 
included; cognitive relaxation instructions and the rehearsal of 
these instructions; muscle relaxation and practice at relaxation 
after performing a W.A.I.S. task and while imagining successful 
interaction with a snake. In summary, little can be concluded from 
these findings about the relative effects of a number of procedures 
and presumed non-specific variables.
Meichenbaum and Cameron (1975) also examined the effects of 
multi-component interventions upon the rat and snake fears of a 
sample of college students. This involved assigning these subjects 
to one of five treatment groups; stress inoculation; self-instructional 
training; systematic desensitisation; anxiety relief; and a no­
treatment control.
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The stress inoculation procedure involved ; (l) a discussion 
of stress reactions (with an emphasis on the labelling and 
attribution of physiological responses, and arousal-inducing 
self-statements); (2) relaxation training (presented as an 
active coping skill); (3) instructed practice in the emission 
of coping self-statements, and (4) supervised practice in 
utilising the above coping skills in an actual stress situation 
(e.g. an unpredicitable shock situation). Subjects in the self- 
instructional group received identical training, except for the 
supervised practice in a stress situation.
The data analyses of approach scores and subjective reports 
of fear for both post-treatment and follow-up assessments, 
revealed the stress inoculation condition to be significantly 
superior to all other conditions in reducing both rat and snake 
fears.
A series of studies conducted by Nelson and her colleagues 
(D'Zurilla, Wilson and Nelson, 1975; Odom, Nelson and Wein, 1978; 
Wein, Nelson and Odom, 1975) evaluated the effects of a treatment 
procedure they labelled 'cognitive restructuring'. This procedure 
involved a 'perceptual relearning' and 're-labelling' of fear and 
fear responses. Specifically, subjects were given four theoretical 
explanations for their fear  ^ (i.e.'perceptual relearning'), and 
encouraged to perceive and modify the irrational bases of their 
own fears, (i.e. 're-labelling').
1 Watson and Raynor's (1920) conditioning theory, acquisition 
through modelling and imitation - Bandura and Walters (1965), 
cognitive labelling - Schachter and Singer (1962) and perceptual 
learning - Hebb (1946).
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in the first of their studies, D'Zurilla, Wilson and 
Nelson (l975) employed this procedure to control for nonspecific 
factors in two experimental conditions (i.e. systematic desensitisation 
and graduated prolonged exposure), which were being examined for 
their effects upon fear of rats in college students. The results 
revealed that only graduated prolonged exposure resulted in 
significant reductions in avoidance behaviour compared with a 
no-treatment control, although no significant differences existed 
between the treatment groups. However, on a self-report measure 
of anxiety, only the cognitive procedure resulted in significant 
improvements compared with controls. Again no differences emerged 
between this and the other treatment conditions on this measure.
In a subsequent study, Wein, Nelson and Cdom (1975) compared 
the effects on snake phobic behaviour of cognitive restructuring (CR), 
verbal extinction (YN), systematic desensitisation (SD) an attention- 
placebo control (AP) and a no-treatment control (NC). Their data 
analyses revealed that cognitive restructuring was as effective 
as systematic desensitisation in reducing avoidance behaviour and, 
as in their previous study, it was found to be superior to no 
treatment in reducing self-reported fear. Systematic desensitisation 
did not differ from attention-placebo or no treatment controls on 
this measure. It is also interesting to note that there was no 
differential improvement among the five conditions on the measure 
of heart rate.
These researchers also took a measure of subjects expectations 
of improvements at various points during treatment. Their analysis 
revealed no significant differences between the groups for pre­
treatment ratings and ratings taken after the first session.
However, analysis of ratings taken after the sixth and last 
treatment session produced a significant main effect. Post-hoc
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comparisons of treatment means (no-treatment subjects were 
excluded) indicated that subjects in the cognitive restructuring 
condition rated themselves more likely to improve than subjects 
in the verbal extinction and attention-placebo conditions.
Similarly systematic desensitisation subjects expected to 
benefit more than verbal extinction and attention-placebo subjects. 
Interpreting these results, Wein et al. suggest
'The fact that the particular treatments to which 
the subjects were exposed influenced their expectations 
of benefit after the last session, but not on the other 
two occasions, indicates that the subjects became 
increasingly cognizant of changes (or absence of changes) 
that were occurring as treatment progressed. Since there 
was no difference among the conditions on predictions of 
i. provement following the explanations of the various 
treatment procedures and rationales, all of the groups 
can be viewed as equivalent in thd. r effects upon the 
non-specific therapy factors of expectancy and demand.*
The third study in this series (Odom, Nelson and Wein,
1978), compared cognitive restructuring (c r ) with guided 
participation (GF), systematic desensitisation (SD), verbal 
extinction (VZ), an attention placebo (AP) and a no-treatment 
control (NC). Once again the subjects were snake-fearful college 
students.
Their analyses revealed that guided participation produced 
significantly more approach behaviour than the five other groups, 
while systematic desensitisation and cognitive restructuring were 
significantly more effective on this measure than verbal extinction, 
attention placebo and no-treatment. Verbal extinction produced
-  8 0  -
significantly greater approach behaviour than attention placebo 
and no-treatment. Analysis of subjective reports of fear 
revealed that guided participation was significantly superior 
to all groups, while cognitive restructuring and verbal extinction 
were more effective in reducing subjective fear than systematic 
desensitisation, attention placebo and no-trea onent.
Interestingly, and in contrast to the findings of their 
previous study, these researchers found that heart rate scores 
at post-test were differentially effected by the six treatments. 
Specifically, post-hoc comparisons of means indicated that heart- 
rats scores ware significantly lower for the cognitive restructuring 
condition than all other .conditions. Scores for the systematic 
desensitisation group were lower than those for subjects in the 
attention placebo and no-treatment conditions, while verbal 
extinction produced lower heart rates than guided participation 
at ention placebo and no-treatment.
Unfortunately their previous study lacked sufficient detail 
regarding the heart rate measure to allow meaningful comparisons with 
these subsequent findings.
In contrast to these studies which have investigated the 
effects of multi-component cognitive interventions, a recent study 
by Evans (l97?) examined the effect of one particular component 
of Meichenbaum's self-instructional training programme. Specifically, 
Evans tested the hypothesis that the rehearsal of positive coping 
self-statements is sufficient to reduce spider-avoidance. This 
hypothesis evolved from Meichenbaum's (l977) emphasis upon the 
therapeutic role of coping self-statements. An emphasis which is 
illustrated by the following quotation :
•Although I agree with Thorngate's (1976) analysis 
that we do not always have to think before we act, I
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believe that if we are going to change a behaviour 
we must think before we act. Such thinking (i.e. the 
production of inner-speech) deautomatizea the maladaptive 
behavioural act and provides the basis for providing 
the new adaptive behaviour.' (p 210)
Interestingly, Evans found that those subjects who had 
prepared themselves for feeling afraid by rehearsing positive 
coping self-statements, evidenced significantly less fear on 
a behavioural avoidance test than controls.
Summary and Conclusions (Also see Table l)
The results of these studies consistently suggest that 
cognitive interventions are significantly superior to no-treatment 
controls in reducing subjective fear. Similarly, the bulk of 
the evidence suggests that these interventions are more effective 
than no-treatment in reducing avoidance behaviour. Only one 
study (D'Zurilla, Wilson and Nelson, 1975) failed to find such 
an effect.
Physiological measures were used in only two of the studies 
reviewed and have provided inconsistent results which are difficult 
to interpret.
It seems reasonable to conclude then, that cognitive interventions 
can significantly reduce the subjective and behavioural concomitants ' 
of fear in insect, rat and snake fearful college students.
In addition, the comparisons made by Nelson and her colleagues 
between cognitive restructuring and other interventions, revealed 
that this procedure was superior to systematic desensitisation and 
graduated prolonged exposure in reducing subjective reports of fear, 
but inferior to guided participation. In terms of avoidance.
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cognitive restructuring was found to be comparable with systematic 
dasensitisation but inferior to graduated prolonged exposure and 
guided participation.
However, what is particularly interesting about these findings 
is that the effective multi-component interventions are procedurally 
quite different and also appear to differ in emphasis. For instance, 
Meichenbaum’3 stress inoculation procedure emphasizes the role of 
positive coping self-statements in reducing fear, while D'Zurilla*s 
cognitive restructuring intervention is similar to Ellis' rational 
emotive therapy, with its emphasis upon challenging the irrational 
beliefs presumed to mediate phobias. Interestingly, however, those 
interventions do share a common element which may be critical for 
change. Wein et al (ibid) make this point in a discussion of their 
findings :
'A parsimonious explanation for the effects of cognitive 
therapies in modifying both verbal and motor behaviour, as 
occurred with the cognitive restructuring treatment in the 
present study, is that internally generated seIf-statementa 
serve to cue appropriate motor behaviour.'
This suggestion appears to echo Heichenbaum's argument which 
was quoted above :
'... Thinking ...... deautomatizes the maladaptive behavioural
act and provides the basis for providing the new adaptive 
behaviour.' (p 210)
In short, these researchers are suggesting that self-statements 
are a critical component in their therapeutic interventions; guiding 
new adaptive behaviours in place of maladaptive behaviours such as 
phobias. This emphasis upon the therapeutic role of self-statements 
is further underscored by the findings from E}vans' (l977) study.
- b$ -
The Effects of Modelled Self-instructions;
Meichenbaum (l97l) has reported a study which examined the 
effects of various model characteristics upon the fearfulness of 
snake phobic observers. He argued that one of the factors which 
influences fearful observers’ imitation of a model, and hence the 
reduction in their fearfulness, is the degree of perceived similarity 
between model and observer. Specifically, the hypothesis is that the 
greater the perceived similarity, the greater the imitation.
In order to test this hypothesis the subjects in this study 
observed either a ’coping' or a 'mastery' model. The coping model 
he suggested, is similar to the fearful observer in that he or she 
initially demonstrates anxious hesitant behaviour and then 
subsequently overcomes anxiety to interact with the snake.
Therefore, the prediction was that this model would facilitate 
greater imitation and hence greater reductions in fear, than a 
mastery model who, unlike the fearful observer is able to demonstrate 
fearless interaction with a snake.
He also suggested that learning coping behaviours through 
observation would be further facilitated if the coping model 
were to explicitly model coping self-statements. In order to test 
this hypothesis two groups of subjects observed silent models (either 
coping or mastery), wliile another two groups observed a coping or 
a mastery model verbalise self-statements appropriate to their 
behaviour. Specifically, the coping model emitted statements 
self-instructing to cope with the physiological concomitants of 
fear and remain calm and relaxed by taking deep breaths, while in 
contrast the mastery model produced statements which reflected 
their overt behaviour, e.g. '’I'll put my hand in the cage and stroke 
it (i.e. the snake) first."
1 This argument is consistent with the suggestions of several 
researchers, e.g. Bandura, Ross and Ross, 1965; Flanders, 1968.
- 86 -
Meichenbaum's analyses revealed that subjects who had been 
exposed to coping models, whether the models verbalised or not, 
displayed significantly more approach behaviour on an avoidance 
test than subjects who had observed mastery models. Furthermore, 
analysis of experimenter's ratings of subjects' fear and hesitancy 
on the initial approach responses of the BAT, also suggest that 
the coping model groups were significantly less afraid than 
'mastery model' subjects. However, similar ratings suggest that 
only those subjects in the coping plus self-verbalisation condition 
experienced significant reductions in fear during final approach 
responses.
Similarly, subje :tive measures of fear experienced during 
the BA.T suggest that while mean scores for all groups showed a 
decrease from pre- to post-treatment assessment,only subjects who 
were in the coping plus verbalisation condition experienced significant 
reductions in fear.
In a more recent series of studies Kazdin (l975, 1974a, 1974b), 
also examined the effects of various model characteristics upon 
the behaviour of fearful observers. However, unlike Meichenbaum 
(1971), Kazdin used covert as opposed to overt models. Specifically, 
he asked subjects to imagine various types of models. Parenthetically, 
Kazdin (1974a) has argued that observational learning is primarily 
concerned with the process by which response elements are symbolically 
coded, rather than the form by which response information is presented. 
Thus, the presentation of live o r filmed models is unnecessary for 
modelling effects as long as the covert processes which guide 
behaviour can be altered. Indeed, to date there is some evidence 
(Cautela, Flannery and Hanley, 1974) to suggest that overt and covert 
modelling procedures are equally effective in reducing the fearfulness 
of observers.
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Similar to Meichenbaum (l97l) however, one of the characteristics 
varied by Kazdin in each of these studies was fear-relevant model 
similarity. Specifically, he compared coping and mastery models, 
although interestingly, his coping model conditions were more 
similar to Meichenbaum*s coping plus self-verbalisations model, 
in that they included statements aimed at coping with fear. He 
included the following instructions in his coping model conditions: 
'Imagine that the person (model) puts on the gloves 
and tries to pick up the snake out of the cage. As the 
person is doing this he sort of hesitates and avoids 
grasping the snake at first. He stops and relaxes himself, 
feels calm, and picks up the snake.'
In Kazdin's (l973) first study, sixty-four snake-fearful 
college students were matched on pre-treatment snake avoidance and 
randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions: (l) covert 
coping model; (2) covert mastery model; (3) scene control, and (4) 
delayed treatment control. The scene control group visualised 
scenes of snake approach without any model interaction, while 
delayed treatment control subjects simply received pre- and post­
assessments .
Post-treatment data analyses revealed that the two covert 
modelling groups achieved significant improvements in snake 
approach performances and subjective indices of fear. Furthermore, 
both modelling groups were superior to the scene control and delayed 
treatment control conditions. Moreover, the coping model condition 
was significantly more effective than the mastery model in improving 
approach behaviour. These improvements were maintained at a three- 
week follow-up assessment, while scene control subjects showed no 
change.
In the second of these studies Kazdin used a similar 
assessment format and a 2 x 2 factorial design in which fear- 
irrelevant model similarities (age and sex) were crossed with 
fear-relevant similarity (coping versus mastery).= An exposure- 
only control group (i.e. scaae control) was again utilised.
Kazdin’s findings suggest that the efficacy of the covert 
model depended upon fear-irrelevant similarities. Subjects who 
imagined a model similar in age and same sexed, performed 
significantly better than subjects who imagined a model who was 
older and opposite sexed. This main effect of irrelevant model 
similarity was consistently demonstrated across measures of approach 
behaviour, and subjective reports of fear. However, of the two 
groups which imagined a model similar in age and same sexed, 
those who also imagined a model similar in the fear-relevant 
dimension, i.e. a coping model, tended to show greater change. 
Specifically, at post-treatment these subjects showed significantly 
more approach behaviour and less anxiety (Anxiety Checklist: 
Zukerman, I960) than subjects who had imagined a similar mastery 
model. However, at follow-up the former subjects were 
significantly different from the latter on the approach test 
only. As with the previous study the exposure only control group 
failed to evidence any improvement.
The same experimental design was used by Kazdin in the third 
study to examine the effect of model identity, i.e. imagining 
oneself versus another person, upon fearful behaviour. His 
results suggest that the efficacy of covert modelling was not 
reliably effected by the identity of the model. However, as with 
the previous studies, the findings underscored the superiority of 
the imagined coping model over the mastery model in reducing fearful 
behaviour.
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Summary  ^ and Conclusions:
The results of these studies suggest that both live and covert 
models are effective in reducing the fearful behaviour of observers.
In addition, they suggest that certain model characteristics 
influence the subsequent behaviour of the observer. The most 
important of these appears to be the similarity between model and 
observer in terms of age and sex. Specifically, subjects who 
imagined (Kazdin, 1974a) a model similar in these respects showed 
the greatest reductions in fearfulness, while models who were 
dissimilar in age and sex were no more effective than controls. 
Interestingly, however, Kazdin's findings suggest that imagining 
oneself as the model is no more effective than imagining a similar 
other. Parenthetically, both models and observers in Meichenbaum's 
(1971) study were female.
The second influential characteristic examined in these s tudies 
was the fearfulness of the model. The results suggest with some 
consistency that a coping model is superior to a mastery model; 
given that the models are similar in age and same-sexed.
Both Kazdin (1974a) and Meichenbaum (l97l) have suggested that 
one of the factors responsible for the efficacy of the same age/sex 
coping model in reducing fear, is the perceived similarity between 
the observer and the model. The main thrust of their argument is 
that this perceived similarity may facilitate the imitation of those 
modelled strategies which help observers to cope with their fearfulness 
and behaviour adaptively, i.e. interact with the phobic stimulus. 
Furthermore, Meichenbaum suggested that when these strategies are 
made explicit by models self-verbalisations, this learning process 
is further enhanced.
1 Also see Table 2,
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However, while these suggestions have some intuitive appeal, 
two points must be noted. Firstly, the degree of perceived 
similarity between models and observers in these studies can only 
be inferred, as these researchers did not directly measure this 
variable. Secondly, the suggestion that observers learned adaptive 
coping strategies, or self-statements from coping models, can again 
only be inferred. No systematic attempt was made by these researchers 
to determine whether subjects were actually using modelled self- 
statements to guide their performances. However, Meichenbaum did 
note that some observers spontaneously imitated coping tactics during 
post-testing, in his study. ■
These points are important (and underscore the need for more 
research), as Bruch (1976) has recently suggested that the efficacy 
of the coping model is explicable in terms of information about 
response consequences, rather than the provision of coping statements : 
'Possibly, a coping model's gradually more daring 
approach behaviour, increases the salience of response 
consequences to observers more than the benign performance 
of a mastery model. The inherent 'contrast effect' of a 
coping model's performance may increase attending to the 
absence of negative consequences thus augmenting positive 
expectations for performing.'
In short, the suggestion is that the observer learns more readily 
from a coping model that aversive consequences will not accrue from 
interaction with the phobic stimulus. Parenthetically, this argument 
assumes that phobic behaviour is mediated by such expectations.
It could be argued that this explanation accounts for the efficacy 
of Meichenbaum's coping model, although it fails to account for the 
superiority of the coping plus self-verbalisations model in his study. 
Similarly, it is difficult to see how Bruch's suggestion may account
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for Kazdin's findings. The subjects in his studies were simply 
asked to image the coping model picking up a snake and not explicitly 
instructed to image the absence of negative consequences. It cannot 
be assumed that such imaging disconfirmed any expectations about 
handling snakes.
Kazdin's (l974b) findings also raise another interesting point 
regarding the mechanisms by which covert models are effective. He 
noted an intriguing lack of correlation between imagery vividness 
and the reduction in observer's fearfulness. Whether this non­
correspondence reflects the absence of a relationship between these 
variables, or the crudeness of imagery assessment methods remains 
to be seen. However, if it is veridical, we are faced with a complex 
question regarding the manner in which covert models produce 
therapeutic change. Indeed, the obvious implication would be that 
imagery of covert models is not necessary for change. We might 
speculate then, that the use of coping self-statements, like those 
included in Kazdin's coping model conditions, can effectively reduce 
fearfulness.
In conclusion, the results of the studies reviewed in this and 
the previous section suggest that a variety of interventions can 
effectively reduce fearful behaviour in college students. Furthermore, 
these studies implicate the role of self-statements in actively 
producing behaviour change. However, only one of these studies 
(Evans, 1977) has directly tested the hypothesis that the rehearsal 
of coping self-statements is an active fear-reducing component of 
these interventions.
Evans, like Meichenbaum (l977) argued that it is not physiological 
arousal per se which mediates fearful behaviour, but what subjects say
- 91+ -
to themselves about that arousal.  ^ For example , Meichenbaum 
(1977) has suggested that subjective fear and avoidance is 
mediated by maladaptive self-statements similar to those he 
observed in one of his subjects ; "I'm really nervous; I'm 
sweating; others will see it; I can't handle this." Furthermore, 
he stressed the adaptive nature of reappriasing that arousal:
'In our own research, the clients, following 
cognitive behaviour modification treatment, come to 
label their physiological arousal as facilitative ru.ther 
than debilitative. (Meichenbaum, 1972; Wine, 1970).
The physiological arousal that the client had 
previously labelled as totally debilitating anxiety and 
fear, the harbinger of further behaviour deterioration 
leading to feelings of helplessness, was now relabelled 
as eagerness to demonstrate competence, as a desire to 
get on with a task and as a sign to cope.'
The self-statements used by Evans in his study, are consistent 
with this notion that fearful subjects are afraid of experiencing 
the physiological concomitants of fear. Specifically, he asked 
a group of spider-fearful subjects to rehearse statements 
instructing themselves to expect, and accept the physiological 
concomitants of fear and to appraise them as harmless. He found 
that these subjects experienced significant reductions in fearfulness 
compared with controls.
1 It should be noted that while these researchers emphasize the 
role of physiological arousal in generating the cognitions which 
mediate avoidance, they are not explicit about the possible origins 
of that arousal.
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Interestingly, however, while these self-statements appear 
to be adaptive, they are in sharp contrast to those employed in 
the interventions examined by Meichenbaum (l97l) and Kazdin (1973» 
1974a, 1974b). These researchers provided subjects with self­
statements designed to actively cope with the physiological 
concomitants of fear (i.e. ’Relax, keep calm, take slow deep 
breaths’) rather than passively accept them.
This apparent inconsistency would suggest that the question; 
"What is the nature of positive or adaptive coping self-statements ?" 
must in future be answered empirically rather than intuitively.
The first study presented below is a partial replication of 
Evans’ experiment and was designed to test the hypothesis that 
his 'passive' coping strategy leads to a reduction in fear of 
spiders. The subsequent study examined the relative effects of this 
strategy and the 'active' self-statements used in Meichenbaum (ibid) 
and Kazdin's ( ibid ) studies.
The Effects of Cognitive Interventions upon Fear of Public Speaking;
Several studies have examined the effects upon speech-anxiety 
of a variety of interventions aimed at altering subjects' cognitions. 
These studies are discussed under the following headings ;
Studies evaluating the efficacy of Rational Emotive Therapy,
Studies evaluating the efficacy of some variant of .
Cognitive Restructuring.
Studies Evaluating the efficacy of Rational Emotive Therapy:
To date three studies (Casas, 1975; Karst and Trexler, 1970; 
Trexler and Karst, 1972) have examined the effects of rational 
emotive therapy upon speech-anxiety.
In their study %arst and Trexler (l970) compared the effects 
of Rational Emotive Therapy, Kelly's (l955) 'Fixed Role Therapy'
— g6 —
and a no-treatment control condition upon public speaking anxiety. 
The dependent variables were five self-report measures of anxiety 
and two behavioural measures. Unfortunately, adequate inter- 
observer reliabilities were obtained with only one of the 
behavioural measures and post-trea nent data analyses indicated 
no differences between the groups on this measure. Three of the 
five self-report measures showed both therapies to be superior to 
the no-treatment control. At a six-month follow-up,60^ of the 
contacted treatment subjects reported their speech anxiety to be 
'much* or 'somewhat' less than it had been prior to intervention. 
However, the lack of adequate controls in this study does not allow 
us to preclude the possibility that the observed changes were a 
function of exposure to a therapy and therapist.
A subsequent study by Trexler and Karst (1972) was a partial 
replication of this study. In addition to a rational emotive therapy 
and no-treatment condition, the design included an 'attention-placebo* 
condition in order to control for non-specific effects of exposure 
to a therapy and therapist. Their three behavioural measures of 
speech anxiety revealed no inter-group differences, while two self- 
report measures favoured Rational Emotive Therapy over the other 
groups. However, a third rating of subjective anxiety suggested 
that the attention-placebo  ^ group subjects had experienced 
significantly greater reductions in anxiety compared to those who 
had received rational emotive therapy.
More recently, Casas (l975) examined the relative efficacy 
of rational emotive therapy and self-control desensitisation in 
reducing public speaking anxiety. His data analyses suggest that
1 Subjects in this condition actually received relaxation training.
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behavioural, subjective and physiological measures of fear failed 
to distinguish between these groups and indeed, showed them to 
be no more effective than a waiting-list control.
We might tentatively conclude  ^ from these three studies, 
that when rational emotive therapy is effective in reducing 
public spea’d-ng anxiety, the effect is limited to subjective 
reports of anxiety.
Studies Evaluating the Efficacy of some Variant of Cognitive 
Restructuring
Several researchers (Fremouw and Zitter, 1978; Jaremko, 1980; 
Meichenbaum, Gilmore and Federaricius, 1971; Weissberg, 1977;
Weissberg and Lamb, 1977), have examined the effects of a number 
of varied cognitive interventions upon speech-anxiety.
In a very thorough and well-controlled study, Meichenbaum 
et al ( 1971), examined the relative efficacy of insight plus 
rehearsal; desensitisation and combined desensitisation plus insight. 
Their design also included attention-placebo, waiting-list and low 
fear control groups.
The insight procedure involved an emphasis upon the argument 
that 'speech anxiety is the result of self-verbalisations and 
internalised sentences which are emitted while thinking about the 
speech situation.' In addition, the goals of therapy were for 
each subject to become aware of these self-statements and then to 
produce incompatible and adaptive self-instructions to guide 
adaptive behaviour. Unfortunately, no details were given regarding 
the nature of either the self-defeating or adaptive self-verbalisations
The measures of speech anxiety included Paul's (1966)
Behavioural Checklist (BCL), three measures of speech disruption 
(i.e. word count, duration of silence and the number of 'ah' 
statements.) and two measures of subjective anxiety.
1 Also see Table 3
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Their data analyses revealed similar patterns of change 
reflected in BCL and anxiety checklist scores. Specifically, 
comparisons between the conditions revealed that i) waiting- 
list control subjects showed significantly less improvement than 
all other groups; (ii) the attention-placebo and combined 
desensitisation plus insight groups did not show differential 
improvements; (iii) both of these groups showed significantly 
less improvement than subjects in the desensitisation and insight 
conditions; these latter two conditions producing similar and 
significant improvements.
The second measure of anxiety (anxiety differential) did not 
distinguish between the treatment conditions but reflected a 
significant reduction in anxiety for these groups compared to 
controls.
These researchers also reported significant improvements for 
the three treatment groups on the measures of speech disruption. 
However, pre-treatment comparisons between low and high fear 
groups casts some doubt upon the validity of two of these measures 
as indices of speech anxiety. Specifically, they found that the 
number of 'ah' statements did not distinguish between these groups, 
while interestingly, the low fear subjects, contrary to predictions, 
produced longer durations of silence.
In conclusion, the general pattern of results seems to suggest 
that desensitisation and insight plus rehearsal are equally 
superior to both a combination of these procedures and controls in 
reducing some aspects of speech anxiety (i.e. behavioural 
manifestations measured by the BCL).
In the first of two recent studies also involving speech 
anxious subjects, Weissberg (l977) compared the relative efficacy
-  100 -
of a cognitive modification procedure (after Meichenbaum,
1972) f desenaitisation and desensitisation with, coping imagery. 
Subjects received one of these treatments either directly or 
vicariously by watching a fellow subject being treated on video.
The cognitive modification programme comprised several 
elements : i) A discussion emphasizing the rationale that speech 
anxiety is caused by illogical, self-defeating and exaggerated 
thoughts and self statements; ii) challenging the truth and 
logic of these statements and substituting anxiety-inhibiting 
self statements intheir place, and iii) standard desensitisation 
using task relevant self statements to cope with any anxiety 
experienced during scene visualisation.
Treatment effectiveness was measured using: i) Paul’s 
(i960) Personal Report of Confidence as a Speaker (PRCS); ii) A 
Behaviour Checklist (BCL) (Paul, 1966), and iii) an Adjective 
Checklist. All measures were taken before treatment, the week 
after treatment was completed and at a follow-up eleven weeks after.
The data analyses revealed that both cognitive modification 
and desensitisation with coping imagery, were significantly more 
effective than desensitisation in reducing the behavioural 
manifestations of anxiety (BCL). However, this difference was 
not maintained at follow-up. On the self-report measures of speech 
anxiety (PRCS and ACL) no significant differences were found between 
the treatment conditions.
Weissberg drew the following conclusion from his findings : 
’There is no direct and consistent evidence to 
indicate that either treatments ... or conditions (direct 
or vicarious), significantly differed in their effectiveness 
in reducing speech anxiety. Relative to a control group, 
however, the treatment programmes as a whole resulted in 
significant reductions in speech anxiety.'
— 101 —'
However, it should be noted that the comparisons of the 
treatment conditions with waiting—list controls were made using 
a total of 84 analyses of covariance. Therefore, his results 
and his conclusion should be considered with caution.
In a subsequent study Veissberg and Lamb (l97V) used the 
same measures of speech anxiety to examine the relative efficacy 
of cognitive modification, desensitisation, and speech preparation 
plus practice, A waiting list control group was again utilised.
Their analysis of Behaviour Checklist scores revealed that 
none of the treatments showed significant reductions at post-test. 
However, at follow-up (eleven weeks) both cognitive modification 
and speech preparation plus practice groups were significantly 
less anxious than controls, although they did not differ 
significantly from each other. In terms of the self-report measures 
of anxiety (pRCS and ACL) the three treatment groups did not 
differ from each other but reported significantly less anxiety 
than controls.
Unfortunately, these researchers did not incorporate an 
attention-placebo condition in their design and therefore we cannot 
preclude the possibility that the observed changes in subjective 
anxiety were a function of non-specific variables associated with 
exposure to a therapy or therapist.
In a more well controlled study, Fremouw and Zitter (l97S) 
assigned speech anxious subjects to one of four conditions ; 
cognitive restructuring (after Keichenbaum et al 197l) plus 
relaxation training as a coping skill; behavioural skills training 
for public speakers; discussion-placebo, or a waiting list control.
Their measures of speech anxiety were: i) Behaviour Checklist 
(BCL - after Mulac and Sherman, 1974); ii) An overall rating of 
anxiety made by observers, iii) The Anxiety Differential (ïïusek
— 102 —
and Alexander, I963); iv) Paul's (1966) Personal report of 
Confidence as a Speaker (PRCS) and v) the duration of silence 
during speeches.
In terms of the behavioural ratings (BCL and overall rating), 
the data analyses suggest that both treatment groups experienced 
significant reductions in anxiety relative to waiting list controls. 
However, the overall ratings also suggest that only cognitive 
restructuring was superior to the discussion placebo control.
The third behavioural measure, namely duration of silence, failed 
to distinguish between any of the groups.
In terms of self-rated confidence (PRCS) the skills training 
procedure was superior to cognitive restructuring, although both 
were superior to discussion-placebo. The other subjective measure 
of anxiety (ACL) however, did not distinguish between the groups.
In conclusion, Fremouw and Zitter's results suggest that their 
cognitive intervention was significantly effective in reducing both 
behavioural and subjective manifestations of speech-anxiety.
More recently, Jaremko (l980) used 62 speech anxious college 
students to compare the effects of Meichenbaum's (l97?) stress 
inoculation training with no treatment.
His measures of speech anxiety included : i) the Behavioural 
Assessment of Speech Anxiety (BASA) - Mulac and Sherman (1974); ii) 
the Multiple Affect Adjective Checklist (MAACL) - Zuckerman and 
Lubin, (1965), and iii) a speech self-efficacy measure  ^ which 
measures subjects' confidence in their ability to perform successfully.
1 This measure was based on the one developed by Bandura (l977)
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His findings suggest that both groups experienced, 
significant and comparable reductions in behavioural anxiety 
(b a s a ) from pre— to post-assessment; reductions which were 
maintained at follow-up. However, the two self-report 
measures suggest that treatment subjects were significantly 
less anxious than controls at post-test and follow-up.
In conclusion, Jaremko's results seem to suggest that 
stress inoculation training is significantly more effective 
than no-treatment in reducing the subjective expression of 
anxiety. However, it must be noted that this poorly controlled 
experiment leaves us to assume the validity of these measures 
as indices of speech anxiety.
Summary and Conclusions; (Also see Table i+)
The results of the above studies suggest that a variety of 
cognitive interventions significantly reduced both the behavioural 
and subjective expressions of speech anxiety relative to waiting- 
list controls. However, the failure to utilize adequate controls 
in three of these studies (i.e. Jaremko, 1980; Weissberg, 1977; 
Weissberg and Lamb, 1977) means that we cannot readily dismiss the 
possibility that the observed effects were a function of non-specific 
variables inherent in the interventions.
The other two studies (i.e. Fremouw and Zitter, 1978;
Meichenbaum et al, 197l) were more well controlled. They included 
attention-placebo conditions in their designs to control for the 
possible effects of exposure to a therapy and therapist. In 
addition, Meichenbaum et al, in a most thorough study, utilized a 
low fear control group in order to assess the validity of their 
measures.
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The results of these studies suggest that both cognitive 
restructuring plus relaxation (Fremouw and Zitter, 1978) are 
significantly more effective than attention-placebo conditions 
in reducing subjective and behavioural expressions of speech 
anxiety.
To date only two studies (Glogower, Fremouw and McCraskey, 
1978; Thorpe, Amatu, Blakey and Burns, 1976) have attempted to 
determine which elements of these multi-component interventions 
are responsible for the observed effects upon speech anxiety.
These are discussed below.
Component Analysis Studies;
In the first of these- studies, Thorpe and his co-workers
(1976) examined the relative effects of the components of 
Meichenbaum et al . *3 (l97l) insight plus rehearsal intervention. 
The subjects, who were secondary school pupils, were either given 
insight into the negative self-statements which are presumed to 
maintain speech anxiety, or asked to rehearse adaptive coping 
self-statements.
These researchers interpreted their results as suggesting 
that 'insight’ is a more important component of the intervention 
than 'rehearsal'. However, their ambiguously presented results 
do not seem to warrant this conclusion. The significant results 
which were found suggest that rehearsal similarly affected the 
subjective measures of anxiety.
In a more recent study, Glogower, Fremouw and McCraskey (l97S) 
assigned 'communication-anxious' college students to one of five 
conditions: insight into negative self statements; knowledge
and rehearsal of coping statements; a combination of these 
procedures; a discussion placebo or a waiting-list control group.
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A low'commiinication-aiixious ' group was also utilised to 
validate the measures of anxiety used.
The effects of these various procedures were determined 
by observations of a number of behavioural manifestations of 
anxiety, while subjects took part in a group discussion, and by 
two self-report measures.
Their findings suggest that both the ’combination’ and 
’coping statements' conditions were significantly superior to 
the waiting-list control, although these groups did not differ 
significantly from e ach other. In contrast, the insight and 
discussion-placebo conditions produced some improvement, although 
this was usually non-significant. These researchers concluded ; 
'The results suggest that while discussion- 
placebo and identification of negative self-statements 
produce some improvement, the coping statement 
component is the primary factor in the cognitive 
restructuring procedure.*
One of the questions which arises from this conclusion 
concerns the nature of coping self-statements. Glogower et al, 
comment on their findings :
'The fact that some subjects in the discussion 
placebo and insight groups used general coping statements 
but did not improve as much as the coping statements or 
combined procedure subjects who learned more specific 
task-related statements, suggests that the type of coping 
statements employed may be important.'
In their study, these researchers encouraged subjects in 
the 'coping statements' and 'combined procedure' conditions 
to use task-relevant statements, such as; "Speak slowly, I can 
handle this" and "What is it I want to say ? It's only a short
— 108 —
sentence."
In contrast, Thorpe et al. (ibid) had subjects in their 
’rehearsal' condition rehearse 'productive' ideas (e.g. "It's 
nice if people approve of me, but I can survive without their 
approve if need be,") which were seen as the 'desirable' counterparts 
of four irrational ideas (i.e. necessity for approval; projectionism; 
necessity to woriy; life's unfairness), which may elicit and 
maintain speech anxiety. However, recent research casts some 
doubt upon the relevance of such adaptive self-statements. 
Specifically Lorh and Rea (198I) found that speech anxiety is 
not characterised by these particular irrational beliefs.
In the outcome studies discussed above, the nature of 
the coping self-statements used was not always reported (e.g. 
Meichenbaum et al. 1971; Jaremko, 1980; Veissberg, 1977)»
Where they have been, they have taken the form : "I can only 
improve," (Fremouw and Zitter, 1978) which is a task-relevant 
coping statement, or comprised of both task-relevant and anxiety- 
related statements (Weissberg and Lamb,1977)» For example 
Weissberg and Lamb had subjects practice such statements as :
"I practiced as much as I need to, so just relax and concentrate 
on the speech"; "Even if I never make a good speech, there are 
still a lot of other things I do well." Subjects in this study 
were also encouraged to rehearse coping-statanents which 
reflected and challenged a presumed irrational need for approval;
"It would be nice if everyone approved of my speech, but I can 
live without that."
In conclusion, it would appear from these research findings 
(as with those concerned with the 'animal literature' in the 
earlier sections above), that coping self—statements (CSS) are
- 109 -
an active fear-reducing component of cognitive interventions. 
However, it is also apparent that these statements, where reported, 
have varied from study to study,with the rationale for their use 
usually being unclear. It would seem that some researchers have 
used their intuition to determine what constitutes adaptive CSS. 
Therefore, future research might empirically determine the nature 
of adaptive CSS, the mechanisms by which they produce change and 
their possible task, situation or subject specificity.
The fourth in the series of experiments presented below 
employed speech-anxious subjects in order to examine the effects 
upon fear of two coping strategies, devised by Evans (1977) and 
Meichenbaum (l97l), which were theoretically based (Wine, 1970; 
Meichenbaum, 1977).
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EXPERIMENT 1
AN EXAMINATION OF THE EFFECTS OF A COPING STRATEGY UPON 
FEAR OF SPIDERS
Glogower and his colleagues (l978) concluded from their well 
controlled study that the rehearsal of task-oriented coping 
statements are more effective in reducing speech anxiety than 
insight into the maladaptive self-statements which are presumed to 
maintain that anxiety. Similarly, Vine (l970) has suggested that the 
rehearsal of adaptive coping statements is the most important 
component of self instructional training (Meichenbaum et al. 1971) 
in reducing test anxiety. Recently, Evans (1977) has also found 
that the rehearsal of coping statements significantly reduced 
spider avoidance in fearful college students.
Consistent with the arguments of Vine (l970) and Meichenbaum
(1977), Evans proposed that fear is not mediated by physiological 
arousal per se, but by the maladaptive self-statements which that 
arousal generates. Such self-statements he argued  ^ reflected a 
’cognitive fear’ of the physiological concomitants of fear, or in 
short a ’fear of fear’. Thus they may take the form "I feel afraid..,. 
I cannot cope with it." Therefore in his study Evans encouraged 
subjects to rehearse and use (on a subsequent spider avoidance test) 
self statements which involved a reappraisal of the physiological 
concomitants of fear, i.e. to expect to experience them but to accept 
them as harmless.
The present study provided a further test of the hypothesis 
that the rehearsal of such self-statanents, phrased in subjects' own
1 Evans (l977) and in personal communication.
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words, leads to a reduction in spider fearful behaviour.
Three measures of fear were taken to test this hypothesis : 
approach towards the feared stimulus (in the form of a behavioural 
avoidance test or B.A.T.) subjective ratings of fear (after Walk,
1956) and heart rate. Heart rate was chosen as a physiological 
measure of fea:fulness on the basis of research findings which 
suggest that fear associated with phobic stimuli such as spiders, 
is characterised by significant increases in heart rate (e.g. Hare 
and Blevings, 1975. Also Sartory and Lader, 1977» for a review of 
this literature).
METHOD
Subjects :
Twenty-six subjects took part in the study, all of whom were 
college students and 18 of whom were females. They had been 
selected from a total of sample of 135 on the basis of their 
response to the item 'spiders’ on the Wolpe’s (l973) Fear 
Survey Schedule (FSSIII). On the five-point scale 16 of the subjects 
had scored 4 ('Much’ fear of spiders) and 10 had scored 5 (’Very 
Much’ fear of spiders).
Equipment and Materials;
A George Washington Polygraph recorder was used to measure 
heart rate (bpm). Heart beats were recorded via three silver 
plate electrodes placed on the right leg and left forearm with an 
earth on the left leg. A manual event recorder was also attached 
to the polygraph.
A IQj inch tall plexiglass container was used to house a 
2 inch long Tegenarians spider. The container had soibed on one 
of its plexiglass faces ten horizontal lines at 1 inch intervals.
1 It was assumed (Evans, 1977) that such coping statements 
rephrased in subjects’ own words, but maintaining the basic strategy, 
would be more meaningful for subjects and more effective in reducing fear.
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Experimental Design;
All subjects were matched in pairs on the basis of their 
sex and a pre-treatment assessment of their fearfulness in 
approaching a spider. Subsequently they were assigned to either 
an experimental or control condition before completing the post­
treatment assessment. Treatment effects were determined by 
behavioural (i.e. a behavioural avoidance test), subjective (i.e. 
a ten point fear thermometer) and physiological (i.e. heart rate) 
measures.
Procedure ;
All subjects volunteered to take part in an experiment which 
would take two hours of their time, and which was divided into two, 
hourly sessions one week apart. They were not told about the 
nature of the experiment until they arrived at the test room for 
the pre-treatment assessment.
Pre-treatment Assessment:
Upon arrival at the test room subjects were reminded of their 
response to the item 'spiders’ on the FSS III (Wolpe, 1973) and 
asked if it was still an accurate evaluation of their fearfulness.
No discrepancies emerged between subjects’ initial and subsequent 
ratings.
Subjects were then read the following instructions:
"I am going to present a live spider. It is a.harmless, 
non-poisonous, British spider. It will be in a container 
from which it cannot escape. When I have presented it I 
want you to try and touch it. Do you wish to proceed ?"
None of the subjects refused to take part.
All subjects were then given a brief explanation of the function 
of the polygraph in order to allay any unnecessary anxiety. 
Subsequently, the heart rate recording electrodes were attached
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with an assurance that no sensations would be felt from them.
Subjects were not told that heart rate was being recorded.
Following this, the contained spider was placed upon a 
small table in front of the seated subject. The table and 
container were positioned so as to make it easy for the subject 
to approach and touch the spider with their electrode-free hand.
(This procedure was employed in order to minimize the effect of 
subjects' body movement upon heart rate and therefore increase 
the sensitivity of this measure as an index of fear).
Subjects were then instructed to try and touch the spider.
When they had stopped approaching but had not touched the spider 
the polygraph print-out was event-marked. They were then asked ;
"Can you go any further ?"  ^ If subjects moved any closer the 
polygraph print-out was again event-marked at the point of their 
maximum approach response.
Approach responses on the B.A.T. were recorded in terms of 
the number of horizontal lines (scribed on the container) that the 
subjects' forefinger had crossed before he withdrew his hand.
Upon completion of the B.A.T. subjects were asked to rate the fear 
they had experienced at the point of maximum approach; i.e. when 
they were closest to the spider. These ratings were made on a 10-point 
1 This 'High demand for approach' (Wein et al. 1975) on both pre 
and post-treatment B.A.T.S. was employed on the assumption 
that it would reduce the possibility that a significant 
difference between the control and experimental conditions 
reflected the influence of demand characteristics inherent in 
the latter condition. (See Bernstein and Paul, 1971» for a 
discussion on this point).
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Fear Thermometer (f .T.) (After Walk, 1956), It was anchored 
in the following way: subjects were told to equate 1 with 'calm 
relaxation’, 5 with 'moderate fear' and 10 with 'extreme fear'.
At the end of this pre-treatment session, arrangements were 
made to see subjects for the following session. They were also 
asked not to divulge the nature of the experiment to anyone.
Treatments and Post-Treatment Assessment;
On the basis of their pre-treatment B.A.T. scores and their 
sex, subjects were matched in pairs and assigned to either the 
control or experimental condition.
On their return to the test room for the second session, subjects 
were told the nature of the task (which was exactly the same as the 
pre-treatment assessment) and asked if they wished to proceed; 
none refused.
The procedures for the two groups were then as follows ;
Control condition:
Prior to the presentation of the second B.A.T. control group 
subjects received the following instructions on a sheet of A4 :
'Most people find that they can prepare themselves for a 
difficult task by thinking about it. In the space below 
please write down your ideas about facing up to your fear 
of spiders. Try to make it convincing to yourself perhaps 
by imagining that you are giving instructions to help 
someone else.'
This procedure was designed to control for the possible non­
specific effects of the experimental condition such as writing 
down and rehearsing self-statements.
Experimental condition;
Experimental group subjects were given the same instructions as 
control group subjects plus the following paragraph printed on a
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sheet of A4.
'A couple of sentences are given to start you off:
Of course I cannot help being afraid in this situation.
I shall be afraid but at least I should realise that 
there is no point in getting frightened of the fear.
The feelings of fear cannot kill me so I shall try and 
stand back and examine my fear: pounding heart, sweating 
palms... '
Subjects were told to read the instructions carefully and 
take as long as they wanted over rephrasing the coping self 
statements in their own words (Experimental group) or devising 
their strategies (control group). They were then told to read 
through and mentally rehearse the self-statements three times and 
use them during the subsequent behavioural avoidance test.
The procedure employed for this B.A.T. along with the 
measurement of subjective and physiological indices of fear, was the 
same as that described for the pre-treatment assessment. In addition, 
however, a one-minute baseline recording of subjects' heart rates was 
taken fifteen minutes after the completion of this post-treatment 
assessment. During this time subjects were instructed to relax.
These baseline heart rates were recorded after the completion 
of both assessments in order to avoid the possibility of a pre­
treatment measure being influenced by anticipatory arousal. However, 
it must be noted that post-assessment recording may have been 
influenced by the treatments administered although it was assumed 
that subjects would be more able to relax knowing that they had 
completed the tasks.
At the end of the second session subjects who wished to, were 
given a chance to ask questions.
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RESULTS
Behavioural Avoidance Test Scores;
B.A.T. scores were subjected to an ANOVA for a two factor 
experimental design with repeated measures on one factor: Group 
(2) X Pre and Post treatment assessments (P ratios are presented 
in Table 5 and ANOVA summary tables in Appendix 1 ).
The analyses revealed a statistically non-significant main 
effect of Group (F = 0.09, df 1, 25, p i>.l). However a significant 
main effect of Assessment did emerge from the analysis (F = 8.6, 
df 1, 24-, p ^ . 01). This main effect is most readily interpretable 
in terms of a significant Group x Assessment interaction (F = 7.1, 
df 1, 24, p < .05). The means (see Table 6 ) reflecting this 
interaction show, as expected, an increase in approach behaviour 
for the experimental group from pre- to post-treatment assessments, 
while the performance of the control group subjects remained almost 
constant across assessments.
An analysis was also made of the numbers of subjects from each 
of the conditions who touched or failed to touch the spider on the 
post-treatment assessment. This analysis revealed a statistically 
significant chi squared ( (l) = 4.06, p<^.05). The numbers
reflecting this statistic are presented in Diagram 1. Consistent 
with expectations they show that more of the experimental group 
subjects (8 out of 13) completed the post-treatment B.A.T. (i.e. 
touched the spider), than control group subjects (2 out of I3 ). 
Subjective Fear Ratings :
Subjective fear ratings were subjected to an ANOVA for a two 
factor experimental design with repeated measures on one factor • 
(Group (2) X Pre- and Post-treatment Assessments). (P ratios 
are presented in Table 5 and ANOVA summary tables in Appendix 1- 
Means are presented in Table 6 ).
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Diagram 1 Number of subjects completing the
B.A.T. as a function of Group and Assessment
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^Table 5
P ratios emerging from the analyses (ANOVAs )  ^ of all 
measures
Measure Source of variation F ratio(degrees of 
freedom)
Approach scores Group
Assessme nt 
Group X Assessment
0.09 (1.25) 
8.59** (1.24) 
7.10* (1.24)
Subjective fear 
ratings
Group
Assessment 
Group X Assessment
2.34 (1.25) 
0.73 (1.24) 
0.37 (1.24)
Heart rate 
scores
Group
Assessment 
Group X Assessment
0.10 (1.25) 
0.78 (1.24) 
1.99 (1.24)
* .05
** p < . 0 1
( 1 Complete ANOVA summary tables are presented in Appendix 1 )
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Table 6
Table of Means (m ) and Standard deviations (s d ) for all dependent 
measures and baseline heart rates
Group Experimental Control
Assessment Pre-treat Post-treat Pre-treat Post-treat
ment ment ment ment
B.A.T. scores. M 6.69 8.31 7.15 7.23
Range 0 - 1 0  SD 2.95 2.78 2.41 2.24
inches.
Subjective M 6.31 ■ 6.77 5.69 5.77
fear ratings. SD 1.93 ' 1.36 1.11 1.74
(Range 0 - 
10)
Heart rate. M 82.10 83.51 84.32 78.0
(b p m ) sd 15.53 16.17 17.16 9.10
Baseline heart M 
rates (BPM) SD
58.23
10.26
60.84
9.42
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Analyses revealed statistically non-significant main 
effect of Group (p = 2.34, df 1, 24, p >*l) and Assessment 
(p = 0.73, df 1, 24, p 3>.0l), and a non-significant Group 
X Assessment interaction (P = 0.37, df 1, 24, p >.l).
Heart Rate Scores:
Pearson correlation coefficients were computed for baseline 
HRs and HRs recorded during the five second period prior to 
subjects' maximum approach responses on both B.A.T.s, These 
correlation coefficients were small and statistically non­
significant (for the pre-treatment B.A.T. r = .32, n = 26,
P>.05; for the post-treatment B.A.T. r = .27, n = 26, p .05). 
Therefore variations in baseline HRs were not statistically 
controlled for when analysing HRs recorded during the Behavioural 
Avoidance Tests.
Heart rate scores were subjected to an ANOVA for a two 
factor experimental design with repeated measures on one factor: 
Group (2) X Pre and Post-treatment Assessments . (P ratios are 
presented in Table 5 and ANOVA summary tables in Appendix 1.
Means are presented in Table 6).
The analyses revealed statistically non-significant main 
effects of Group (P = 0.1, df 1, 25, p j>.l) and Assessment 
(P = 0.78, df 1, 24, p > . 1), and a non-significant Group x 
Assessment interaction (p = 1.99, df 1, 24, p J>.l).
DISCUSSION
The findings of this study offer some support for the hypothesis 
that the rehearsal of coping self-statements results in a reduction 
of fear in spider-fearful college students. Specifically, the above 
results show that approach behaviour increased significantly for the 
experimental group subjects, who had devised and rehearsed self­
statements which focussed upon the expectation and acceptance of 
the physiological concomitants of fear. In contrast, the control
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group subjects, who had devised and rehearsed their own 
self statements, showed little change in approach behaviour.
However, the subjective and physiological measures failed 
to support the above hypothesis; contrary to expectations these 
indices suggest that the experimental group subjects did not 
experience significant reductions in fear.
The most straightforward interpretation of this desynchronous 
change in these indices of fear is that it reflects the method 
of measurement employed. Both the subjective ratings and heart 
rates were taken as an index of fear at the point of maximum 
approach on both the pre- and post-treatment B.A.T.S. However, 
it is possible that this point of maximum approach was determined 
by subjects' tolerance threshold for subjective and/or physiological 
fear. Therefore, these measures could also be seen as an index 
of this threshold which, for both the control and experimental 
groups, did not change significantly across B.A.T.S; although for 
the latter group approach behaviour changed significantly before 
the threshold was reached.
Given this interpretation (which assumes a causal relationship 
between these indices of fear) a more adequate test of the hypothesis 
that the rehearsal of coping self-statements results in a reduction 
in subjective and physiological fear, could be achieved by controlling 
for pre- and post-treatment differences in approach behaviour.
Using the present experimental design this would involve scoring 
the subjective and physiological measures at the point of maximum 
approach on the pre-treatment B.A.T. and then comparing these scores 
with scores taken at the same point of approach on the post-treatment 
B.A.T. Thus, when subjects reached their pre-treatment maximum 
during the post-treatment B.A.T., they would be stopped and asked 
to rate their subjective f e a r  and HR would also be recorded.
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Subsequently they would be asked to proceed with the B.A.T. 
in order to determine their maximum post-treatment approach score.
If subjects’ approach behaviour increased on the post-treatment 
B.A.T. (as it did for the experimental group in this study) then 
the threshold hypothesis would predict that these subjects would 
experience lower levels of subjective and physiological fear 
at that point during the post-treatment B.A.T. equivalent to 
their maximum pre-treatment approach score. This would be 
because at this point they would not have reached their maximum 
post treatment approach score and therefore, their associated 
subjective and/or physiological threshold.
The possibility was considered of evaluating the effect 
of the treatments upon the subjective and physiological indices, 
while statistically controlling for the differences in approach 
scores between the groups. However, Spearman correlation 
coefficients (post hoc analyses; see Appendix 2 ) do not suggest 
that a linear relationship exists between these variables; such 
a relationship being the basis of statistical control.
In summary, these results suggest that the rehearsal of 
coping self-statements significantly increased the approach 
behaviour of fearful subjects towards the feared stimulus. In 
contrast, these self-statements appeared to have little effect 
upon the subjective and physiological indices of fear.. However, it 
was proposed that the methodology adopted in the present study did 
not provide an adequate test of the prediction that these measures 
would index significant reductions in fear for the experimental 
group.
Several additional points regarding methodology also need to be 
noted. Firstly, exact matching of subjects on all pre-treatment 
measures, while ideally desirable was practically impossible. Indeed,
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perfect matching on the one measure selected, i.e. B.A.T. 
scores, was not achieved. The effects of such imperfect matching 
are not clear, although the possible influence upon the reported 
findings cannot be disregarded. Secondly, baseline heart rate means 
were noticeably low: subsequent studies in this series report that 
baseline heart rate means for groups of college students are usually 
within the 70 - 80 bpm range. In this study, the mean for the 
total sample was 59.5 bpm. This may have been a function of the 
15 minute relaxation period. However, it is also possible that 
it reflects measurement error and therefore the observations of 
heart rate must be regarded as suspect.
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Experiment 2
AN INVESTIGATION OF THE EFFECTS OF DIFFERENT COPING STRATEGIES UPON 
FEAR OF COCKROACHES:
In Chapter 4 of this thesis a number of studies which 
examined the efficacy of a variety of cognitive therapies were 
reviewed. Briefly, the conclusions to be drawn from this review 
are as follows : firstly, it is evident that both speech anxiety 
and fears of animals and insects in college students have been 
reduced by cognitive behaviour therapies. Secondly, there is 
some evidence (i.e. Wine, 1970; Glogower, 1978) to suggest that 
while all of the components of cognitive restructuring therapies 
produce some reduction in fear, the major therapeutic component 
is the use of coping self-statements (cSS). Thirdly, it is also 
apparent that the nature of adaptive coping self-statements has 
yet to be clearly defined (indeed, in many studies researchers 
have tended to omit a full description of the statements used by 
their subjects).
Relevant to this third point, Meichenbaum (l977) has suggested  ^
that the cognitions which are presumed to mediate fearful behaviour 
are a function of the perception of the physiological concomitants 
of fear and, therefore, effective self-statements should focus 
upon adaptively coping with subjects* perceptions of being aroused 
in fear-evoking situations.
Consistent with this suggestion, Evans (l977) argued that 
adaptive self-statements include those which encourage fearful 
subjects to revise their perceptions by learning to expect and 
passively accept the physiological concomitants of fear and thus
1 This suggestion is discussed more fully in Chapter 3*
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not be afraid of being (physiologically) afraid. The findings 
of the previous study offer some support for this suggestion by 
showing that the rehearsal of such statements significantly 
reduced avoidance behaviour in spider-fearful students* 
Interestingly, several other studies (e.g. Meichenbaum, 1971;
Kazdin, 1973; also see Chapter 4 above) have also reported the 
efficacy of interventions which involved presenting subjects 
with self-statements designed to cope with physiological arousal. 
However, in these instances the coping self-statements were 
conceptually quite different from those used in Evans' study: 
they encouraged subjects to actively cope with the physiological 
concomitants of fear by self-instructing to "relax and keep calm" 
while they approached a phobic stimulus.
The interesting theoretical implications of these two coping 
strategies concerns their effect upon the physiological 
concomitants of fear. The coping self-statements used in the 
studies of Meichenbaum (l97l) and Kazdin (I973) imply that a 
reduction in physiological arousal is a pre-requisite for 
approach behaviour (i.e. subjects must be calm and relaxed) and 
therefore, that such statements are adaptive only if they reduce 
that arousal. (Unfortunately, these studies did not include a 
measure of physiological arousal with which to test this hypothesis). 
In contrast, the coping seIf-statements examined in the previous 
study imply that a reappraisal but not a reduction of physiological 
arousal is necessaiy for approach behaviour; although such a 
reappraisal may result in a reduction of arousal.
These implications are interesting. They would seem to 
suggest that these coping seIf-statements produce reductions in 
fear (if indeed this is what they do) via different mechanisms.
- 126 -
Although this need not necessarily be so. For example, it is 
conceivable that both strategies result in a perceived reduction 
in physiological arousal*rather than a reduction in arousal per 
se and that this perception results in reductions in subjectively 
and behaviourally expressed fear. Alternatively, it is possible 
that the rehearsal of the coping self-statements serve to distract 
subjects from those self-statements which usually mediate fear, 
thus resulting in a reduction of fear.
The investigation of these possibilities in future research 
might shed some light upon the nature of fear and the mechanisms 
by which self-statements modify fear. However, the purpose of 
the study reported below was to provide a further examination of 
the effects of the coping self statements devised by Evans (l977),and 
in addition to test the basic  ^ hypothesis that the coping self 
statements devised by Meichenbaum (l97l) produce significant 
reductions in fear. The relative efficacy of these coping self­
statements was also of interest.
The effects of these strategies were examined by measuring the 
fearfulness of cockroach-fearful college students as they underwent 
a behavioural avoidance test (B.A.T.). Specifically it was 
predicted that subjects who rehearsed either of the coping 
strategies would express significantly less fear than control group 
subjects•
The measures of fear included a measure of approach behaviour 
(i.e. physical distance from a phobic stimulus), a subjective 
rating of fear (using a 10-point Fear Thermometer) and a 
physiological measure (i.e. heart rate). In order to validate 
1 In the studies reviewed in Chapter 4 (i.e. Meichenbaum 1971; 
Kazdin, 1973» 1974a,b) these coping self-statements formed a 
part of treatments comprising several components and their 
efficacy has not been directly examined.
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the use of these measures as indices of fear, a low fear control 
group was incorporated in the experimental design: it was 
predicted that these measures would distinguish between the 
high and low fear subjects.
In addition, this low fear control group allowed for a 
comparison of the heart rate responses of high and low Fear 
subjects to a signal preceding the presentation of a phobic 
stimulus. On the basis of recent research findings (Hare and 
Blevings, 1975) it was expected that the heart rates of the fearful 
subjects would be characterised by acceleration in response to 
the signal, while the heart rate response of the low Fear group 
would be a deceleratory one. Moreover, observations made by Hare 
(1973) suggest that a similar pattern of heart rate response 
(i.e. acceleration for fearful subjects and deceleration for 
fearless subjects) would be expected following the presentation 
of a phobic stimulus.
METHOD
Subjects :
Forty-eight subjects took part in the study. They were 
selected from a total sample of 260 students who had completed 
Wolpe's (1973) Fear Survey Schedule (fsSIII). This selection 
was based upon their responses to the item 'crawling insects':
36 of them (high fear subjects) had indicated their fear to 
be 'much' (n = 2l) or 'very much' (n = 15) while 12 (low fear 
subjects) reported that they were 'not at all' afraid.
Equipment and materials:
A Grass Model 7D Polygraph recorder and D.C. driver 
amplifier were used to measure heart rate (bpm). Heart beats
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were recorded via 3 silver-plate electrodes placed on the 
right leg, left forearm andleft leg (the earth). A manual 
event-recorder was also attached to the polygraph.
Subjects avoidance behaviour was measured by recording 
the distance (in centimetres) their hands moved towards the 
phobic stimulus, i.e. a cockroach. The precise distance was 
determined by using a length of cotton on a reel. The cotton 
was attached to the subjects’ forefinger with an elastic band 
and as he moved towards the cockroach, from a fixed starting 
point, so the cotton unwound from the reel. The distance the 
cotton travelled from starting point to maximum approach response 
was recorded.
The cockroach was contained in an open-topped jar 3 inches 
deep and 5 inches in diameter. This container was coated with 
a clear non-stick substance (manufactured by I.C.I.) which 
ensured that the cockroach could not escape.
Procedure;
All selected subjects'volunteered to take part in an 
experiment the nature of which was kept from them until they 
arrived at the test room.
Upon arrival at the test-room subjects were asked to confirm 
their FSSIII rating of their fearfulness of 'crawling insects' 
and then asked if their rating would be the same if the item read 
'touching a cockroach'. Three subjects had reported a fear of 
crawling insects but were unafraid of cokroaches, therefore they 
were thanked for their help but dismissed at this stage. This 
procedure occurred before subjects were assigned to conditions 
and meant that a total of 51 subjects were screened in this manner 
beforethe total of 48 participants was reached.
These subjects were then read the following instructions :
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"I am going to present to yon a live, harmless cockroach.
It will be in a container from which it cannot escape.
I am going to ask you to try and touch it. Is that clear ?
Do you wish to proceed ?"
None of the subjects refused to proceed.
All subjects were then given a brief explanation of the 
function of the polygraph in order to allay any unnecessary 
anxiety. Subsequently, they were seated in a room adjacent 
to the equipment room and the recording electrodes were attached 
with an assurance that no sensations would be felt from them.
The subjects were not told that heart rate was being recorded.
Subjects were then given 8 minutes in which to ’acclimatise' 
to the electrodes and the test situation. In this time the High 
Fear subjects were assigned to one of the three conditions.
This was done in the following way: the first scheduled subject 
from a particular FSS level (i.e. 4('much') or 5 ('very much') 
was assigned to the first of the 3 conditions; the second subject 
from that FSS level to the second condition and so on. This 
assignment procedure was repeated with each block of three subjects 
from each of the FSS levels, thereby guaranteeing an equal number 
of subjects from each FSS level (i.e. 7 from level 4 and 5 from level 
5) in each of the three conditions.
Subsequently subjects received written instructions in 
accordance with their allocation. These were as follows :
Passive Strategy condition:
For ease of distinction this condition is labelled the 
'Passive strategy Condition'. Subjects in this group received 
the following coping self statements (after Evans, 1977)» printed 
on a sheet of A4 paper. They read as follows :
"Most people find that they can prepare themselves for
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a difficult task by thinking about it. In the space 
below write down your ideas about facing up to your 
fear of cockroaches. Try to make it convincing, perhaps 
by imagining that you are giving instructions to help 
someone else."
A couple of sentences are given to start you off. "Of 
course I cannot help being afraid in this situation. I shall 
be afraid, but at least I should realise that there is no 
point in getting frightened of the fear. The feelings of 
fear cannot kill me, so I shall try and stand back and examine 
my fear; pounding heart, sweating palms ...."
Active Strategy Condition;
Subjects in this condition received the following coping 
self-statements (after Meichenbaum, 1971) printed on a sheet 
of A4 paper:
"Most people find that they can prepare themselves for 
a difficult task by thinking about it. In the space 
below write down your ideas about facing up to your 
fear of cockroaches. Try to make it convincing, perhaps 
by imagining that you are giving ins tructions to help 
someone else."
"A couple of sentences are given to start you off..
'Relax, keep calm, take this one step at a time. If other 
people can do it so can I. Take it slowly, breathe 
deeply, that's it. I am relaxed, calm. I can cope with 
this."
High Fear Control Condition:
Subjects in this condition received the following instructions 
printed on a sheet of A4 paper :
"Most people find that they can prepare themselves for a
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difficult task by thinking about it. In the space 
below write down your ideas about facing up to your 
fear of cokroaches. Tiy to make it convincing, perhaps 
by imagining that you are giving instructions to help 
someone else."
The condition was incorporated into the experimental 
design in order to control for the possible non-specific 
effects of the .other conditions, such as writing down and 
rehearsing self-statements.
Low Fear Control conditions;
Low Fear control group subjects received the following 
instructions printed on a^  sheet of A4 paper :
"Most people find that they can prepare themselves for 
a difficult task by thinking about it. In the space 
below please write down your ideas about facing up to 
your fears. Try to make it convincing, perhaps by 
imagining that you are giving instructions to help 
someone else."
Subjects were told to read the instructions carefully 
and take as long as they wanted over rephrasing the coping 
strategies in their own words (Passive and Active Strategy 
conditions) or devising their own strategies (High and Low 
Fear control conditions).
They were then told to read through and mentally rehearse 
the self-statements three times and use them during the 
subsequent behavioural avoidance test.
The cotton which was used to measure approach behaviour 
was then attached to the subjects' index finger. Subsequently 
the contained cockroach was placed behind a screen (and therefore 
out of sight) on a table in front of the seated subject.
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The table and container were positioned so as to make it easy 
for the subject to approach and touch the cockroach with their 
electrode-free hand. (This procedure was employed in order to 
minimise the effect of subjects* body movement upon heart rate 
and therefore increase the sensitivity of this measure as an 
index of fear). Subjects were then read the following instructions;
"I am going to present to you a live, harmless cockroach 
in a container from which it cannot escape. When I tell 
you to do so, I want you to try and touch it. Is that 
clear ? During this task I also want you to use the 
strategy that you have rehearsed."
Subjects were then instructed ;
"please focus upon the screen. It will be removed in ten 
seconds from now."
Heart rate was being recorded at this time and the ten- 
second period was event marked on the polygraph print-out.
When the screen was removed ten seconds was allowed to elapse 
before the subject was told to try and touch the cockroach.
When subjects stopped approaching but had not touched the 
cockroach (this point was also event-marked on the polygraph 
print-out), they were asked : "Can you go any further ?" ^
If subjects moved any closer the polygraph print-out was again 
event-marked at the instant of their maximum approach response.
1 This high demand for approach (Wein et al. 1975) on the
B.A.T. was employed on the assumption that it would reduce the 
possibility that a significant difference between the High fear control 
and the Passive and Active strategy conditions reflected the influence 
of demand characteristics inherent in the latter two conditions.
(See Bernstein and Paul (l97l) for a discussion of this point.)
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Upon completion of this behavioural avoidance test (B.A.T.) 
subjects were asked to rate the fear they had experienced 
during the test by using a 10-point Fear Thermometer (F.T.) 
after Walk, 1956). This Fear Thermometer was anchored in the 
following way: subjects were told to equate 1 with calm 
relaxation, 5 with moderate fear and 10 with extreme fear.
Subsequently they were told to relax for 10 minutes after 
which time a baseline heart rate was recorded.
Finally, any questions subjects had about the experiment 
were answered and they were asked not to divulge the nature of 
the study to anyone.
RESULTS:
Behavioural Avoidance Test scores:
B.A.T. scores were not normally distributed: 18 of the 
36 high fear subjects completed the B.A.T. (i.e. touched the 
cockroach - a score of 75). Therefore the hypothesis that the 
conditions resulted in differential approach behaviour was 
tested by subjecting B.A.T. scores to a Kruskall- Wallis 
one way analysis of variance. This analysis revealed that 
no statistically significant differences existed between the 
high fear groups (H = 2.88, df 2, p >.05). (Means are presented 
in Table 7). (An analysis summary table is presented in Table 9) 
The Kruskall- Wallis H statistic (steel, 1959) was used to 
canpare the B.A.T. scores of each of the high fear groups with 
the Low Fear Control group. The analyses revealed a significant 
difference between the Low Fear and High Fear control group 
(T min = 102, df 3» p ^.Ol) suggesting that B.A.T. scores were 
an index of fear. However, no significant differences were 
found between the Low Fear and Passive Strategy groups (T min = 
126, df 3» 12j p > . 05) or between the Low Fear and Active 
Strategy groups (T min = 114, df 3, 12, p >■ .05).
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Analysis of B.A.T. scores in terms of the number of subjects 
completing the final response (i.e. touching the cockroach) 
revealed a statistically non-significant distribution across 
the High Fear conditions (x^ (2) = 2.68, p>.05.for each 
condition these numbers were: Passive Strategy - 8; Active 
Strategy - 6; High Fear controls - 4).
Subjective ratings of fear:
Subjective ratings of fear for the high fear conditions 
were subjected to a Kruskall-Wallis one way analysis of variance.
This analysis revealed no significant differences between the 
groups (H< 1). (Means are presented in Table 7 ).
Using Steel’s (l959) procedure for comparing all treatments 
with a control, scores for the high fear groups were compared 
with those of the Low Fear Control Group. These comparisons 
revealed that subjective ratings of fear were significantly 
lower for the Low Fear Group compared with each of the high fear 
groups: Low Fear (LF)group vs High Fear Control group (T min = 8 5 ,
df 3» 12, p 'C .01): Low Fear vs Passive Strategy group (t min =
81, df 3» 12, p ^  .01); Low Fear vs Active Strategy group (t min =
84, df 3» 12, p Z..OI). (An analysis summary table is presented in Table 9). 
Heart Rate:
Baseline heart rates for all groups were subjected to a 
one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA). This analysis revealed a 
statistically significant difference between the groups (f = 3.14, 
df 3» 44, p ^  .05). The group means (which are presented in 
Table 8 ) show that the average heart rate for the Low Fear group
was approximately 12 bpm faster than the average for the High Fear 
control group and between 7 and 9 bpm faster than the average for 
the passive and Active strategy groups respectively. The reason
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Table 7
Table of Means (m ) and. Standard Deviations (s d ) for the 
behavioural and subjective measures of fear
Measure Active
Strategy
condition
Passive
Strategy
condition
High
Fear
control
Low
Fear
control
B.A.T. score M 65.52 73.17 68.98 75.00
(Range ; 0 - 
75 cms)
SD 13.12 3.64 7.81 0.00
Subjective M 5.17 5.17 4.67 1.50
fear ratings 
(range 0 - lO)
SD 2.12 1.51 1.86 0.80
for these differences is not clear although they may have 
been a function of the treatments administered. Therefore 
they cannot be assumed to reflect actual baseline variations.
For this reason the analyses of heart rates recorded during the 
B.A.T. did not statistically control for these differences in 
'baseline’ scores.
The purpose of the subsequent analysis was to test the 
hypothesis that heart rate distinguishes between high and low 
fear subjects during approach towards a phobic stimulus. In 
addition, this analysis tested the prediction that subjects in 
the strategy conditions would experience lower levels of fear 
(indexed by slower heart rates) than the High Fear controls.
This analysis was a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
of heart rates for all groups > recorded during the five second 
period prior to the instant of maximum approach on the B.A.T.
It revealed, contrary to expectations, that no .
significant differences existed between the groups (F = .48, df 3,
44, p ^  .05). Group means are presented in Table 8 and
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and plotted in Figure 1.
Figure 1 also illustrates the group heart rate means
for three periods prior to the presentation (p) of the
cockroach (i.e. p - 10 seconds; p - 5 seconds; p - 2 seconds)
and for three periods after presentation (i.e. p + 2 seconds;
p + 5. seconds; p + 10 seconds).
This figure shows that both the Low and High Fear
control groups experienced an overall deceleration in heart
rate in the minute prior to presentation and that all groups
experienced a deceleration during the lO second period prior
to presentation. After the presentation the two control groups
and the Active Strategy group experienced an initial
acceleration in heart rate from p + 2 to p + 5 seconds and
then a deceleration from p +5 to p + 10 seconds. In contrast,
for the Passive Strategy group the pattern of heart rate
change during these periods was the reverse; initial
deceleration and then acceleration.
A post hoc, two way analysis of variance for a repeated
measures design: Group (4) x Period (2), was computed in order
to determine whether these heart rates differed significantly
with respect to group or period. Heart rates for the ten second
periods before and after presentation were used in the computation,
The analysis revealed statistically non-significant main
effects of Group (f = 2.70, df 3» 44, p >.05) and Period
(F = 0.30, df 3, 44, p .05) and a non-significant Group i
Period interaction (F = 2.33, df 3, 44 p .05), (Group
means are presented in Table B) . (See Appendix 3 for an ANOVA 
summary table) •
Table 8
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Table of Means (m ) and Standard Deviations (s d ) for heart rates
Group: Active Passive High Low
(n=8) Strategy Strategy Fear pear
condition condition control control
Measure:
Heart rate (bpm)
Time (secs)
P - 60 - M 90.50 97.67 88.83 90.50
SD 10.34 15.22 15.07 13.31
P - 10 M 97 .5 0 103.00 88.00 96.00
SD 11.19 17.69 15.84 9.22
P - 5 M 97.00 IOC.00 86.00 95.00
SD 13.00 18.06 16.84 11.95
P - 2 M 95.00 IOC. 00 85.00 90.00
SD 17.32 17.32 17.32 18.11
P + 2 M 100.00 102.50 85.00 92.50
Sd 14.77 23.79 17.32 15.42
P + 5 M 102.00 . 100.50 89,00 95.00
SD 12.00 18.29 13.00 13.97
P + 10 M 100.83 101.00 87.00 93.50
SD 10.18 19.12 12.40 12.65
P = point 0:F pres entation of cockroach
M - 5 M 101.00 102.00 95.00 98.00
SD 11.92 19.48 13.00 16.83
M - 2 M 105.00 97.50 95.00 102.50
SD 15.72 18.60 11.71 20.11
M + 2 M 97.50 102.50 92.50 97.50
SD 13.61 15.41 20.14 18.63
M + 5 M 98.00 104.00 95.00 102.00
SD 8.61 17.97 15.74 18.86
M = point of maximurn approach on the B.A.T •
M + 10 M 100.00 103.00 95.00 102.50
SD 9.34 16.50 13.50 16.74
M + 20 M 97.00 101.31 93.30 101.20
SD 9.93 14.42 12.00 15.50
Baseline M 81.00 83.12 77.31 90.10
SD 8.96 11.29 8.99 11.67
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Table 9
Results Summary Table
Measure Analysis Outcome of Analysis
B.A.T.
scores
Kruskall-Wallis one way analysis 
of approach scores for the high 
fear conditions
H = 2.88, df 2, p ^  .03
The Kruskall-Wallis H statistic was 
used to compare the B.A.T. scores 
of each of the high fear groups with 
those of the Low Fear control group
(l f )
LF vs High Fear
controls p^^ .01 
LF vs Passive strategy 
condition p >  .05 
LF vs Active strategy 
condition p ^  .05
Chi square: a comparison of the 
number of high fear subjects in 
each group who touched thecockroach 
with the number who did not
= 2.68x df 2, p>.05)
Subjective
fear
ratings
Krusl^ 11-Wallis one way analysis 
of fear ratings for the high 
fear conditions
H=,8df 2, p >  .05
The KruskSdl-Wallis H statistic was 
used to compare the fear ratings 
of each of the high fear groups with 
those of the Low Fear control group
(l f )
LF vs High fear
controls p .01 
LF vs Passive strategy 
condition p ^  .01 
LF vs Active strategy 
conditon p .01
Heart  ^
rate
One way analysis of variance of 
baseline heart rates for all 
groups
F = 3.14, df 3, 44, 
P <  .05
One way analysis of variance of 
heart rates recorded during the 
five second period prior to the 
instant of the maximum approach 
on the B.A.T.
F = .48, df 3, 44, 
P > . 0 5
1. A complete ANOVA summary table is presented in Appendix 3.
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DISCUSSION
Contrary to the findings of the previous study, the 
results of this study do not suggest that the rehearsal of 
the ’Passive Coping Strategy' (after Evans, 1977) is 
significantly more effective in reducing fear in cockroach- 
fearful subjects than the rehearsal of personally devised 
strategies, i.e. those strategies rehearsed by the High Fear 
Control group. In addition, the present experiment failed to 
illustrate the expected fear-reducing properties of the 
'Active Coping Strategy’ (after Meichenbaum, 197l)*
The reason why these expected differences did not emerge 
is not clear, although the observations which were made in 
this study do raise doubts about the adequacy of the 
experimental methodology, as a test of the hypothesised effects 
of the strategies. Specifically, these observations suggest 
that the subjects in all of the high fear groups were, on 
average, only moderately fearful during the H.A.T.: they reported 
only moderate amounts of subjective fear and approach scores 
show a marked ceiling effect, with 50^' of subjects touching 
the cockroach. Moreover, heart rates recorded during the B.A.T. 
failed to distinguish between the high fear and low fear groups. 
It is conceivable that such levels of fearfulness, with little 
scope for further reductions, served to reduce the possibility 
of significant differences between the strategies emerging. 
Therefore, a more adequate investigation of the differential 
efficacy of the strategies would attempt to maximise the fear- 
evoking potential of the behaviour avoidance test. .This would 
have the effect of increasing the potential magnitude of fear 
reduction and, therefore, increase the probability of any real 
differences emerging.
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Maximising the fear-evoking potential of the B.A.T. could 
be achieved by selecting a sample of more highly fearful subjects 
(e.g. only those who reported 'very much' fear on the FSSIIl), 
and by making the B.A.T. itself more demanding. For example, 
subjects could be asked to handle the feared stimulus rather 
than just touch it.
A future experiment might also include a second high fear 
control group who simply undergo a B.A.T. without the prior 
rehearsal of a strategy. The inclusion of such a group would 
allow for a test of the possibility (not considered in this or 
the previous study), that the rehearsal of any strategy is 
effective in reducing fearfulness.
A final point of interest about the observations made in
this study concerns the pattern of heart rate responses to the
signal  ^ proceeding the presentation of the cockroach. It is
interesting to note that in the ten second period following the
signal, but prior to presentation, the high fear groups showed
2
an overall deceleration in heart rate . This pattern of 
deceleration is inconsistent with research findings (Bare and 
Blevings, 1975) which suggest that the heart rates of fearful 
subjects awaiting a slide presentation of a phobic stimulus 
are characterised by acceleration.
1 This was the signal "Now" which was given to the subject 
by the experimenter and preceded ■ the presentation of 
the cockroach by ten seconds.
2 Also see Figure 1.
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One possible interpretation of these discrepant 
findings is that the heart rate responses of the high fsar 
subjects in this study, including these of the High Fear 
control group, were influenced by the treatments which were 
administered prior to the signal. However, given that there 
is no evidence to suggest that the treatments had a significant 
effect upon any of the measures, a more plausible interpretation 
of this finding,and one which is consistent with the other 
observations discussed above, is that the observed pattern 
of heart rates were those of moderately fearful subjects, while 
those recorded by Hare and Blevings were those of highly 
fearful subjects. Indeed the pattern of heart rates for 
the high fear subjects in this study more readily resembles 
the deceleration noted by Hare and Blevings (ibid) for low 
fear subjects anticipating a slide presentation. We might 
speculate then, that anticipatory heart rates for highly 
fearful subjects are characterised by acceleration, while 
heart rate deceleration is characteristic of moderate or low 
levels of fear.
Alternatively, it is possible that these inconsistent 
findings reflect the different stimulus presentations (i.e. 
slide vs live stimulus), or that in this study heart rate 
acceleration for both high and low fear subjects reflected 
their readiness to perform a task (i.e. approaching the 
stimulus). Interestingly, Hare and Blevings, (ibid) have 
suggested that the anticipatory accelerative response they 
observed prior to pictorial stimuli, may represent a way of 
'coping with an unpleasant situation, viz. tuning out, 
rejection, or alternation of disturbing stimuli, with the 
result that the impact of the CS (tone) — UCS (slide) complex
-  143 -
is reduced somewhat.' However, they go on to suggest that 
such attenuation of potentially disturbing stimuli is only 
adaptive when the individual cannot 'use these stimuli to 
facilitate avoidance or escape behaviour.' It is possible 
that when subjects expect to see a live stimulus which they 
have been asked to approach, such attenuation is not as 
adaptive as an increased alertness and peripheral scanning 
for stimuli relevant to the situation and particularly to 
approach and avoidance: such increased alertness . and peripheral 
scanning being characterised by heart rate deceleration 
(Hastings and Christ, 196?).
Hopefully, future research will determine the nature 
of the relationship between the degree of fearfulness of 
subjects and their anticipatory heart rate responses to phobic 
stimuli presented in different ways.
In the lO second period following the presentation of 
the cockroach, the pattern  ^ of heart rates for the Active 
strategy and High Fear Control groups was one of initial 
acceleration (in the first 5 seconds) followed by deceleration 
between 5 and 10 seconds; the overall trend being acceleration.
This pattern is consistent with the observations made by Hare
(1973) and Hare and Blevings, (1975) of heart rate responses of
fearful subjects to slides of spiders which were presented
with and without signals. Interestingly, however, the third
high fear group in the present study i.e. the Passive Strategy condition,
exhibited the reverse pattern: deceleration followed by acceleration,
but with an overall trend of deceleration. In addition, while
Hare (l973) found that low fear subjects responded to slides of
spiders with heart rate deceleration, the Low Fear group in
this study responded with a pattern of heart rate change similar
1 Also see Figure 1•
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to that of the High Fear control group, i.e. overall acceleration 
in the 10 second period following presentation.
The reason for these seemingly inconsistent observations 
is not clear although they must raise some doubts about 
whether High and low fear subjects can be considered to be 
reliably characterised by different patterns of heart rate 
change during stimulus presentations.
Finally, a discussion of some of the practical and 
methodological difficulties which arose in this and the previous 
study is warranted. It was because of these difficulties that 
subsequent experiments pursued the investigation of the 
efficacy of coping strategies using subjects with a fear of 
speaking in public rather than a fear of insects.
The first practical difficulty concerned the recruitment 
of large numbers of fearful subjects to take part in both pilot 
studies and experiments; this and the previous study greatly 
depleted the pool of insect and/spider fearful subjects available. 
In addition, the results of the present study suggest that a 
more stringent criterion would need to be employed in future 
experiments if a sample of highly, rather than moderately, 
fearful subjects were required. Thus the number of potential 
subjects would be further reduced.
The second practical problem involved the acquisition 
of the phobic stimuli. Both spiders and cockroaches are 
surprisingly difficult to find at certain times of the year.
Of the methodological difficulties which arose the most 
interesting concerned the containment of the stimuli. In both 
studies care was taken to control for the movement of the 
stimuli andtherefore subjects were presented with a contained,
- iii5 -
motionless spider or cockroach. However, this procedure provoked 
some interesting comments from the subjects who took part in 
this study. A number of them asked after the B.A.T. if the 
cockroach was dead, while several commented upon the absence 
of movement and the roach's containment. When these subjects 
were questioned it became apparent that their perceptions had 
made thecockroach less frightening than they had expected it 
to be.
It seems then, that for some subjects at least, a contained, 
motionless cockroach is a different stimulus to a moving 
uncontained one: the latter possibly evoking significantly 
higher levels of fear than the former. If this is the case then 
presenting subjects with an uncontained roach would not only be 
expected to evoke higher levels of fear but also provide a 
more meaningful methodology for the assessment of treatment 
effects: in real life insects are usually uncontained. However, 
such a procedure is unlikely to be employed experimentally as it 
would create practical and ethical problems. Practically it would 
be difficult to accurately measure approach behaviour with both 
the subject and the stimulus moving, especially when the movement 
of the stimulus is unpredictable and variable. Moreover, a 
moving subject would reduce the sensitivity of heart rate as an 
index of fear because such movement would also affect this 
variable. In addition, physiological recording would be ethically 
difficult to justify if it involved restricting the subjects' 
movements (i.e. by being wired to a polygraph) and therefore their 
ability to avoid the moving stimulus.
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Experiment 3:
AN EXAMINATION OF THE POSSIBLE USE OF VIDEO-RECORDING AS AN 
ALTERNATIVE TO A LIVE AUDIENCE IN INVESTIGATIONS OF PUBLIC SPEAKING 
ANXIETY
Due to the practical and methodological difficulties encountered 
in the previous studies a different 'target behaviour' was chosen 
for subsequent investigations, namely fear of speaking in public.
This particular fear was chosen for a number of reasons. Firstly, 
within the college population which was screened  ^ for types and 
intensity of fears there was a large number of subjects who reported 
extreme fear of public speaking; 18^ of females and 15^ of males 
indicated their fear to be 'very much' on the FSS III (Kartsounis, 
Mervyn-Smith and Pickersgill, 1983) While indexing a large pool 
of potential subjects these figures also illustrate the widespread 
nature of a problem possibly debilitating for many people during 
college life. Secondly, several studies have demonstrated the 
amenability of public speaking to a variety of behavioural, subjective 
and physiological measures (e.g. Blom and Craighead, 1974; Paul,
1966). Thirdly , Borkovec et al. (l974) have argued that indices 
of public speaking anxiety are resistant to the influence of simple 
demand or suggestion effects.
Nevertheless, practical problems do exist for researchers 
investigating speech anxiety, the most notable of which is assembling 
a live audience. It was considered that one possible solution to 
this problem would be to use a video-camera instead of an audience: 
if such a stimulus elicits high levels of fear from
1 Uging Wolpe's (l973) Fear Survey Schedule (FSS III)
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speech-anxious subjects then it would have clear practical 
advantages over the use of a live audience. In addition, a 
video-recording would provide the researcher with a permanent 
record of the data source which could be analysed and re-analysed 
whenever required. Furthermore, video-recording could provide 
the basis for a standard procedure for investigating speech 
anxiety which would allow for the direct comparison of research 
findings. That such a standard procedure is needed is evident 
from a review of the literature which revealed a good deal of 
variation in the experimental methodology of those studies 
investigating speech anxiety, especially with respect to the 
audience. For example, the size of an audience has varied from 
one person in some studies (Borkovec et al, 1974) to ten in 
others ( Fremouw and Zitter, 1978) while the composition has 
varied from a group of clinical psychologists and students 
(Meichenbaum et al, 197l) to fellow subjects (Fremouw and Zitter, 
1978).
Observations made in a pilot study did indeed show that
subjects who reported high levels of 'speech-anxiety  ^ expressed
2
high levels of fear during the presentation of an impromptu 
speech to a video-camera. The procedure also involved instructing 
these subjects that the film of their performance may be shown 
to a live audience at a later date.
Therefore, the purpose of the present study was to provide a 
controlled test of the hypothesis that this stimulus complex 
(i.e. video-camera plus instructions) would elicit significantly 
more fear from high  ^ fear public speakers than subjects low  ^
in speech anxiety.
1 This was determined by their response to the item 'speaking 
in public on Wolpe's (1973) Fear Survey Schedule (FSS III).
2 Indexed by subjective, behavioural and physiological measures.
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This hypothesis was tested using behavioural and subjective 
measures. The behavioural measures included word count (i.e. 
number of words spoken) and the aggregate duration of silence 
during the speech. Several researchers (e.g. Geer, 1965; Meichenbaum 
et al 1971), have shown that these measures distinguish between 
high and low speech anxious subjects and suggested therefore, that they 
index speech anxiety. More specifically, Geer (1965) found 
that high fear speakers produced loP.ger silences than low fear 
speakers during an impromptu speech, while Meichenbaum et al 
(1971) found that high fear subjects spoke significantly fewer 
words than a low fear group during a four-minute speech presented 
to a live audience.
In accordance with these findings it was predicted that 
the high fear subjects in this study would produce significantly 
fewer words and significantly more silence than low fear subjects.
Speech disruptions  ^ were also scored. Mahl (1956) has 
reported that speech disruptions index anxiety in psychiatric 
patients during interview, although Fremouw and Harmatz (l975) 
and Meichenbaum et al (l97l) found that this measure failed to 
distinguish between high and low speech-anxious college students 
presenting prepared speeches. Therefore, in this study this 
measure was included in order to test the possibility that 
speech disruptions index anxiety in fearful subjects presenting 
impromptu speeches. Specifically, it was predicted that low 
fear subjects would emit significantly fewer disruptions than the 
high fear speakers.
During the pilot study it was also noted that in terms of 
1 'Urns’, *ahs*, stutters, repetitions.
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these behavioural measures the high fear subjects tended to show 
a deterioration in performance during their speech. Specifically, 
as time went on they spoke fewer words, silence increased and 
so did disruptions. Therefore, in order to examine the possibility 
that high and low fear speakers exhibit significantly different 
intraspeech trends in performance, the behavioural measures were 
scored and analysed in terms of three forty-second periods for the 
two minute speeches.
Subjects were also asked to rate the degree of fear they 
experienced at three points of their speech presentations. Prior 
to their speech they were asked for a rating and following it 
they were asked to rate the degree of fear they had experienced at 
the beginning and towards the end of their speech. It was 
predicted that ratings for each point would index significantly 
higher levels of fearfulness for the high fear speakers.
The effect upon heart rate of presenting an impromptu speech 
to a camera was also examined in this study. Borkovec and Rachman 
(1979) have noted in their literature review that speech anxiety 
is ’characterised by substantial anticipatory heart rate activity'. 
However, of the few studies (e.g. Blom and Craighead, 1974; Paul, 
1966) which have examined such 'anticipatory heart rate activity’ 
none have used groups of low fear subjects with which to validate 
the use of this measure as an index of fear. Therefore, in the 
present study heart rates were recorded during a ten-second period 
prior to speech presentations in order to test the hypothesis 
that this measure distinguishes between high and low fear speakers. 
Specifically, it was predicted that heart rates for the high fear 
subjects would be significantly higher than those of the low fear 
group during this period. Heart rates were also recorded during 
speech presentations in order to test the hypothesis that this
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measure indexes fear while speakers are giving an impromptu 
speech. Again it was predicted that the heart rates for the 
high fear speakers would be significantly higher than those for 
the low fear subjects.
In the same way as with the behavioural measures, heart rates 
recorded during speech presentations were also analysed in terms 
of three forty-second periods of the speech in order to determine 
possible differential trends for the high and low fear groups.
METHOD
Subjects ;
Twenty subjects took part in the study, all of whom were 
college students. These subjects were selected from 250 students 
who had completed Volpe's (I964) Fear Survey Schedule (FSS III).
They were selected on the basis of their response to the item 
'speaking in public': 10 had indicated their fear to be 'much'
(n = 4 ) or 'very much' (n = 6) (High Pear Group), and 10 had 
indicated their fear to be 'not at all' (Low Fear Group). 
Equipment/Materials :
A Phillips camera and Sony video-recording equipment were 
used to record subject's speech presentations.
Before, during and after their speeches, subject's heart 
rates were monitored and recorded via a finger-plethysmograph linked 
to a pulse meter and counter. A San El pulse meter was used to 
pick up the signal from the light-sensitive-cell plethysmograph 
and the monitor light on the meter was used to generate a digital 
display on a counter. This display consisted of a number of flashes 
emitted by the monitor light in consecutive 5-second periods, or 
essentially the number of heart beats per 5-seconds. The digital 
display was recorded by the experimenter. (See Appendix 4 for a wiring
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diagram of this apparatus and an example of the experimenter’s 
recording sheet.
Measures ;
i) Behaviouralt
Three measures of speech performance were scored;
(a) The number of words spoken - word count (wc),
(b) The sum of each period of silence longer than 1 
second - silence (s), and
(c) The number of disruptions (d), i.e. 'um', 'ah', 
stutters and repetitions.
These measures were scored for each of the 5 forty-second 
periods of each 2-minute speech.
ii) Subjective ratings of fear:
Subjects used a 10 point Fear Thermometer (FT) (after Walk, 
1956) to rate thedegree of fear they experienced at three points 
of their speech presentations: prior to their speech they were 
asked for a rating and following it they were asked to rate the 
degree of fear they experienced at the beginning and end of the 
speech. They were told to equate 1 with calm relaxation, 5 with 
moderate fear and 10 with extreme fear.
iii) Physiological measure;
Heart rates(bpm) were recorded for a ten second period prior 
to speech presentations and for the duration of the two minute 
speech. It was scored for each of the three forty-second periods 
of each speech.
A baseline heart rate was also recorded for a 50 second period 
10 minutes afterthe completion of the speech.
Procedure :
The procedure was exactly the same for subjects in both the 
High Fear (HF) and Low Fear (LF) groups.
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Subjects arrived at the test-room not knowing the nature 
of the study; they had simply volunteered to take part in an 
experiment. Upon arrival they were reminded of their response 
to the item 'speaking in public' on the FS3III and asked to 
re-appraise it. If their response remained the same (which 
it did for all subjects) they were given the following 
instructions :
"I would like you to speak into the camera you see in 
front of you (it was placed fifteen feet away from the 
desk at which they were sitting) on a given topic for 
two minutes. You will have no time to prepare your speech.
The recording of your presentation will be shown at a 
later date to an audience of people from outside the 
college. These people willhave no knowledge of the topic 
I will ask you to talk about, so direct your speech to 
them. Is that clear ? Do you wish to proceed ?"
One High Fear subject from the original sample of ten 
refused to take part and therefore another speech anxious student 
was asked to take part.
The subjects who agreed to proceed sat at a desk in front 
of the camera and their left fore-finger was placed in a finger 
plethysmograph which was fixed to the desk top. In order to allay 
any unnecessary anxiety they were told that the plethysmograph measured 
'blood flow' and that they would not feel any sensations from it,
A brief description of how the plethysmograph worked was given.
No mention was made of heart rate recording. A microphone was 
then clipped to a suitable item of the subjects' clothing and at 
the same time they were given an explanation of its purpose.
Subjects were then asked to use the Fear Thermometer to rate 
the fear they were experiencing in anticipation of presenting a
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speech. Subsequently, they were given the following instructions: 
"Printed on the card on the desk is the topic on which 
I want you to speak (i.e. 'That I expect to get from 
college life'), please read it."
IVhen subjects had read the card the instructions continued:
" I will give you three signals; I will say 'Ready' and then 
ten seconds later I will say 'Now'. You will start your 
presentation then and stop when I say 'Stop'. Is that 
clear ?"
In the 10 second period prior to the speech presentation and 
throughout the two minute speech, heart rate was being monitored 
and recorded by the Experimenter, who remained in the test-room 
sitting in a corner behind the subject. A technician, who 
remained out of sight in an adjacent equipment room, operated 
the filming equipment and synchronised (using the signals given 
to the subject) a digital timer which was superimposed onto the film.
Following their speech presentations subjects were asked 
to use the Fear Thermometer to rate the fear they experienced at 
the beginning and towards the end of their speeches. They were 
then told that the final part of the experiment involved taking 
a baseline recording of their heart rate. They were asked to 
relax and ten minutes after the completion of their speech a 
baseline recording was taken for a 50 second period. Subsequently 
subjects were given a chance to see the film of their speech 
presentation and asked for their permission to show the recording 
to a live audience. Finally, subjects were asked not to divulge 
the nature of the experiment to anyone.
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RESULTS
i) Behavioural Measures;
Silence (s), word count (wc), and disruptions (d), were 
scored for the three,40 second periods of each speech. Each of 
these measures was scored by the Experimenter  ^ . Silence was 
scored with the aid of the digital timer superimposed upon the 
video tape and word count and disruptions were scored with the 
aid of a hand-counter. Each recording was scored twice for each 
measure and where discrepancies existed between the scores, the 
recording was scored a third time.
Scores for each of these variables were subjected to an 
ANOVA for a two factor experimental design; Group (High Fear vs 
Low Fear) x Period (3) (F ratios are presented in Table 14 and 
ANOVA summary tables are presented in Appendix 5 ).
1 As a check on the accuracy of the Experimenter's (s) scoring a 
colleague, blind to the hypotheses tested, scored ten of the 
recordings: five selected randomly from each of the groups. Seven 
of a total of 30 of this colleague's scores were discrepant with 
those of the examiner; 2 were disruption scores, 3 were silence 
scores and 2 were word count scores. Re-scoring (both by the 
examiner and the colleague) of the recordings oonfirmed four 
of the examiner's original scores and three of the colleague's.
Of the errors made by the examiner, 2 were disruption scores 
and one was a word count score. The margin of error was one and 
2 disruptions not scored on two recordings of High Fear subjects 
and 3 words not scored on a recording of’Low Fear subjects. It 
was felt that these were acceptable degrees of error and that 
further checking was not required.
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a) Silence :
Analyses of silence scores revealed a statistically 
significant main effect of Group (f = 11.84, df 1, 18, p<.Ol).
As expected the High Fear subjects were silent for significantly 
longer than Low Fear subjects. (Means are presented in Table 10 ), 
The effect of Period did not reach statistical significance 
(F = 2.74, df 2, 36, p .l) although the Group x Period interaction
did (f = 6.16, df 2, 36, p C .01).
The means reflecting this interaction (which are presented 
in Table 10 and plotted in Figure p )» illustrate the consistent 
intraspeech performance of the Low Fear group in terms of silence 
and the marked increase in silence for the High Fear group during 
Period 3» A planned test for a linear trend in the silence means 
for the High Fear group (from period 1 to 3) revealed that this 
increase was statistically significant (f = 11.59, df 1, 36, p^*Ol).
b) Word Count ;
The expected main effect of Group did not emerge frcm the 
analysis of word count scores (p = 3*9, df 1, 18, p >  .l), although 
a statistically significant main effect of Period did (f = 4.41, 
df 2, 36, p <  .05). This main effect is most readily interpretable 
in terms of a significant Group x Period interaction (f = 20.5, 
df 2, 36, p ^  .01). The means reflecting this interaction(which 
are presented in Table 10 and graphically illustrated in Figure 3 )
show, the consistent intra-speech performance of the Low Fear 
subjects and the marked reduction in words spoken by the High Fear 
Group during Period 3* A planned test for a linear trend in 
word count means for the High Fear group (from Period 1 to 3) 
revealed that this reduction was statistically significant (f = 242,
d f  1, 36, p zC .01).
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Figure 2 Silence Means as a function of Group and Period_
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c) Disruptiona;
The analysis of disruption scores revealed a statistically 
non-significant main effect of Group ( ? < l ) , although a 
significant main effect of Period (p = 3.64, df 2, 36, p <.05) 
did emerge. This main effect of Period is most readily 
interprétable in terms of a significant Group x Period 
interaction ( P =  5.2, df 2, 36, p <  .05). The means reflecting 
this interaction are presented in Table 10 and graphically 
illustrated in Figure 4 . The graph shows the intraspeech
consistency of the Low Fear group in terms of speech disruptions 
and a marked reduction for the High Fear group after the first 
speech period. A. planned test for a linear trend in the Disruption 
means (from Period 1 to 3) for the High Fear group revealed that 
this intraspeech reduction was statistically significant (f = 12.18, 
df 1, 36, p ^  .01).
In summary, only the analysis of silence scores revealed
the expected main effect of Group (i.e. significantly more silence
for the High Fear group) although the effect of this factor upon
word count scores approached statistical significance ^. However,
when intraspeech trends were considered both of these measures
distinguished between the groups, with the High Fear group showing
2
a significant intraspeech deterioration in performance.
The intraspeech trend in disruptions for the High Fear group 
was also statistically significant although this trend was in the 
direction opposite to that expected, i.e. an intraspeech reduction 
in disruptions.
1 The.05 rejection region was adopted in all statistical 
evaluations.
2 i.e. fewer words spoken and more silence
Figure 4
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Table 10;
Table of Means (m ) and standard deviations (s d ) for the 
behavioural measures:
Group (n = lo)
High Fear Low Fear
Speech
Measure Period M SD M SD
Word count 1 78.60 22.16 92.70 24.07
(No.) 2 84.30 22.18 88.60 23.07
3 57.80 31.79 99.00 17.10
Silence (secs) 1 8.70 5.42 2.45 4 .17
2 ' 8.20 6.73 4.40 8.95.
3 16.70 10.47 1.80 1.99
Disruptions 1 3 .90 3.51 2.10 1.85
(No.) 2 2.00 2.36 2.40 2.01
3 2.10 2.13 2.10 1 .91
ii) Subjective Fear Ratings:
a) Anticipatory Fear ratings:
Subjective, ratings of fear recorded prior to speech presentation 
were subjected to a t-test for independent groups.
The analysis revealed as expected, that high fear subjects 
reported significantly higher ratings (i.e. more fear) than low 
fear subjects in anticipation of speaking (t = 6.03, df 18, p 4,*0l). 
The group means are presented in Table 11 and plotted, as Rating 1 
in Figure 5» above,
b) Subjective ratings of fear experienced during speech presentations:
Subjective ratings reflecting fear experienced during speech 
presentations were subjected to a two-way ANOVA for a repeated 
measures experimental design.: Group (2) x Rating (2). (P ratios 
emerging from these analyses are presented in Table 14 and ANOVA
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summary tables are presented in Appendix 5«)
The analyses revealed a statistically significant main effect 
of Group (f = 22.6, df 1, 18 pz. Ol). This main effect is illustrated 
by Figure 5, which shows group means plotted as a function of 
rating (rating 2 reflects fear experienced at the beginning of 
the speech; rating 3 reflects fear experienced towards the end 
of the speech). This figure shows that high fear subjects were 
more fearful than low fear subjects during their speeches.
It also illustrates the statistically significant main effect 
of rating (F = 5.1, df 1, 18, p ^:.05) with both groups 
experiencing a reduction in subjective fear by the end of their 
speeches.
The Group x Rating interaction was statistically non­
significant (f <i ).
In summary, these results suggest, as expected, that the
High Fear group were significantly more fearful than the low
fear subjects both before and during their speeches. In
addition, the analysis of ratings reflecting fear experienced
while speaking suggests that both groups experienced significant
intraspeech reductions in fear.
Table 11:
Table of means (m) and standard deviations (sd) for the 
subjective fear ratings :
Group (n = 10)
High Fear Low Fear
Measure Rating M SD M SD
Subjective
fear • 1 7.05 1.83 3.70 0.95
2 7.20 2.31 3.30 1.25
5 6.00 2.87 2.50 0.97
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iii) Heart rate Measures ;
Pearson correlation coefficients were computed for 
baseline heart rates  ^ and heart rates recorded during speech 
presentations for both groups. These coefficients (see 
Table 12) do not suggest with any consistency that a positive 
linear relationship exists between these measures. Therefore, 
the following analyses of heart rates were made without 
statistically adjusting for baseline differences between 
thé groups.
Table 12
Coefficients of correlation between baseline heart rates and heart 
rates recorded before and during each of the three speech periods
Group
Phase of speech High Fear Low Fear
(n = 10) (n = 10)
10 second period
prior to speech
presentation - .14 .54
Speech Period 1 - .43 .77 *
2 .18 .20
3 .21 .79 *
* p <.01 (one-tailed tests)
1 For all analyses heart rates were scored in terms of beats 
per minute.
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a) Anticipatory Heart Rates;
Anticipatory heart rates (i.e. those heart rates recorded 
in the 10 second period prior to speech presentations) were 
subjected to a t-test for independent groups. This test 
revealed a statistically significant difference between the 
groups (t = 2.21, df 18, p <.025). This difference is 
graphically illustrated by Figure 6 (group means are also 
presented in Table 13) which shows that heart rates for the 
High Fear group were, as expected, higher than those for the 
Lor Fear subjects.
b) Heart rates recorded during speech presentations;
Heart rates recorded during the speeches were subjected to 
an ANCYA for a two-factor experimental design; Group (2) x 
Period (3), with repeated measures on one factor i.e. Period,
This analysis revealed statistically non-significant main 
effects of Group (f = 1.3, df 1, 18, p >  .05) and Period (F = 1.4, 
df 2, 3b, p >  .05). Similarly the Group x Period interaction 
was not significant (f<1). (Group means are presented in Table 
13 and plotted in Figure 6. F ratios are presented in Table 14 
and ANOVA summary tables are presented in Appendix 5).
In summary, these results show that heart rate distinguished 
between High and Low Fear public speakers who were anticipating 
presenting an impromptu speech to a video camera. Consistent with 
expectations heart rates for the High Fear subjects were significantly 
higher than those of the Low Fear group. However, contrary to 
expectations heart rates recorded while subjects were speaking 
failed to distinguish between the groups. In addition, while both 
groups experienced intra-speech reductions in heart rate (see 
Figure 6) these trends were not statistically significant.
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Table 13
Table of Means (M ) and standard deviations (SD ) for the 
heart rate measures;
------ --
Group (n = lO)
High Fear Low Fear
Measure Speech
Period M SD M SD
Heart rate
(b p m )
Antici­
patory
1
2
3
Base
Line
100.20
104.39
105.90
100.80
75.21
13.57
22.32
24.72
23.02
6.48
87.00
98.20
92.90
92.60
76.44
11.75
12.23
14.70
15.49
4.31
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Table 14
\
Summary tableof Analyses of Variance (ANOVAs ) for ail measures.
Measures
3 ilence Word
Count
Disruptions Heart
rate
Subjective
fear
rating
Source
of
variat­
ion
DF F ratio F. ratio F ratio F ratio F ratio
Group 1 11.84*** 3.89* 0.23 1.28 22.63***
Residual 18
Period 2 2.74* 4.41** 3.64** 1.44
Group x 
Period 2 6.16*** 20.45*** 5.18** 0.83
Residual 36
Rating 1 5.10**
Group X 
Rating 1 0.20
Residual 18
* p <.l
** p <.05
***p <.01
Complete ANOVA summary Tables are presented in Appendix 5*
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DISCUSSION
The above results offer some support for the hypothesis 
that individuals who report  ^ 'much' or 'very much* fear of 
speaking in public (i.e. high fear speakers) experience and 
express significantly more fear than those who have no fear of 
public speaking (i.e. low fear speakers), when presenting an 
impromptu speech to a video-camera with the knowledge that the 
recording of their performance will be viewed by an audience at 
a later date.
Specifically, it was found, consistent with expectations 
and previous findings (Ceer, 1965), that silence distinguished 
between the groups of high and low fear speakers, with the former 
group producing significantly longer durations of silence than 
the latter. Given that this measure indexes speech anxiety 
this finding suggests that the high fear speakers were significantly 
more fearful than the low fear subjects during their speeches, and 
consistent with this interpretation, it was also found that the High Fear 
group experienced significantly higher levels of subjective fear 
while speaking, than the Low Fear group. Furthermore, the analysis 
of subjective fear ratings also shows that the High Fear group 
reported being significantly more fearful than the Low Fear group 
in anticipation of speaking.
Interestingly, word count per se did not distinguish between 
the groups although the intra-speech trends in word count were 
significantly different. Consistent with expectations, and the 
suggestion that the High Fear group were significantly more 
fearful than the Low Fear group, the former group produced a 
significant intra-speech reduction in words spoken, while word 
production for the latter group remained fairly constant.
1 Using ¥olpe*s (l973) PSSIII.
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Speech disruptions also distinguished between the H^gh 
and Low Pear groups when intraspeech trends were considered, although 
contrary to expectations the High Fear subjects showed a significant 
intra-speech reduction, rather than increase, in disruptions.
However, in retrospect, it seems more plausible to expect that 
disruptions would decrease over the course of a speech especially 
if there is an intraspeech increase in silence and decrease in 
words spoken; disruptions are less likely if a subject is not 
speaking. If speech disruptions do reflect anxiety but are also 
dependent upon whether the subject is speaking, then a more 
sensitive index of anxiety, when the speech is impromptu, might 
be the ratio of disruptions to words spoken. This possibility 
could be examined in future studies.
In summary then, the behavioural measures of word count 
and silence and the subjective ratings of fear, suggest that 
the High F ear group were significantly more fearful than the Low 
Fear subjects during their speeches. In addition, subjective 
ratings suggest that the high fear speakers were significantly 
more fearful in anticipation of speaking. Contrary to expectations, 
disruptions did not index higher levels of anxiety for the High 
Fear group.
The prediction that anticipatory heart rates would distinguish 
between the groups was also upheld. As expected heart rates for the 
high fear subjects were significantly higher than those for the 
Low Fear group. Given that the High Fear group were subjectively 
more fearful than the Low Fear group in anticipation of speaking, 
it seems plausible to suggest that this difference in heart rates 
also reflects a significant difference between the groups in 
fearfulness. Thus, this finding supports the hypothesis that 
anticipatory heart rate is an index of fear.
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In contrast, the hypothesis that heart rate is an index 
of fear while subjects are speaking is not supported. Contrary 
to expectations heart rates recorded during the speeches failed 
to distinguish between the groups. It is interesting to note 
however, that both groups did experience substantial increases 
in heart rate above baseline during their speeches (see Figure 6) 
We might speculate that these increases not only reflect the 
anxiety generated by the task but also the mental and physical 
effort required to produce an impromptu speech. If this is 
the case then it is possible that the expected difference in 
heart rates between the groups, due to differences in fearfulness, 
was obscured by the effect upon this variable of the mental 
and physical effort common to both groups. We might speculate 
further that heart rate would be a more sensitive index of 
speech anxiety when the mental and physical effort required 
to deliver a speech is minimized; for example when subjects are 
reading a rehearsed speech. This possibility might be examined 
in future studies.
Finally, it is interesting to note that the analyses 
revealed significantly different intraspeech trends for the 
groups with respect to both word count and silence. The means 
show (see Table 10 ) that word production and silence for the Low 
Fear group was fairly constant across speeches. However, the 
performance of the High Fear group deteriorated significantly 
during their speeches. They spoke fewer words while silences 
became increasingly longer. If, as assumed, these measures index 
fear, then we might speculate that the intraspeech trend for the 
High Fear group reflects a significant intraspeech increase 
in fearfulness. However, the analysis of subjective fear ratings
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suggests that both the High and Low Fear groups experienced a 
significant intraspeech reduction in fear. How can these 
apparently contradictory findings be interpreted ?
Perhaps the most straightforward interpretation is that 
the observed desynchrony between these measures reflects the 
partial independence of these systems (i.e. behavioural and 
subjective) of fearful expression. Such an interpretation is 
consistent with a "Three-Systems-Model* of fear (Lang et al,
1972, Rachman, 1978) which proposes that fear is best construed 
as a set of loosely coupled,partially independent components.
Alternatively, it is possible that these desynchronous 
trends do not reflect differences in the systems of 
expression but the way in which these expressions of fear 
were measured. In the study subjects were asked to rate the 
degree of subjective fear they felt at the beginning and 
’towards the end* of their speech. As these ratings were 
retrospective it is possible that the ratings for ’towards the 
end* of the speeches were influenced not only by the fear 
subjects experienced towards the end of their speech but also 
the ’fear relief’ they may have felt when they were told to 
stop speaking. Thus it may be misleading to compare these ratings 
with the behavioural measures which indexed the trend in fear 
from the first to the last forty-second period of the speeches.
Whatever the explanation, it is hoped that future research 
might shed some light upon this puzzling observation.
To conclude, the results of this study suggest that the 
stimulus complex of video-camera plus instructions,elicited 
significantly more fear from the High Fear speakers, both before 
and during the presentation of an impromptu speech. Therefore, 
this stimulus complex can be used as an effective substitute for 
a live audience in future investigations of speech anxiety.
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Experiment 4
AN INVESTIGATION OF THE EFFECTS OF DIFFERENT COPING STRATEGIES UPON 
SPEECH ANXIETY
In Chapter 4 of this thesis a number of studies which examined
the efficacy of a variety of cognitive therapies were reviewed.
Briefly, the conclusions to be drawn from this review are as
follows ; firstly, it is evident that speech anxiety and fears of
animals and insects in college students have been reduced by cognitive
behaviour therapies. Secondly, there is some evidence (i.e. Wine,
1970; Glogower et al. 1978) to suggest that while all of the
components of cognitive restructuring therapies produce some
reduction in fearfulness, the major therapeutic component is the use
of coping self-statements (CSS). Thirdly, it is also apparent that the
nature of adaptive/effective coping self-statements has yet to be
clearly defined. Indeed in most studies researchers have tended to
omit a full description of the self-statements used by their subjects.
Two of the coping strategies which have been described
(Meichenbaum, 1971; Evans, 1977) evolved from Meichenbaum's (l977)
suggestion  ^ that the cognitions which are presumed to mediate fearful
behaviour are a function of the perception of the physiological
concomitants of fear. Interestingly, however, the CSS devised by these
2
researchers are quite different. Evans* CSS encouraged subjects 
to passively expect and accept the physiological concomitants of 
fear, while Meichenbaum*s encouraged subjects to actively cope 
with these concomitants by self-instructing to 'relax and keep calm*.
The purpose of the second experiment in this series was to 
provide a test of the hypothesis that the rehearsal of these coping
1 This suggestion is discussed more fully in Chapter 4.
2 The possible theoretical implication of these coping self-statements 
are discussed in Experiment 2.
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strategies results in a significant reduction in fear 
(i.e. fear of cockroaches), although it failed to do so 
satisfactorily. Therefore, the present study was carried out 
in order to provide a further test of this hypothesis. However, 
this study differed from the former study in several important respects 
Firstly, the results of the previous study (i.e. experiment 3 ) 
suggest that speech anxiety is indexed by behavioural, subjective 
and physiological measures when speakers are presenting an 
impromptu speech to a video-camera with the knowledge that the 
recording of their performance will be viewed by a live audience 
at a later date. Therefore it was decided to use this experimental 
method in the present study in order to examine the effects of 
the coping strategies upon speech anxiety. Secondly, experiment 2 
included a condition designed to control for the effects upon 
fear of writing down and rehearsing a coping strategy; this group 
devised and rehearsed their own cop_ng self-statements before 
undergoing the behavioural avoidance test (BAT). However, the 
study did not include a control group which simply underwent the 
B.A.T. Thus, the possibility that subjects’ personally devised coping 
strategies were effective in reducing fearfulness could not 
be examined. This omission was remedied in this study.
Specifically, the experimental design included four conditions 
in which subjects either rehearsed coping self-statements based  ^
upon those devised by Meichenbaum or Evans (experimental conditions) 
or rehearsed their own personally devised coping strategies, or 
simply underwent exposure to the fearvevoking task without prior
1 As in experiments 1 and ' 2 subjects were asked to rephrase 
the coping self-statements in their own words but maintain 
the meaning.
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preparation (control conditions). Thirdly, in the present study 
subjects were exposed to the phobic stimulus on two occasions, i.e. 
they gave two speeches. It was considered that the differential 
fear-reducing effects of the experimental and control conditions 
might become more readily apparent during a second speech, after 
subjects had rehearsed and experienced using the coping strategies 
during the first speech. More specifically it was expected that 
the experimental groups would experience significantly greater 
inter-speech (i.e. from speech 1 to 2) reductions in fear.
The specific predictions made with regard to each of the 
measures of fear used were as follows. ' Firstly, the findings of 
the previous study (i.e. Experiment 3) show that the impromptu 
speeches of high fear speakers are characterised by a significant 
intra-speech deterioration in terms of behavioural measures, i.e. 
a reduction in words spoken and an increase in silence. Therefore, 
in the present study it was expected that the fear-reducing 
properties of the coping strategies used by the experimental groups 
would be demonstrated by significantly different intra-speech 
trends in these indices for the four groups. More specifically, 
it was predicted that the intra-speech deterioration in performance 
would be significantly greater for the control groups during both 
speeches. In addition, it was considered that all groups would 
experience an inter-speech (i.e. from Speech 1 to 2) reduction in 
fear as a function of their repeated exposure to the phobic stimulus 
and that that reduction would be indexed by an improvement in 
performance, i.e. more words spoken and less silence during the 
second speech. Eoivever, it was also predicted that the experimental 
groups would demonstrate a significantly greater inter-speech 
improvement in performance compared to the control groups.
Secondly, the results of the previous study also show that
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speakers * fear both before and during the presentation of a 
speech is indexed by subjective ratings on a 10 point Fear 
Thermometer (after Walk, 1956). Therefore, in the present study 
it was predicted that this measure would reflect the expected 
difference between the experimental and control groups. More 
specifically, it was predicted that the former groups would 
report significantly lower levels of fear both before and during 
their speeches. In addition, it was expected that all groups 
would experience intra  ^ and inter-speech reductions in subjective 
fear but that these reductions would be significantly greater 
for the experimental groups. Thirdly, the findings of the 
previous study also show that anticipatory heart rates (i.e. 
those recorded in a ten second period prior to speaking; also 
index speech anxiety. Therefore in this study it was predicted 
that the expected lower levels of fear for the experimental groups 
would be indexed by significantly lower anticipatory heart rates 
for these groups compared to the control groups.
The results of experiment 3 also show that the heart rates 
of high and low fear speakers recorded while they were speaking 
were markedly elevated above baseline, although this measure 
failed to distinguish between these groups. In addition, the 
observations made in this study show that both of these groups 
experienced an intra-speech deceleration in heart rate; albeit a 
statistically non-significant one. However, it might be expected
1 Intra-speech changes in subjective fear were measured by 
asking subjects to rate the fear they experienced at the 
beginning and end of each of their speeches.
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on the basis of this trend that high fear speakers would show 
a continued deceleration in h:art rate with repeated exposure, 
iv, during'a second speech. Therefore in the present study, 
heart rates were recorded during the subjects' speeches in order 
to determine whether high fear speakers experience significant 
interspeech reductions in heart rate and furthermore whether the 
groups experience different inter-speech trends in heart rate 
consistent with the trends expected for the behavioural and 
subjective measures.
METHOD
Subjects ;
Thirty-two subjects^ took part in the study. They were 
selected from approximately 320 students on the basis of their 
response to the item 'Speaking in Public' on Wolpe's (l973)
Fear Survey Schedule (FSS III). Twenty-four of the subjects had 
indicted their fear of speaking in public to be 'very much* and 
eight had indicated their fear to be 'much'.
Equipment/MateriaIs ;
A Phillips camera and Sony video recording equipment was 
used to record subjects' speech presentations.
Before, during and after their speeches, subjects' heart
rates were monitored and recorded via a finger plethysmograph linked
to a pulse meter and counter. A San El pulse meter was used to
pick up the signal from the light-sensitive-ce11-plethysmograph
and the monitor light on the meter was used to generate a digital
display on a counter. This display consisted of the number of
flashes emitted by the monitor light in consecutive 5 second periods,
or essentially the number of heart beats per 5 seconds. The
digital display was recorded by the experimenter (See Appendix 4 
^ None of these subjects had taken part in the previous study.
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for a wiring diagram of this apparatus and an example of the 
experimenter’s recording sheet)*
Experimental Design;
Thirty-two subjects were assigned to one of four conditions 
labelled: Active Strategy, Passive Strategy, Control Strategy 
and Control condition. They were assigned to these conditions 
in the following way: the first scheduled subject from a 
particular FSS level (i.e. 4 - 'much' or 5 - 'very much') was 
assigned to the first of the four conditions; the second subject 
from that FSS level to the second condition and so on. This 
assignment procedure was repeated with each block of four 
subjects from each of the. FSS levels, thereby guaranteeing an 
equal number of subjects from each level in each of the four 
conditions, i.e. 6 from level 5 and 2 from level 4»
Each subject gave two speeches, separated by a week, on 
two different topics. For clarity these will be denoted Topics A 
and B. In order to control for the possible effects of speech 
topic upon the measures of speech anxiety used, four of the 
subjects in each condition were asked to speak on Topic A first and 
Topic B second, while the other four presented speeches in the 
reverse order, i.e. Topic B and Topic A. The order in which a 
subject presented speeches on these topics was determined by the 
same procedure used for allocating the subjects to conditions.
Specifically, the first scheduled subject within each condition
from a particular FSS level presented speeches in the order AB
while the second subject from that level presented the speeches
in the order BA and so on. This procedure resulted in one subject
in each condition from FSS level 4 and three from FSS level 5
presenting speeches in the AB order and similarly one subject from
FSS level 4 and three from FSS level 5 presenting speeches in the BA order.
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Measures of Speech Anxiety;
i) Behavioural Indices
Two behavioural measures of speech anxiety were scored :
(a) the number of words spoken - wozrd count (wc); (b) the sum 
of each period of silence longer than one second in duration - 
silence (s). These measures were scored for each of the three 
forty-second periods of e ach speech in order to determine intra­
speech trends.
ii) Subjective report;
For both of their speeches subjects used a 10 point Fear 
Thermometer (FT) (After Walk, 1956) to rate the fear they 
experienced at three points of the presentation. They were 
asked to rate their fear immediately prior to speaking and 
following their speech they were askedfor a rating of the fear 
they experienced at the beginning and end of the speech. They 
were told to equate 1 with calm relaxation, 5 with moderate 
fear and 10 with extreme fear.
iii) Physiological Index;
Heart rate was recorded for a ten second period prior to 
the presentation of each speech and for the duration of each of 
the two minute speeches. A baseline heart rate was also recorded 
for 50 seconds ten minutes after the completion of the second 
speech.
Procedure ;
Session 1
Subjects arrived at the test-room for the first of the two 
sessions unaware of the nature of the study; they had simply 
volunteered to take part in an experiment. Upon arrival subjects 
were reminded of their response to the item 'Speaking in Public’ 
on the FSS III and asked to appraise it. If their responses
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remained the same  ^ they were given the following instructions:
"I would like you to speak into the camera you see in 
front of you (it was placed 15 feet away from the desk 
at which they were sitting) on a given topic for two 
minutes. You will have no time to prepare your speech.
The film of your presentation will be shown at a later 
date to an audience of people from outside the college.
These people will have no knowledge of the topic I will 
ask you to talk about, so direct your speech to them.
Is that clear ? Do you wish to proceed ?"
Three subjects refused to take part; two of them had been 
assigned to the two experimental groups and one to the High Fear 
control group. These subjects were replaced by additional subjects 
who had expressed the same degree of fear of public speaking on 
the FSS III.
Those subjects who agreed to proceed sat at a desk in front 
of the camera and those who had been assigned to the Active 
Strategy, Passive Strategy or Control Strategy received, in 
accordance with their allocation, the following instructions printed 
on a sheet of A4 paper :
Active Strategy Condition;
Subjects in this group received the coping strategy devised 
by Meichenbaum et al (l97l) and denoted for the purposes of this 
study the Active Strategy. It was proceeded by an introductory 
paragraph and read as follows :
Most people find that they can prepare themselves for a 
difficult task by thinking about it. In the space below 
please write down your ideas about facing up to your fear 
of public speaking. Try to make it convincing to yourself
1 For all subjects these responses were the same as their initial
responses on the FSS ITT.
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perhaps by imagining that you are giving instructions 
to help someone else.
A couple of sentences are given to start you off:
"Relax, keep calm, take this steadily. If other people 
can do it, so can I. Take it slowly, breathe deeply, that's 
it. I am relaxed, calm, I can cope with the situation...." 
Passive Strategy Condition:
The subjects in this group received the following coping 
self-statements devised by Evans, (l977). Similarly they were 
proceeded by an introductory paragraph;
Most people find that they can prepare themselves for a 
difficult task by thinking about it. In the space below, 
please write down your ideas about facing up to your fear 
of public speaking. Try to make it convincing to yourself, 
perhaps by imagining that you are giving instructions to 
help someone else.
A couple of sentences to start you off ;
"Of course, I can't help being afraid in the situation.
I shall be afraid, but at least I should realise that 
there is no point in getting frightened of the fear. The 
feelings of fear cannot kill me, so I shall try and stand 
back and examine my fear; pounding heart, sweaty palms, etc...." 
Control Strategy Condition;
Subjects in this group simply received the introductory 
paragraph received by those subjects in the two experimental 
groups ;
Most people find that they can prepare themselves for a 
difficult task by thinking about it. In the space below 
please write down your ideas about facing up to your fear 
of public speaking. Try to make it convincing to yourself.
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perhaps by imagining that you are giving instructions
to help someone else.
This condition was incorporated into the design in order 
to control for the possible non-specific effects of the experimental 
conditions, such as writing down and rehearsing self-statements. 
Control Condition;
Subjects in this group were simply asked to present two 
speeches.
Subjects in the Active and Passive strategy groups were then 
told to carefully read through their instructions and take their 
time over rephrasing the strategy in their own words but without 
changing the meaning. The subjects in the Control Strategy group 
were instructed to take their time over devising their own 
strategies. Subsequently the subjects in these three groups were 
told to read through and mentally rehearse their strategies three 
times and use them in preparation for their speeches.
The procedure for subjects in all groups was then as follows : 
The subjects' left fore-finger was placed in a finger-plethysmograph 
which was fixed to the desk top at which they were sitting. In 
order to allay any unnecessary anxiety they were told that the 
plethysmograph measured 'blood flow'. A brief description of how 
this was achieved was given. No mention was made of heart rate 
recording. A microphone was then clipped to a suitable item of the 
subjects' clothing and at the same time they were given an 
explanation of its purpose.
Subjects were then asked to use the Fear Thermometer (FT) 
to rate the fear they were experiencing in anticipation of presenting 
a speech and then were given the following instructions:
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’On the card on the desk is printed the topic  ^ on which I 
want you to speak, please read it.' When the subjects had 
read the card, the instructions continued; 'I will give 
you three signals; I will say 'Ready' and then ten seconds 
later I will say 'Now'. You will start your speech then 
and stop when I say 'Stop'. Please remember to use the 
strategies you have been rehearsing.'
In the ten second period prior to the speech presentation 
and throughout the two minute speech, heart rate was monitored and 
recorded by the Experimenter who remained in the test room sitting 
in a corner behind the subject. A technician who remained out of 
sight in an adjacent equipment room, operated the recording 
equipment and synchronised (using the signals given to the subject) 
a digital timer which was superimposed on the film.
Following their speech presentations subjects were asked to 
use the FT to rate the fear they experienced at the beginning and 
end of the speech.
Appointments were then made at the end of this first session
to see subjects in a week's time in order to complete the second
half of the study. Arrangements were made to meet them in another 
part of the college in order to allay any suspicions about the 
nature of the second session. They were also asked not to talk to 
anyone about the study.
Session 2;
The second session proceeded as follows : subjects were met 
at the pre-arranged place and taken to the test-room.
1 The speech topics were : 'What I expect to get from college life,
in both social and academic terms' and 'Describe what Bedford 
College has to offer in terms of social and academic facilities.'
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There, they were told that the second half of the study, as in 
the first, involved presenting an impromptu two minute speech 
which would be recorded andshown to a live audience at a later 
date. When asked, all subjects agreed to proceed.
Subjects in the strategy groups (i.e. Passive, Active and 
Control Strategy groups) were then given the strategies they had 
written and rehearsed in the first session and told to use them 
in preparation for their second speech. Again they were told to 
carefully read through the statements and mentally rehearse them 
three times. The procedure for all subjects was then exactly 
the same as for the first session apart from the change in speech 
topic for each subject.
Following their second speech subjects were told that the 
final part of the experiment involved taking a baseline recording 
via the plethysmograph, of their 'blood flow'. They were told to 
relax, and then ten minutes after the completion of their speech 
a baseline recording of their heart rate was taken for a 30-second 
period.
Subsequently subjects were asked for their permission to show 
the recording to a live audience. Their questions about the 
experiment were answered and finally they were asked not to discuss 
the study with anyone.
Due to a recurrent equipment fault (i.e. the digital display 
counter) heart measures for twelve of the subjects presenting their 
second speeches were lost. However, these subjects agreed to 
return to the test room so that their baseline heart rates could be 
re-recorded.
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RESULTS
Behavioral Measures;
Word count (wc) and duration of silence (s) were scored for the 
three 40 second periods of each two minute speech. Both of these 
measures were scored by the Experimenter. Silence was scored with 
the aid of the digital timer superimposed on, the video-tape and 
word count with the aid of a hand counter. Each recording was 
scored twice for each measure and where discrepancies existed 
between the scores the recording was scored a third time.
The scores for each of these variables were subjected to 
an ANOVA for a four factor experimental design: Group (4 ) x 
Speech (2) x Topic Order (2) x Period (3), with repeated measures 
on two of the factors, i.et Speech and Period. (F ratios are 
presented in Table 17 and complete ANOVA summary tables in 
Appendices 6 and ?).
(a) Word Count ;
Analysis of word count scores revealed statistically non­
significant main effects of Group (f = 0.79, df 3, 24, p ^  .05), 
Speech (f = O.9I, df 1, 24, p i> .05) and Topic Order (F = 0.36, 
df 1, 24, p >'05).
However a significant main effect of Period (f  = 11.22, df 2,
48, p .01) did emerge from the analysis. This effect is most 
easily interpreted in terms an expected Group x Period interaction
( F= 4 .9 1, df 6, 48, p ^C*Ol). The means reflecting this interaction
which are presented in Table 15 and plotted in Figure 7 , were
subjected to planned tests for linear trends (Winer, 1971; p 177).
Consistent with expectations these tests revealed a significant
intra-speech reduction in word production for the control group
(F = 4 .64, df 1, 48, p Z.'05), while the word count for the Active
Strategy group was fairly consistent during their speeches (F-^1,
df 1, 48, p .> .05). However, contrary to expectations the intra
— 183 “
ro M
ta
t r y
p P
co-
P p
3 3
P p
P
§
P
P P
y P
p p
o o
o o
t-> M
t-f M
p P
t l *d
M p
P p
p .
O o
< <
p p
y
P *T)
"d P
p M
P H-
o O
p - P .
p P
w
F :
o
O
g
< t
s
S
pp
3
t-t CD f)
IV) M p ro  M p 4
p p O
p - o P
3 *d
IV
ro
P
V/l IV) M VM rv) v-j VvJ IV  t-f H-
O
M
o
00 ~J - J - J  00 00 -0 e t
VD CD ON -fk NjJ 00 ON o M  4k 3 H-
<
M  Vj-J VjO CD ro  o o  VJ t-t ON -0 P
V j  00 CD 00 V I  o o  M  VX) o  o
en
IV) M  M ro  ro  fNO IV  rv  IV M  ro en 2
O  cr\ -P*- VA) -fk V I M O I - ' ~0  Vjj o e t• • • P
go -F^  VX) v>) |N0 vn 4k  M  V VaJ VJ S
œ  <3 VX) fV  VJ V  M  4k VJ
—J “~3 -P  ^ CD 4k - J  —J ON -J 3 P
->3 O  l\) VX) O n vD CD 00 ON VJ M P
•  •  • m
O W ) M  V I  CD VaJ 4k VJ ON CD H-
VtJ CD vn V )  O  (S 00 00 M 00 VJ <
p
en
e t
|\0 V>J V)3 rv  H  VJ ro IV  VJ VJ ro y
- <  M  M OD - J  H -V  VJ o M  VX) O p
•  • • e+
~ j  vn - j VX) O  - J V>J V  VD ,ro IV P
O  M  - J ro  - 0  CD - J  Vû VJ V )  VJ q
—0 -~3 - J  00 - J --3 - 4  -o - J  00 o
IX) V/j 00 -C  VX) ON CD ON ro  M o
5S p
VJ1 ON vn M  o  ~0 V jj VJ ON V I  ON et
o  VJ o VjJ o  V M  M  VJ 4k VJ g
en
ro  v>J ro IV  IV  M IV  IV  M ro  ro et
-F»- o  o 00 O  V I VJ ON - J 4k  M y
w p
->J O n OJ O  -P» M ON ON ON V I  IV et
H  CD ON O  VX) ro  VX) ON 4 k  ON PS3
ON VJ1 <P> VJ1 - J  <J VJ1 ON - 3 ON ON
O  CD IV  M  ON ON VJ rv M  ON 3
•  •  • O
O  vn M - a  V I  ro VJ V I IV  00 oo o V) V I  o  V I CD o VX) M  VJ p
yo
V )  V )  V ) VJ IV  IV V J V I  \j3 IV) M
ON Vjl - J IV  -Jk ON V J o M VJ1 CD «
ON CD ON - J  V )  o 00 - 4  V I V I  ON
4k  ON vn VX) -p». 4k O  4k ON O  ON
g
Of'
o
M)
g:
P3
g
P
g.
w
rh
g
p
2.
g*
5.
P
c+
H-
O
g
o’
y
§
oo
p
p
et
co
o
o
s
p
f-3
P
O'
U1
— 181), —
-p
p
d
o
o
'S
o
Figure 7
Word count means as a function of Group and Period
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speech trend for the Passive Strategy group was statistically 
significant (F = 14.5, df 1, 48, p <.00l), with the means 
showing a marked reduction in word production across their 
speeches. In contrast the Control Strategy group produced 
consistent, intra-speech performances(F^ 1, df 1, 48, p >.05).
The expected interaction between Group and Speech was 
statistically non-significant (F =0.78, df 5, 24, p >  .05), 
although the Active Strategy group did produce an inter-speech 
increase in word production while the other three groups produced 
fewer words during the second speech. (See Table 15).
Similarly, the other first order interactions were also 
statistically non-significant; Group x Topic Order (f = 0.29, df 5, 
24, p >  .05), Speech and Topic Order (P = 0.07, df 1, 24, 
p >.05); Speech x Period (F = 5.02, df 2, 48, p >  .05) and Topic 
Order and Speech (f = 0.15, df 2, 48, p >  .05).
All the second and third order interactions failed to reach 
statistical significance. (All F ratios were <1.0. They are 
given in Table 17 and ANOVA summary tables are presented in 
Appendix 6).
(b) Silence ;
The analysis of silence scores revealed statistically non­
significant main effects of Group (F = 1.85, df 5, 24, p >  .05), 
Speech (f = 0.02, df 1, 24, p ^  .05) and Topic Order (F = 0.58, 
df 1, 24, p >  .05).
However, as with word count scores a significant main effect 
of Period (F = 16.28, df 2, 48, p xC.OOl) did emerge from the 
analysis. Again this effect is most easily interpreted in terms of 
an expected Group x Period interaction (f = 2.75, df 6, 48, p *<..05). 
The means reflecting this interaction, which are presented in 
Table 16 and plotted in Figure 8, were subjected to planned tests
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^Figrure 8
Silence means as a function of Group and Period
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for linear trends. Consistent with expectations these comparisons 
revealed significant intra-speech increases in silence for the 
control group (f = 4.72, df 1, 48, p 4. .05), while silence 
for the Active Strategy group remained fairly constant during 
their speeches, the slight intra-speech increase being statistically 
non-significant (F = 1, df 1, 48, p .05). However, contrary 
to expectations the intra-speech trend for the Passive Strategy 
group was statistically significant (F = 11.70, df 1, 48, p ^  .Ol), 
with the means showing a marked increase in silence during the 
speeches of these subjects. In contrast, silence for the Control 
Strategy group was fairly constant during the speeches (F< 1, df 1,
48, p >  ,05).
The expected interaction between Group and Speech failed to 
reach statistical significance (f = 2.10, df 3» 24» .05), however
the planned comparison  ^ of the Group x Speech means was carried 
out. (These means are presented in Table 16).
As expected these comparisons revealed a significant inter­
speech reduction in silence for the Active Strategy Group (F = 5.99, 
df 1, 56, p <. .05). Furthermore, during the second speech the 
average duration of silence for this group was significantly less 
than that for the control group (F = 8.67, df 1, 56, p <,.0l); 
this latter group interestingly, producing an inter-speech increase 
in silence. Contrary to expectations the Passive Strategy group 
produced an inter-speech increase in silence although it was not 
statistically significant (F = 1.39, df 1, 56, p >.05). However,
1 The procedure used for making these planned comparisons is 
described by Winer (l971, p 384 - 386).
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during the second speech this group was silent for significantly longer
than the Active Strategy group (F = 6.66, df 1, 56, p <  .05). The Active
Strategy and Control Strategy groups did not differ significantly from
each other during the second speech, (f = 1.24, df 1, 56, p >.05).
The other first order interactions failed to reach statistical
significance: Group x Topic order (F = 0.01, df 1, 24, p <.05);
Speech x Period (F - 0.86, df 2, 48, p .05); Period x Topic Order
(F = 0.34, df 2, 48, p .05). Similarly, all second and third order
interactions were statistically non-significant. (F ratios are presented
in Table 17. Complete ANOVA summary tables are presented in Appendix 7).
Table 17: Table of F ratios emerging from the analyses (ANOVAs)of Word
Count and Silence scores:
Source of 
Variation
DF
Measure
Word count 
F ratio
Silence 
F ratio
Group 3 0.79 1.83
Topic order 1 0.36 0.58
GroupxTopic order 3 0.29 0.25
Residual 24
Speech 1 0.91 0.02
SpeechxGroup 3 0.78 2.07
SpeechxTopic Order 1 0.07 0.01
Spee chxG roupx.T o pi c
order 3 1.00 1.01
Residual 24
Period 2 11.22** 16.28**
PeriodxGroup 6 4.91** 2.73*
PeriodxTopic Order 2 0.13 0.34
PeriodX GroupxTopic
order 6 0.72 0.81
Residual 48
SpeechXPeriod 2 3.02 0.86
SpeechxPeriodxGroup 6 0.72 1.19
Spe e ch xPe ri od xT 0 pi c
order 2 0.23 0.29
SpeechxPeriodxGroup
XTopic Order 6 0.41 0.55
Residual 48
• * p <  .05
** p <  .01
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(c) Subjective Fear Ratings;
i) Anticipatory Fear Ratings;
Ratings of fear experienced prior to presenting each speech
were subjected to an ANOVA for a three factor experimental
design; Group (1+) x Topic Order (2) x Speech (2), with repeated 
measures on one factor , i.e. speech.
This analysis revealed statistically non-significant main 
effects of Group (F = O.Sl, df 3, 2i|, P >.0$) and Topic Order 
(F = 0.2d, df 1, 2U, p ^  .05). A main effect of Speech (F = 16.69
df 1, 2 h t p .01) did emerge from the analyses. The means; Speech
1, X = 6.88, SD = 1.17; Speech 2, x = 5*83, SD = 1,66, show that 
anticipatory fear had decreased prior to the presentation of the 
second speech. -
All interactions failed to reach statistical significance 
(F ratios are given in Table 19. Complete ANOVA Summary tables are 
presented in Appendix 8),
ii) Subjective ratings of fear experienced during speech 
presentations :
Subjective ratings reflecting fear experienced at the beginning 
and end of each speech were subjected to an ANOVA for a four factor 
experimental design; Group (U) x Topic Order (2) x Speech (2) x ’ 
Rating (2; beginning and end of each speech) with repeated measures 
on two factors, i.e. Speech and Rating. This analysis revealed 
statistically non-significant main effects of Group (F = 0.56, df 3, 
2l|, p >.05), Topic Order (F = 0.01, df 1, 2U, V ^  .05), Speech (F = 
3.38, df 1, 2 h t V >  .05) and Rating (F = I.89, df 1, 2i|, p >  .05).
The Group x Rating interaction also failed to reach 
statistical significance (F = 1,69, df 3, 2I4, p ^  .05) and 
therefore failed to support the prediction of differential intra-
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speech trends in subjective fear. However, the Group x Speech 
interaction was statistically significant (P = 9.12, df 3, 24, p<  
.Ol), suggesting, as expected, different interspeech trends in 
fear for the groups. However, contraly to expectations the 
means (which are presented in Table 18 and plotted in Figure 9) 
show that the Passive Strategy group experienced an increase 
in subjective fear from Speech 1 to 2. Planned comparisons^of 
these means revealed that this inter-speech increase for the 
Passive Strategy group was statistically significant (F = 25.18, 
df 1, 56, p ^ . O l ) . In contrast, the other three groups reported 
significant inter-speech reductions in fear; Active Strategy 
group (f = 9.05, df 1, 56, p <..0l); Control Strategy group 
(F = 7.34, df 1, 56, p ^ . O l ) ; Control group (F = 20.38, df 1,
56, p ^ .Ol). Further comparisons also revealed that the Passive 
Strategy group reported experiencing significantly more fear 
during the second speech than the Active Strategy group (F = 11.92, 
df 1, 56, p < ,0l), the Control Strategy group (F = 6.77, df 1,
56, p < . 05) and the Control group (F = 10.58, df 1, 56, p ^ .Ol) 
while the difference between these latter three groups were 
statistically non-significant (F s^l). All other first and 
second order interactions failed to reach statistical 
significance (f ratios are given in Table 19 and ANOVA 
summary tables are presented in Appendix 9).
1 The procedure used for making these comparisons is described 
by Winer (l971, p 384 - 386.)
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F ig u re  9
Means of Subjective Ratings of fear experienced 
during the speeches, as a function-of Group and Speech
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Table 19
Table of F ratios emerging from the analysis (ANOVA) of Subjective Fear Ratings
MZASUR8
Subjective fear Anticipatory fear
ratings ratings
Source of variation DF F ratio F ratio
Group 3 0.56 0.51
TopicXorder 1 0.01 0.24
GroupXTopic order 3 1.60 0.58
Residual 24
Rating 1 1.89
RatingXGroup 3 1.69
RatingXTopic order 1 0.03
RatingXGroupxTopic order 3 1.25
Residual 24
RatingXspeech 1 0.40
EatingXspeechXgroup 3 0.09
RatingKspeechXTopic order 1 0.76
Residual 27
Speech 1 3.38 16.69**
SpeechXGroup 3 9.12** 0.41
SpeechXTopic Order 1 0.84 0.18
SpeechXGroup TopicXOrder 3 2.31 0.52
* p ^.05 
** p zl.Ol
Heart Rate Measures :
Owing to an equipment fault heart rate scores for 12 of 
the subjects were lost during the presentation of their second 
speech. Therefore, only those scores recorded during the first 
speech were analysed.
Pearson correlation coefficients were computed for baseline 
heart rates and heart rates recorded before and during the first
-  195 -
speech. These coefficients (which are presented in Table 20) 
do not suggest with any consistency, that a linear relationship 
exists between these measures. Therefore baseline differences 
between the groups were not statistically controlled for.
Table 20 shows that the coefficients for the Control 
Strategy and Control groups were, for the most part, large and 
statistically significant, suggesting a positive linear 
relationship between the heart rate measures. However, the 
coefficients for the Passive Strategy and Active Strategy 
groups were of moderate magnitude and statistically non­
significant.
Table 20
Table of Pearson correlation coefficients for baseline heart rates and 
heart rates recorded before and during speeches
Group 
(n = 8)
Active
Strategy
Passive
Strategy
Control
Strategy
Contrpl
Anticipatory
heart rate .61 .38 .79** .69*
Heart rate Period
recorded during
the first 1 .06 .25 .84** .45
speech
2 .44 .31 .63** .75*
3 .51 .02 .77* .84**
*
P (one-tailed tests)
p^.Ol
- 196 -
Anticipatory Heart Rates:
Heart rates recorded in the 10 second period prior to the 
first speech were subjected to a two-way ANOVA: Group (4 ) z
Topic Order (2). (P ratios are presented in Table 22 and 
ANOVA summary tables in Appendix 8).
This analysis revealed a statistically non-significant main 
effect of Group (p = 1.83, df 3» 24, p >.05), although the 
means, which are presented in Table 21, show that the observed 
differences were in the predicted direction. The main effect 
of Topic Order also failed to reach statistical significance 
(P = 2.5 5, df 1, 24, p >  .05) as did the Group x Topic Order 
interaction (P = 1.50, df 3, 24, p >  .05).
Heart rates recorded during speech presentations:
Heart rates recorded during the first speech were 
subjected to an ANOVA for a three-factor experimental design: 
Group (4 ) X Topic Order (2) x Period (3), with repeated 
measures on one factor, i.e. Period.
This analysis revealed statistically non-significant main 
effects of Group (P = 1.49, df 3, 24, p ^  .05), Topic Order 
(P = 1.47, df 1, 24, p >  .05) and Period (P = 0.79, df 2, 48, 
p > . 05). The first order interaction between Group and Period 
also failed to reach statistical significance (P = 0.92, 
df 6, 48, p > . 05). (Means are presented in Table 2l). All 
other first and second order interactions were also statistically 
non-significant. (P ratios are presented in Table 22)
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Table 22
F ratios emerging from the analysis (ANOVAs ) of Heart Rates recorded 
before and during the first speech
I
Measure
Source of variation Heart rate 
(recorded during 
the speech)
Anticipatory 
heart rate
DF F ratio ^ F ratio ^
Group 3 1.49 1.83
TopicKorder 1 1.47 2.55
GroupX'Topic order 3 1.03 1.50
Residual 24
Period 2 0.79
Period/Group 6 0.92
PeriodKTopic order 
PeriodXGroup^Topic
2 1.61
order
Residual
6
48
1.10
1 For all F ratios, p ^  ,05
DISCUSSION
The results of this study provide some support for the 
hypothesis that self-statements which encourage subjects to 
actively cope with fear by self-instructing to 'keep calm and 
relax' when exposed to a phobic stimulus, result in significant 
reductions in fear. Specifically, the Active Strategy group 
who rehearsed these self-statements, produced significantly 
superior intra-speech performances (indexed by both word count 
and silence) than controls and, in addition, their performances 
improved significantly (indexed by silence) from Speech 1 to 2,
-  199 -
while those of the control group did not. Given that these 
behavioural measures index speech anxiety,these results suggest 
that the Active Strategy group experienced significantly less 
fear than controls during both speeches and also experienced a 
significantly greater inter-speech reduction in fear. However, 
contrary to expectations the Active Strategy group did not differ 
from controls in terms of intra- and inter-speech changes in 
subjective fear: both groups experienced intra-speech reductions 
in fear, although these were not significant, and significant 
inter-speech reductions in fear. Lastly, the difference between 
these groups in terms of anticipatory heart rate (recorded prior 
to the first speech) was also non-significant, although it was 
quite marked and in the expected direction. It is unfortunate 
that the heart recordings for the second speech were lost, 
therefore making it impossible to determine whether this 
difference became larger and statistically significant.
Contrary to expectations, the findings of this study also 
suggest that self-statements which encourage subjects to expect 
and accept the physiological concomitants of fear when exposed 
to a phobic stimulus, do not lead to a reduction in fear. 
Specifically, the results suggest that the Passive Strategy 
group, who rehearsed such statements, did not differ from 
controls in terms of intra- and inter-speech levels of fear indexed 
by the behavioural measures. Indeed, the subjective ratings of 
fear suggest that this group experienced a significant inter­
speech increase in fear and during the second speech experienced 
significantly more fear than both the other strategy groups and
- 200 -
the control group.
Interestingly, the behaviour of the Control Strategy 
group was also contrary to expectations. Specifically, the 
results show that this group and the control group differed 
significantly in terms of behavioural measures. The control 
group's speeches were characterised by significant intra-speech 
deteriorations in performance measured by both word count and 
silence, while the Control Strategy group’s speeches were 
characterised by intra-speech consistency. Again, given that 
these measures index speech anxiety, these results suggest that 
the control strategy group devised and rehearsed strategies which 
resulted in significantly lower levels of fear wiiile speaking, 
relative to the control group. However, unlike the Active 
Strategy group, this group did not produce significant inter-speech 
improvements in performance.
In summary, the behavioural indices suggest that both the 
Active and Control Strategy groups experienced significant 
reductions in anxiety. For the former group this was both an 
intra and inter-speech reduction,while for the latter group it 
was only an intra-speech reduction. Both groups experienced 
significant inter-speech reductions in subjective fear both 
before and during their speeches, however, they were not 
significantly different from those experienced by the control 
group. In contrast, the behavioural indices suggest that the 
Passive Strategy group were as fearful as controls during their 
speeches while subjective ratings suggest that they experienced 
a significant inter-speech increase in fear. Differences 
between the groups in terms of anticipatory heart rates were 
not significant.
These findings raise several interesting and related
- 201 -
questions. Those pertinent to the Strategy groups are (i)
"What are the mechanisms by which the Active and Control 
Strategies produced their fear-reducing effects ?" (ii)
"What was the mechanism by which the Passive Strategy produced 
an increase in subjective fear ? These questions will be 
considered in relation to Meichenbaum’s (l977) cognitive 
model of fear and fear reduction as it was from this model 
that the strategies of initial interest (i.e. the Passive and 
Active Strategies) emerged. However, before addressing these 
questions, another point of interest emerges from the above 
observations which-varrants discussion, as it has a bearing upon 
cognitive conceptualisations of fear.
Specifically, the above results show that for all the 
groups, to varying degrees, the various indices of fear changed 
in a desynchronous way from Speech 1 to 2. This is not a 
particularly remarkable observation. Indeed, similar observations 
have been reported in this thesis (i.e. in Experiment 5) and 
elsewhere (see Rachman, 1978) and can be accommodated within 
a 'Three-Systems-Modèl' of fear (Rachman, 1978) which 
conceptualises fear as a construct of loosely coupled components 
which may change independently of each other and in a 
desynchronous way. However, cognitive mediational models of 
fear (see Chapter 3 above) cannot easily account for such 
observations. To illustrate this point the behaviour of the 
control group in this study will be referred to. To reiterate 
this group produced significant intra-speech deteriorations in 
performance (indexed by word count and silence) during both 
speeches with no significant change in performance from Speech 
1 to 2. This finding suggests that these subjects experienced 
comparable levels of fear during both of their speeches. In
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contrast however, subjective ratings suggest that they 
experienced a significant reduction in subjective fear from 
Speech 1 to 2. Given that the basic premise of cognitive 
models of fear is that fear is mediated by thoughts or self­
statements, then it follows that this group’s fear during their 
first speech was mediated by thoughts or self-statements.
However, it is consistent with this premise to suggest that 
their decrease in subjective fear from Speech 1 to 2 reflects 
the modification (presumably with exposure) of their fear- 
evoking thoughts. However, if their cognitions became less 
potent in terms of generating fear then it is necessary to 
explain why this was not reflected in terms of inter-speech 
reductions in behaviourally expressed fear. It is apparent 
that cognitive models of fear which assume a one-to-one 
relationship between cognitions andfear, conceptualised as a 
unitary phenomenon, cannot do so. Specifically, such models 
imply that if an individual entertains fear-evoking cognitions 
then he will become afraid in a unitary sense. Therefore, they 
do not account for the observations of desynchronous change 
between expressions of fear in different systems or the observations 
(Rachman, 1976) of fear expressed in one system (e.g. behavioural) 
but not another (e.g. subjective).
However, solutions to this theoretical problem, which are 
consistent with a 'Three-Systems-Model' of fear, are possible.
For instance, it is conceivable that when individuals are afraid 
they are generating different cognitions which have an effect 
upon particular response systems. So for example, the approach 
behaviour of a snake-fearful college students taking part in 
an experiment may be mediated by thoughts such as : "If other 
people can handle snakes, then so can I". However, his
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subjective report of fear may be mediated by the thought:
"I feel afraid”. Thus he would be behaviourally unafraid but 
subjectively fearful.
Alternatively, it is possible that fear-evoking thoughts 
have differential effects upon responses in more than one 
system. For example, it is conceivable that the inter-speech 
reduction in subjective fear for the control group reflects 
thoughts such as ’I am becoming less frightened”. However, it 
is also possible that such thoughts reflect the perception, 
veridical or otherwise, of changes in physiological arousal.
If this is the case then we might speculate that when subjects 
are monitoring and processing 'internal information,'i.e. 
physiological responses, there is a resultant reduction in 
attention to, or even interference with a task such as 
presenting an impromptu speech which requires them to attend to 
what they are saying and think about what they will say next.
Hence, the poor performances of the control group during both 
speeches. However, it must be noted that this proposition does 
not really explain why subjects' attention to the physiological 
concomitants of fear manifests itself in terms of intra-speech 
deteriorations in performance, unless perhaps their attention shifted 
from the task to their physiological arousal during their speeches.
Without labouring this discussion it is apparent from these 
speculations that a cognitive mediational model of fear which 
conceptualises fear as a unitary phenomena is not tenable. A 
more complex model is required to account for the presumed 
relationship between cognitions and the observations of fear as a 
construct of partially independent components.
Let us now consider the other questions to emerge from the 
observations made in this study, namely: "What are the mechanisms
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by which the Active and Control Strategy Groups produced their 
fear-reducing effects ?" and "What is the mechanism by which 
the Passive Strategy produced an increase in fear ?"
To reiterate the Active Strategy group was asked to 
rehearse  ^ self-statements which encouraged them to actively cope 
with the physiological concomitants of fear by self- instructing 
to relax and keep calm. In accordance with these self­
statements this group became subjectively more calm and 
relaxed from speech 1 to 2 and, in addition, experienced a 
significant inter-speech reduction in behaviourally expressed 
fear. However, these statements did not significantly influence 
subjects heart rates either before or during their first speech. 
Similarly, the Passive Strategy group who also rehearsed 
self-statements aimed at coping with the physiological 
concomitants of fear, did not differ significantly from controls 
in terms of heart rate or indeed, in terms of behaviourally 
expressed fear, although unlike all other groups they experienced 
a significant inter-speech increase in subjective fear.
In short, while the Active and Passive Strategies had a 
significant effect upon the behavioural and subjective indices 
of fear they failed to significantly influence heart rates 
recorded before and during the first speech. Thus, it would 
appear that the effects of these strategies upon behavioural 
and subjective fear were not determined by their effect upon 
their focus, namely the physiological concomitants of fear.
However, it must be noted that heart rates recorded while 
subjects are speaking is an insensitive index of fear. The 
results of experiment y  show that anticipatory heart rates 
distinguished between high and low fear speakers but that heart 
1 It must be noted that subjects' compliance with these instructions 
can only be assumed as no direct check was made.
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rates recorded during their speeches did not. Thus, the 
only sound basis for suggesting that these strategies did 
not influence the physiological concomitants of fear,is the 
observation that the strategy groups did not differ from 
each other or controls in terms of anticipatory heart rates 
recorded before the first speech. Therefore it would be unwise 
to dismiss the possibility that the effects of the strategies 
were mediated by their unobserved effect upon physiological 
arousal.
If, for the moment, it is assumed that these strategies 
did not significantly influence subjects’ physiological arousal, 
then an alternative interpretation of these findings can be 
pos tulated.
Specifically, Meichenbaum (197T) has suggested that the 
maladaptive self-statements which mediate fear are based upon 
subjects’ perceptions of the physiological concomitants of fear. 
Thus, we might speculate that the effects of the Passive and 
Active Strategies were determined by their effect upon subjects’ 
perceptions of their physiological arousal rather than upon 
physiological arousal per se. The question then arises: "What 
effect did these strategies have upon subjects’ perceptions ?’’
A possible and parsimonious hypothesis is that they influenced 
subjects’ perceptions of control over the physiological concomitants 
of fear. Consider the following suggestion made recently by 
Rachman, (l978 p 261.):
’’The utility of the concept (of controllability) can 
be increased by incorporating a three-systems approach, 
and by extending the concept to include not only the 
capacity to reduce the possibility of an aversive outcome, but 
also the ability to reduce the effects of an aversive event.
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It seems plausible that fear will be reduced or even 
avoided if the person perceives that he can control 
the effects of a potential aversive event."
If we consider that for fearful subjects an effect of 
speaking in public is physiological aroisal then it is 
possible to extend Rachman’s argument and suggest that fear 
(i.e. the behavioural and subjective expressions) will be 
reduced or even avoided if the person perceives that he can 
control that arousal. There is some empirical evidence to 
support this suggestion. Specifically, Gatchel et al (l979) 
reported that subjects who received false heart rats feedback 
leading them to believe that they were successfully slowing 
their heart rates subsequently experienced significant 
reductions in speech anxiety although no actual changes in 
heart rate occurred.
It is possible then, that by instructing themselves to 
relax and keep calm, etc., the Active Strategy Group perceived 
that they had control over the physiological concomitants of 
their fear and therefore were less subjectively and behaviourally 
afraid. In contrast, the Passive Strategy group, who were 
encouraged to expect and accept the physiological concomitants 
of fear, may have perceived a lack of control over their arousal 
and therefore experienced and reported significant increases 
in subjective fear and exhibited an inter-speech deterioration 
in performance, albeit a non-significant one. Future research 
might examine this possibility by measuring subjects' perceptions 
of control over physiological arousal after they have used 
these strategies in fear-evoking situations. However, the 
following experiments were concerned with a preliminary 
investigation of the concept of control in relation to the
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expression of fear. Specifically, studies were made of 
the relationship between the expression of speech anxiety, 
perceptions of control over the physiological concomitants 
of fear and subject's locus of control orientation.
Finally, some speculations about the Control Strategy 
condition. To reiterate, the subjects in this condition were 
asked to devise and rehearse strategies which they thought 
would help them cope with their speech anxiety. Indeed, 
relative to the control group these subjects were significantly 
less fearful (indexed by the behavioural measures), during their 
speeches. One possible reason for this effect is suggested 
by the strategies this group devised. Specifically, five of 
the eight subjects in this group included in their strategies 
positive task-oriented statements such as: 'speak clearly', 
concentrate on what you are saying*. In terms of a cognitive 
model of fear (i.e. Meichenbaum, 197?) it is possible that 
such statements were adaptive, in the sense that they reduced 
fear, because they replaced or distracted subjects from those 
maladaptive self-statements which are presumed to mediate fear. 
Hopefully, future research will pursue this enquiry by providing 
a direct test of the hypothesis that the rehearsal of task oriented 
self-atatemehts leads to a reduction in speech anxiety.
Summary and Conclusions;
Glogower et al (1978) have suggested that coping self­
statements are an active fear-reducing component of cognitive 
therapies. The behaviour of the Active Strategy group in this 
study tends to support this suggestion. Moreover, the reduction 
in fear experienced by this group is consistent with the notion , 
implied in the work of several researchers (e.g. Meichenbaum
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et al. 1971; Kazdin, 1973)» that adaptive strategies include 
those which focus upon coping with the physiological 
concomitants of fear by seIf-instrueting to 'keep calm and 
relax...,' However, the behaviour of the Passive Strategy group 
also suggeststhat some self-statements can have a detrimental 
effect, inasmuch as they result in an increase in subjective 
fear.
Interestingly, both of these strategies focussed upon the 
physiological concomitants of fear, although there is no 
evidence to suggest that they significantly influenced subjects' 
arousal. However this remains a possibility.
It is also proposed that the effects of these strategies may 
have been mediated by subjects' perceptions of control over 
the physiological concomitants of fear. Specifically, it is 
suggested that the reduction in fear experienced by the Active 
Strategy group was a function of perceived control while the 
increase in fear reported by the Passive Strategy group reflected 
a perceived lack of control over physiological arousal.
The following studies pursued an investigation of the 
notion of control in relation to fear by examining the relationship 
between the expression of speech anxiety, subjects' perceptions 
of control over the physiological concomitants of fear and their 
locus of control orientation.
The results of this study also suggest that speech-anxious 
subjects are capable of devising their own coping self-statements 
(i.e. the Control Strategy group) which have a significant 
fear-reducing effect. Although these strategies were not as 
effective as those used by the Active Strategy group. It was 
noted that most of the subjects in the Control Strategy group 
devised positive task-oriented statements and it was suggested
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that such statements have a fear-reducing effect because they 
may replace or distract subjects from those maladaptive self­
statements presumed (Meichenbaum, 1977) to mediate fear.
Finally, it is proposed that cognitive mediational models 
of fear need to be revised if they are to account for the 
observations of discordance and desynchrony between expressions 
of fear. Possible revisions were discussed in brief.
- 210 -
Experiment 5
AN INVESTIGATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LOCUS OF CONTROL 
ORIENTATION AND THE EXPRESSION OF SPEECH ANXIETY
In the above discussion it was noted that Rachman (1978) 
has recently suggested that
fear will be reduced or even avoided if the 
person perceives that he can control the effects 
of a potential aversive event,' (p 25l)
Rachman was not explicit about the nature of these 'effects' 
although the implication of his argument appears to be that he 
is referring to the physiological concomitants of fear. He argues 
'Consider the psychological consequences that would flow 
from the discovery of a reliable, fast-acting tablet 
capable of reducing fear - a fear-reducing equivalent of 
an aspirin. The mere knowledge of being able to cope 
with the effects of fear would confer a degree of 
immunity to fear on the fortunate possessors of this 
remarkable but regrettably non-existent drug. It would 
provide an antidote to the fear of fear. There is little 
doubt that many phobic people, especially those 
incapacitated by agoraphobic problems, would in addition 
experience a substantial decline in anticipatory fear if 
they knew they had the power to cope with unwanted effects 
should they arise.' (p 262)
If these 'effects' are defined as the physiological concomitants 
of fear then Rachman's hypothesis can be more precisely stated. 
Specifically it can be proposed that the behavioural and subjective 
expressions of fear will be reduced or avoided if the individual 
perceives that he can control the physiological concomitants of 
fear evoked by a particular stimulus.
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Some empirical support for this hypothesis comes from 
two recent studies conducted by Gatchel and his colleagues, 
who examined the effects of biofeedback training upon speech 
anxiety. (Gatchel, Hatch, Watson, Smith and Caas, 1977;
Gatchel, Hatch, Maynard, Turns and Taunton-Blackwood, 1979).
As a control, these researchers included in their experimental 
designs a condition in which subjects received false heart rate 
feedback suggesting that they were successfully slowing down 
their heart rates. Their findings suggest that these subjects 
experienced significant reductions in behavioural and subjective 
fear, a finding they interpreted as follows :
'The perception by individuals in this group 
(false-feedback) that they could exert active control 
over an anxiety competing response (heart rate) appears 
to have significantly influenced their self-reports 
and behavioural anxiety,' (Gatchel et al. 1979).
Their interpretation then, suggests that behavioural and 
subjective expressions of fear are reduced if an individual 
perceives that he has control over the physiological concomitants 
of fear. Moreover, this interpretation suggests a certain 
relationship between the expression of fear and the concept of 
control. Specifically, while Gatchel et al examined the role 
of perceived control in the reduction of fear, the implication 
of their findings is that generally the expression of fear is 
negatively related to the degree to which the physiological 
concomitants of fear are perceived as controllable.
However, if for the moment the reality of a relationship 
between the expression of fear and the perception of control over 
physiological responses is accepted, then the findings of several 
recent studies (Archer, 1979; Houston, 1972; Watson and Baumal,
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196?) suggest that such a relationship may be complicated by 
the personality variable described as locus of control orientation 
(Phares, 1976).
Briefly, the locus of control construct viewed as a 
personality trait, describes individual differences in relatively 
enduring predispositions to perceive outcomes across a variety 
of situations as being under personal control, or determined by 
chance, fate, or powerful others. Those individuals who tend to 
perceive outcomes as under perso nal control are described as 
internals, while those who view outcomes as being determined 
by chance, fate or powerful others are described as externals.
On the basis of their observations, Watson and Baumal 
proposed that individuals experience less anxiety in those 
situations where there is congruence between their beliefs 
about locus of control of reinforcement in general (i.e. locus 
of control orientation), and their beliefs about the locus of 
control of reinforcement of that particular situation. Thus, 
they predicted that internals will express less anxiety than 
externals in threatening situations where personal control over 
threat can be exercised, and conversely that externals will express 
less anxiety than internals in threatening situations where personal 
control cannot be exercised.
To date support for Watson and Baumal's congruency hypothesis 
has come frcm studies by Archer (l979) and Houston (l972).
Houston (1972) found that when subjects were threatened with anxiety- 
inducing electric shock during the performance of a task ^(which 
was seen as an index of anxiety) their performance on that task
1 The Digits Backward Sub-test of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence 
Scale, Wechsler (l955) P 41.
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was related, in the predicted way, to subjects’ locus of control 
orientation. Specifically, he found that when shock was 
unavoidable, i.e. beyond personal control, externally-oriented 
subjects performed significantly better than internally-oriented 
subjects. However, when shock was controllable, i.e. contingent 
upon subjects' performance, the pattern was the reverse: internals 
performed better than externals. Consistent with Houston's findings. 
Archer found that the subjective anxiety of subjects threatened 
with either controllable or uncontrollable shock was similarly 
related to their locus of control orientation.
To return to the earlier argument, if, as suggested the 
expression of fear is related to the perceived degree of control 
over the physiological effects of being exposed to a phobic 
stimulus, then two predictions follow from Watson and Baumal's 
congruency hypothesis.
Firstly, the perception that the physiological concomitants 
of fear are uncontrollable is a perception which, by definition, is 
incongruent with the locus of control orientation of internals 
but congruent with that of externals. Therefore, we can expect 
that when fearful subjects cannot exercise personal control over 
these physiological concomitants, internals will express higher 
levels of fear than externals.
In simpler terms, the suggestion is that fear involves a loss 
of inner control, in terms of physiological arousal, and that 
internals are more disturbed by such a loss than externals because 
it is incongruent with their tendency to perceive that they have 
personal control over events. Moreover, being more disturbed will 
be manifest by internals in terms of higher levels of subjectively 
and behaviourally expressed fear.
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Secondly, however, we can predict, on the basis of the 
congruency hypothesis, that manipulations^ or treatments which 
increase subjects’ expectations of personal control over physiological 
concomitants of fear, will result in greater reductions of fear for 
internals, as such control is congruent with their locus of control 
orientation but incongruent with that of externals.
The purpose of the present study was to provide a preliminary 
investigation of the first of these predictions. This was done by 
measuring the behavioural and subjective expressions of fear of 
a group of high and low fear public speakers both before and during 
the presentation of a speech. In addition, a measure was taken 
prior to the speeches of subjects’ expectations of control over the 
physiological concomitants of fear that they may experience while 
speaking.
The specific predictions were as follows :
Firstly, it was predicted that the high fear subjects would expect to 
experience the physiological concomitants of fear during their 
presentations as uncontrollable and significantly more so than the 
low fear subjects.
Secondly, it was predicted that both the behavioural, i.e. 
number of speech disruptions^ (after Kahl, 1956), and subjective
1 Such as Gatchel et al.'s (ibid) biofeedback procedure, or the Active 
Coping Strategy examined in the last experiment.
2 It was found in experiment 3 that speech disruptions did not
distinguish between high and low speech-anxious subjects as they
presented an impromptu speech. However, it is possible that under
such circumstances disruptions reflect, to a large degree, processes
other than anxiety, such as 'filled pauses' for thought. In the
present study the speeches were prepared and therefore it was expected
that such pauses would be fewer in proportion to those reflecting anxiety
and as a consequence that speech disruptions would be a more sensitive 
index o} anxiety.
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measure , i.e. the state Anxiety scale of the S.T.A.I. (Spielherger 
et al. 1970) would index significantly higher levels of anxiety 
for the high fear speakers both before and during their speeches. 
More specifically, it was expected that the high fear speakers 
would report higher levels of state anxiety before speaking and 
emit more disruptions while speaking.
Thirdly, it was predicted that high fear internals would 
express significantly higher levels of subjective and behavioural 
fear than high fear externals.
Finally, predictions were made about the behaviour of the low 
fear internals and externals. One of the predictions noted above 
was that the low fear speakers would perceive the physiological 
effects of exposure to their speaking task as significantly more 
controllable tha'n the high fear subjects. According to Watson and 
Baumal's congruency hypothesis internals experience less anxiety 
than externals in those situations where personal control over 
events can be exercised. Therefore,it was predicted that the low 
fear internals would express significantly less subjective and 
behavioural fear than the low fear externals,
METHOD
Subjects ;
Twenty-six subjects took part in the study, all of whom were 
third year psychology undergraduates. As part of their course 
requirement these subjects had been asked to present the findings of 
their final year research projects to the psychology department; 
an audience comprised of lecturers, postgraduates and fellow 
undergraduates. None of them had taken part in the previous studies.
Two weeks prior to their presentations these subjects were sent 
the following battery of questionnaires ; Levenson's (1974) Locus 
of Control Questionnaire; the S.T.A.I. (Spielberger, Gorsuch and
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Lushene, 1970) and a 7-point rating scale designed to assess their 
degree of fear of speaking in public. (See Appendix 10a ). In
addition, subjects received a letter asking for their co-operation
and instructing them to complete and return the questionnaires 
at least one week before their presentations.
The returned questionnaires were not scored until after the 
subjects’ presentations in order to ensure that the scorers (one 
of who# was the author),of their speech disruptions were blind to 
both their degree of fearfulness and locus of control orientation.
v«/hen the questionnaires had been scored, a median score of 
17 on the Internal  ^ dimension of Levenson’s Locus of Control scale 
was used to define 'internals’ (^17) and 'externals' ( >17).
In addition, a score of two or three on the 7 point fear scale was 
used to define the low fear speakers while scores of 5, 6 and 7 
defined the high fear speakers. (One subject who scored 1 on this 
scale, andwhose native language was not English, was discarded 
from the analysis. Interestingly, none of the subjects used the 
mid-point (4 ) of the scale.)
The defining characteristics of the groups then were as 
follows :
High Fear Internals ; Locus of control mean ^ = 14.63 (s.D. = 1.5l); 
Subjects scoring 7 on the fear scale; n = 4; scoring 6; n = 3, 
scoring 9 : n = 1; Total n = 8. Mean fear score-6.38, (s.D, = 0.74) 
High Fear Externals : Locus of control mean = 23.0 ; (S.D. = 3*78)
Subjects scoring 7 on the fear scale; n = 5; scoring 6; n = 2;
scoring 5; n = 1; Total n = 8. Mean fear score = 6.5» (s.D. = 0.76.)
1 This dimension measures the degree to which an individual perceives 
events as being contingent upon his own behaviour.
2 The mean Internal scale score for all the subjects (n = 86) who 
completed Levenson's Locus of Control questionnaire in this and 
subsequent studies was 19.06, S.D. = 5.25.
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Low P^ar Internals; Locus of control mean = 13.50; (s.D. 2.65). 
Subjects scoring 2 on the fear scale: n = 3; scoring 3: n = 1; 
Total n = 4. Mean fear score : 2.25 (SD = 0.50).
Low Fear Externals: Locus of control mean = 22.00: (s.D. 4.18). 
Subjects scoring 2 on the fear scale: n = 3; scoring 3; n = 2; 
Total n = 5. Mean fear score = 2.40 (s.D. = 0.55). 
Questionnaires :
Levenson's (l973) Locus of Control questionnaire consists 
of three scales which can be scored independently of each other. 
These scales are labelled Internal, Chance and Powerful Others,
The Internal scale measures the degree to which individuals 
perceive that they determine or control events in their lives, 
while the other two scales measure the degree to which individuals 
perceive that events are determined by external forces such as 
chance, fate or powerful other people. In the present study the 
Internal scale was used to define internals and externals 
because a tendency to perceive that events are not personally 
determined necessarily implies an external locus of control. In 
contrast a tendency to perceive that events are not determined 
by either chance or powerful others does not necessarily imply an 
internal locus of control. It is possible to believe that events 
are not determined by chance but nonetheless believe that they are 
determined by other external forces and as powerful others and 
vice versa.
Research (Levenson, 1973) has indicated that these scales have 
good reliability and validity.
Each of the scales is comprised of 8 questions although they 
are presented to subjects as a single questionnaire of 24 items.
The questions are answered on a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging 
from 'Strongly Agree' to 'Strongly Disagree'.
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Spielberger et al.'s (l970) State-Trait Anxiety Inventory 
(S.T.A.1.) consists of two scales;each of 20 items. The State scale 
is designed to measure state anxiety intensity at specific points 
in time, while the Trait scale is designed to measure a more 
enduring level of anxiousness less influenced by external events. 
Subjects respond to each of these items by rating themselves on 
a four-point scale. The S.T.A.I. test manual (Spielberger, et al,
1970) gives extensive reliability and validity data for both the
State and Trait scales. These questionnaires appear in appendices 19 & 20.
Procedure :
All third year psychology undergraduates were asked, as a 
part of their course requirement, to present the findihgs of their 
final year research projects to the department. The presentations 
were made during the course of five, weekly, afternoon sessions, 
with five to six presentations made in each session. On each 
occasion the audience comprised of academic staff, postgraduates 
and fellow undergraduates, with the total number of people ranging 
from between twenty-five and thirty.
Consistent with this real-life setting, the measures of speech 
anxiety were chosen in order to minimise the obtrus^iveness of the 
experimenters. The State Anxiety Scale of the S.T.A.I. (Spielberger, 
et al., 1970) was used to measure subjective anticipatory anxiety.
It was given to each presenter prior to each session with the 
instruction that it should be completed immediately before their 
presentations.
Just prior to each session the presenting subjects were also 
asked to use a 7-point scale (see Appendix 10 ), ranging from 
Completely (l) to Not at all (?) to rate their expectations of control 
of the physiological effects of fear that they may experience while 
speaking.
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Speech disruptions  ^ (Mahl, 1956) were recorded as a measure
2
of behavioural anxiety and scored for the first two minutes 
of each presentation by two scorers. ^
The subjects were only informed after the presentation that 
they had been observed in this way.
RESULTS:
Ratings of expected control over the physiological concomitants 
of fear:
»
Ratings of subjects expectations of control over the 
physiological concomitants of fear were subjected to a two-way 
ANOVA ^ : Group (High Fear vs. Low Fear) x Locus of control 
(internal vs. External). (See Table 23 , for F ratios and Appendix 11 
for complete ANOVA summary tables).
This analysis revealed a significant main effect of Group 
(F = 14.75, df 1, 21, p 4 , .Ol). Consistent with predictions the 
High Fear subjects expected to have signifiia, ntly less control 
over the physiological concomitants of fear than Low Fear subjects. 
(Means and standard deviations are presented in Table 23). This
1 These disruptions included ’urns', ’ahs', stutters and repetitions.
2 This was timed from the first word uttered.
3 The scorers were the Experimenter and a colleague who had scored 
some of the recordings analysed in experiment 3# Thus, she had 
some experience of scoring speech disruptions and shared the 
same criteria of disruptions as the Experimenter. A hand-counter 
was used by these scorers.
4 Using the Least-Squares Solution of unequal cell sizes (winer, 
1971, p 499).
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analysis also revealed a statistically non-significant main effect 
of Locus of control (P = 0.1, df 1, 21, p .05) and Group x Locus 
of control interaction (P = 0.6, df 1, 21, p J> .05). Thus 
expectations of control were not related to locus of control 
orientation.
State Anxiety Scores:
Spearman coefficients of correlation between subjects' state 
anxiety and trait  ^ anxiety scores were computed. These coefficients 
were large, probably reflecting subject numbers, but not statistically 
significant and in one case not positive: for the High Fear Internals 
r = .35 (n = 8); High Fear Externals r = .60 (n = 8); Low Pear 
Internals r = .76 (n = 4);, Low Fear Externals r = ^,80 ( n = s ) .  
Therefore state anxiety scores were analysed without controlling 
for variations in trait anxiety levels. They were subjected to a 
two-way ANCVA ^ : Group (2) x Locus of Control (2). (p ratios 
are presented in Table 24 and complete ANOVA summary tables in 
Appendix ll ).
This analysis revealed a significant ^ main effect of Group 
(F = 14.2, df 1, 21, p 4  .Ol) and a significant Group x Locus of 
control interaction (P = 6.45, df 1, 21, p 4  . 0 5 )  t while the main 
effect of Locus of control failed to reach statistical significance 
(F = 2.1, df 1, 21, p ^ .05).
The Group by Locus of Control means are presented in Table 23 
and Diagram 2. They show, as expected, that the High Fear group 
reported higher levels of anticipatory anxiety than Low Fear subjects.
In addition, Diagram 2 illustrates the predicted difference between
1 Measured using the Trait Anxiety Scale of the S.T.A.I.
2 Using the Least Squares Solution for unequal cell sizes (Winer, ibid)
3 The 0.05 rejection region was used in all statistical evaluations.
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Diagram 2
State Anxiety means as a function of Group and Locus of 
control, orientation
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internals and eitemals in both the Low and High
fear groups. Specifically, it shows that internals reported more
anxiety than externals in the High fear group, while externals
reported more anxiety than internals in the Low fear group.
However, comparisons  ^ of these means revealed that only the
difference between High fear internals and externals was statistically
significant, (p <,.05).
Speech Disruptions;
Before analysing the speech disruption scores, the degree of
inter-rater reliability was determined using Spearman’s correlation
computation. The coefficient of correlation between the two sets
of ratings was large and statistically significant (r = .89, n = 25,
*
p <..01) and suggests a high degree of reliability. Furthermore, 
the mean scores for the two raters were similar and did not differ 
significantly (r^ : Mean = 9.51, SD = 5.36; Mean = 8.99, SD - 
4.82; t = .79, df 25, p >  .05).
The raters* mean scores for each subject were then subjected 
to a two-way ANOVA^ : Group (2) x Locus of Control (2). (f ratios 
are presented in Table 24, and complete ANOVA summary tables in 
Appendix 11 ).
A significant main effect of Group (f = 11.9, df 1, 21, p ^  .Ol) 
emerged from this analysis. As expected, the Group means (see 
Table 23) show that the High fear subjects emitted more disruptions 
than the Low fear speakers. The main effect of Locus of control was
1 Comparisons of these means were made using the Newman-Keuls 
procedure for unequal cell sizes, (winer, 1971; P 216).
2 Using the Least Squares Solution for unequal cell sizes (winer,
ibid).
* (one-tailed test)
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Diagram 3
Disruption means as a function of Group and Locus of control 
orientation
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not statistically significant (P-41, df 1, 21, p >.05), although 
the expected Group x Locus of control interaction was (P = 5*8, df 1,
21, p <  .05).
The means reflecting this significant interaction are presented 
in Table 23, and represented in Diagram 3* Consistent with expectations 
this diagram illustrates that the High fear internals produced more 
disruptions that the High fear externals, while Low fear externals 
produced more disruptions than Low fear internals. However, 
comparisons  ^ of these means revealed that only the difference between 
the Low fear speakers was statistically significant (p<.05).
DISCUSSION
Consistent with expectations the results of this study suggest 
that the High Tear group were significantly more fearful than the 
Low Tear group both before (as indexed by State Anxiety scores) and 
during (as indexed by Speech disruptions) their speeches.
The observation that speech disruptions distinguished between 
High and Low pear speakers is interesting because it is contrary to 
the finding in Experiment 3* A possible explanation for this 
inconsistency may be found in the fact that in the present study 
subjects presented prepared speeches, while in the previous study 
the speech was impromptu. Two points may be relevant here. Firstly, 
we might expect that when speeches are prepared, fearful speakers 
spend less time being silent and more time producing words, thus 
increasing the probability of disruptions. Secondly, it is possible 
that disruptions more probably reflect anxiety when the speech is 
prepared. We might expect that when speeches are impromptu the 
speakers' 'urns' and 'aha' reflect a 'filled pause' in which they
1 Comparisons were made using the Newman-Keuls procedure for unequal 
cell sizes (winer, 1971, p 216).
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think of what to say next, rather than anxiety. However, when 
the speech is prepared the speakers may need fewer such pauses 
for thought.
The findings of this study also suggest that these expressions 
of speech anxiety were related to the speakers' locus of control 
orientation, although the pattern of results is complex.
It was predicted that high fear internals would express 
higher levels of subjective and behavioural anxiety than high 
fear externals and conversely, that low fear internals would 
express lower levels of subjective and behavioural anxiety than 
Low fear externals. However, although the results for both 
measures were in the predicted direction, only state anxiety scores 
reflected a significant difference between the High fear groups, 
while only speech disruptions distinguished between the Low fear 
subjects.
Several interpretations of this pattern of results are possible. 
Essentially, they reflect two basic possibilities: namely that real 
differences between high fear internals and externals and low fear 
internals and externals only exist in terms of specific systems 
of expression (i.e. either behavioural or subjective), or alternatively 
that real differences exist between these groups in both of these 
response systems but that there was a failure to consistently measure 
it.
The most straightforward interpretation reflects the first 
possibility. Specifically, we might speculate that the difference 
between high fear internals and externals only exists in terms of 
subjective anticipatory anxiety and similarly, that the only real 
difference between low fear internals and externals is in terms of 
behavioural anxiety. While this interpretation is the most straightforward 
it necessarily implies that the relationship between subjects* Locus of
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control orientation and the expression of speech anxiety is more 
complex than originally thought.
A more parsimonious interpretation of these data is in terms 
of measurement error. For example, we might speculate that this 
pattern of results reflects the different ranges of sensitivity 
of the measures used. Specifically, it is possible that the S.T.A.I. 
is a more sensitive index of speech anxiety when subjects are 
experiencing high, rather than low levels of anxiety and therefore 
distinguished between the High fear groups but failed to differentiate 
the Low fear groups. Similarly, it is possible that speech disruptions 
are a more sensitive index when subjects are experiencing low or 
moderate amounts of speech anxiety and, as a consequence, this measure 
failed to reflect real differences in anxiety between the High fear 
subjects. It is apparent, however, that only further research will 
allow us to decide between these possible interpretations.
Given that the data suggest that some sort of relationship 
exists between the behavioural and subjective expressions of speech 
anxiety and speakers' locus of control orientation, the question 
arises as to the mechanisms of this relationship.
It was proposed in the introduction (on the basis of Bachman's 
(1978) arguments and Gatchel et al.'s (l979) research) that the 
magnitude of the expression of subjective and behavioural fear is 
determined by the degree to which the physiological concomitants of 
fear are perceived as uncontrollable. Furthermore, it was argued 
that the expression of fear would be influenced in a predictable 
way by subjects' locus of control orientation. Specifically, it was 
proposed, consistent with Watson and Baumal’s (ibid) congruency 
hypothesis, that if high fear subjects perceived the physiological 
concomitants of fear as uncontrollable, then those internally- 
oriented subjects would express higher levels of anxiety than the
- 229 -
externally-oriented subjects. Similarly, it was predicted that 
if low fear subjects perceived the physiological concomitants of 
fear as controllable, then internally oriented subjects would 
express significantly less anxiety than externals.
The significant differences in the expressions of fear 
observed in this study are consistent with this hypothesis.
In addition, High fear subjects tended to expect to experience 
the physiological concomitants of fear as uncontrollable and 
significantly more so than the Low fear subjects who tended to 
expect to be able to control the physiological effects of fear.
However, it must be noted that these data do not provide a direct 
test of the pivotal assumption of this hypothesis, namely that the 
behavioural and subjective expressions of speech anxiety are 
causally related to the degree to which the physiological concomitants 
of fear are perceived as uncontrollable. Therefore, the observed 
effects cannot be confidently evaluated in terms of the above 
hypothesis.
In addition, while these effects require explanation, it seems 
prudent to suspend speculation until they have been reproduced 
under more rigorously controlled conditions. In the present study 
a number of possible influential variables were not controlled. 
Specifically, it was not possible to control the size of the audience 
across sessions or its composition* Indeed, the subjects themselves 
made up part of the audience and this may have resulted in modelling 
effects* Furthermore, the topic of each presentation was probably 
quite varied* Although it is difficult to sse how the observed effects 
may have been determined by these variables, their possible influence 
cannot be confidently dismissed. Therefore, the following experiment 
was designed primarily to observe these effects under more well 
controlled conditions and thus provide a sounder basis for future research.
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Experiment 6
A FURTHER INVESTIGATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE EXPRESSION 
OF SPEECH ANXIETY AND THE SPEAKERS' LOCUS OF CONTROL ORIENTATION
The results of the previous study suggest that the expression of 
speech anxiety is related to both a speaker's degree of self-reported 
fear of public speaking (i.e. high or low fear) and his locus of 
control orientation (i.e. internal or external), although this 
relationship was more complex than expected.
Specifically, it was predicted that high fear internals would 
express higher levels of subjective and behavioural anxiety than 
high fear externals, while low fear internals would express lower 
levels of subjective and behavioural anxiety than low fear externals. 
However, although the results for both indices of fear were in the 
predicted direction, only the subjective measure reflected significant 
iifferences between the high fear subjects and only the behavioural 
measure distinguished between the low fear groups.
Possible interpretations of this pattern of results were discussed, 
although it was stressed that such speculation may be premature 
given the methodoloQirAl veaknesses inherent in the study. Due to 
these weaknesses it is apparent that the factors of fear level and 
locus of control orientation need to be examined under more rigorously 
controlled conditions before we can be at all confident about the 
reality of their relationship with speech anxiety. This examination was 
the primary objective of the present study, although the effect of 
a third factor of interest, namely repeated exposure to the phobic 
situation (i.e. presenting a second speech), was also examined.
The predictions relating to these factors were tested using 
the experimental paradigm described in an earlier study (i.e. experiment 
3). They were as follows : consistent with the findings of experiment
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3 it was predicted that subjects who reported  ^ high levels of
public speaking anxiety would express significantly higher levels
of anxiety than low fear speakers both before and during
the presentation of two impromptu speeches and that this expression
would be indexed by subjective behavioural ^ and physiological
3measures •
The experimental procedures also included measuring heart rate 
(bpm) during the presentation of speeches; the results of experiment 
3 show that this measure failed to distinguish between high and low 
fear speakers and therefore, its use in the present study provides 
a further test of the hypothesis that heart rate recorded while 
presenting an impromptu speech, is an index of speech anxiety.
In addition, and in accordance with the hypothesis presented in 
the previous study, it was expected that high fear internals would 
express significantly higher levels of anxiety than high fear 
externals, while among the low fear subjects internals would express 
significantly lower levels of anxiety than externals. Consistent 
with the parsimony of this hypothesis, rather than the complex pattern
1 Levels of public speaking anxiety were determined by subjects 
responses to the item 'Speaking in Public' on the Fear Survey 
Schedule III (wolpe, 1973).
2 Subjective anticipatory anxiety was measured using the A-State scale 
of the S.T.A.I. (S'pielberger et, al., 1970).
3. Heart rate (bpm) was taken as a measure of anticipatory 
anxiety.
4. A ten-point fear thermometer (Walk, 1956) was used to measure 
subjective anxiety experienced during speech presentations.
5* Word count and duration of silence were used to measure behavioural 
anxiety expressed during speech presentations.
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of results observed in the last study, it was predicted that these 
differences would be indexed by subjective, behavioural  ^ and 
physiological measures of speech anxiety.
Lastly, predictions were made about the effect upon speech 
anxiety of repeated exposure to the phobic stimulus (i.e. presenting 
a second speech). The results of experiment 4 in this series show that 
the control group subjects in that study experienced significant inter­
speech reductions in subjective fear although the behavioural measures 
failed to index significant change. Therefore, in the present study a 
similar desynchronous pattern of inter-speech change was expected for 
both high and low fear subjects. It was also predicted, based upon 
the findings of Eorkovec et al. (l974) that both high and low fear 
subjects would experience significant inter-speech reductions in heart 
rate measured both before and during speech presentations. In addition 
asking subjects to present two speeches also made it possible to 
fui'ther our knowledge of the relationship between a speaker’s locus 
of control orientation and the e x p r e s s i o n  o? speech anxiety. Specifically, 
an additional exploratory question addressed in this study was :
"Do high fear internals and externals and low fear internals and 
externals experience similar inter-speech changes in speech anxiety 7”
METHOD
Subjects :
Twenty subjects volunteered to take part in the study. All of 
them were college students. These subjects were selected on the basis
1 In the previous study speech disruptions were used as a measure 
of speech anxiety, however, the findings of experiment 3 show that 
when thespeech is impromptu, word count and duration of silence 
rather than disruptions distinguish between high and low fear 
speakers. Therefore these measures were used in the present study.
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of their responses to the item 'Speaking in Public' on Wolpe's 
(1973) Fear Survey Schedule (PSS III) and their scores on 
Levenson's (l974) Locus of Control Scale.
The first phase of this procedure involved selecting those 
subjects who had indicated their fear of public speaking to be 
'very much' (High Fear subjects) or 'a little' (Low Fear subjects) 
from a group of approximately 500 students who had completed the 
FSSIII. Levenson's Locus of control scale was then sent to the 
first 35 suitable subjects; twenty high fear speakers and fifteen 
low fear speakers. As part of a procedure adopted to ensure that 
the experimenter remained blind to the subjects' locus of control 
orientation throughout the experiment, this questionnaire was 
circulated with written instructions to the subjects to write 
their names on an adjoining top-sheet only. V»hen the questionnaire 
with its adjoining top-sheet was returned, it was passed to a 
colleague who assigned the same number to both the questionnaire 
and the sheet.
This colleague also marked this questionnaire in accord with the 
subjects' fear status, i.e. they were simply marked with an H (high 
fear speaker) or an L (low fear speaker). The questionnaire and the 
top-sheet were then separated: the former was filed and the latter 
was sent to the experimenter for scoring. On the basis of the 
scores of these returned questionnaires (following reminders 
seventeen of the high fear speakers and fourteen of the low fear 
speakers returned the questionnaire), a median score of 18 on the 
Internal dimension  ^ of the Locus of Control scale was used to define 
subjects as either internals ( <^18) or externals ( >  18). Ten of the
1 The Internal dimension of Levenson's Locus of control scale
measures the degree to which subjects’ perceive events as being 
contingent upon their own behaviour.
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high fear speakers and ten of the low fear speakers were 
then roughly matched on the basis of their locus of control 
scores, ensuring that five in each group were internals and 
five externals. A list of the numbers of these subjects was 
then passed to a colleague who matched them with the file of 
numbers and names. The experimenter was given the names of
these subjects and they were then contacted by letter and asked
to take part in an experiment. Two of these subjects . failed 
to reply and were replaced by subjects with the same fear status 
and similar locus of control scale score. Care was taken once
again to ensure that the experimenter was unable to match the
names of subjects with their locus of control orientation.
After the experiment the subjects’ names were used to 
trace their numbered questionnaire and hence their locus of 
control score. The mean scale scores and standard deviations for 
each of the four categories was as.follows :
Low speech-anxious internals: Mean 14.60, SD; = 2.88
Low speech-anxious externals: Mean 21,80, SD = 3.11
High speech-anxious internals: Mean 13.40, SD = 2.88
High speech-anxious externals: Mean 22.00, SD = 2.65
Equipment/Materials :
A Phillips camera and Sony video-recording equipment was 
used to record subjects’ speech presentations.
Before, during, and after their presentations, subjects' 
heart rates were recorded via a finger-plethysmograph linked to 
a pulse-meter and counter. A San El pulse-meter was used to pick 
up the signal from the light-sensitive-ce11-plethysmograph and the 
monitor light on the meter was used to generate a digital display 
on a counter. This display consisted of the number of flashes
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emitted by the monitor light in consecutive five-second periods, or 
essentially, the number of heart beats per five seconds.
This digital display was recorded by the experimenter. (See 
Appendix 4 for a wiring diagram).
Questionnaires :
Levenson's (l973) Locus of Control questionnaire consists 
of three scales which can be scored independently of each other. 
These scales are labelled Internal, Chance and Powerful Others.
The Internal scale measures the degree to which individuals 
perceive that they determine or control events in their lives, 
while the other two scales measure the degree to which individuals 
perceive that events are determined by external forces such as 
chance, fate or powerful other people. In the present study the 
Internal scale was used to define internals and externals 
because a tendency to perceive that events are not personally 
determined necessarily implies an external locus of control. In 
contrast a tendency to perceive that events are not determined 
by either chance or powerful others does not necessarily imply an 
internal locus of control. It is possible to believe that events 
are not determined by chance but nonetheless believe that they are 
determined by other external forces and as powerful others and 
vice versa.
Research (Levenson, 1973) has indicated that these scales have 
good reliability and validity.
Each of the scales is comprised of 8 questions although they 
are presented to subjects as a single questionnaire of 24 items.
The questions are answered on a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging 
from 'Strongly Agree' to 'Strongly Disagree'.
Spiélberger et al.'s (l970) State-Trait Anxiety Inventory 
(s.T.A.1.) consists of two scales each of 20 items. The State scale
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is designed to measure state anxiety intensity at specific points 
in time, while the Trait scale is designed to measure a more 
enduring level of anxiousness less influenced hy external events.
Subjects respond to each of these items by rating themselves on 
a four-point scale. The S.T.A.I. test manual (spielberger, et al,
1970) gives extensive reliability and validity data for both the
State and Trait scales. These questionnaires appear in Appendices I9 & 20.
Measures of Speech Anxiety;
(i) Behavioural Indices;
Two behavioural indices of speech anxiety were scored : (a) 
word count, and (b) the sum of each period of silence longer than 
one second in duration - silence (s).
These measures were scored for each of the three forty-second 
periods of each speech. This procedure, which was used in previous 
studies (i.e. experiments 3, 4); was used to increase the sensitivity 
of the indices to differences in speech anxiety by taking account of 
intra-speech trends, 
iii) Subjective Report;
Two instruments were used to measure subjective fear: the S.T.A.I. 
State Anxiety scale (Spielberger, Gorsuch, and Lushene, 1970) and a 
ten point Fear Thermometer (FT) (after Walk, 1956). The S.T.A.I.
State Anxiety scale was used to measure anticipatory anxiety and was 
administered prior to the presentation of both speeches. The Trait scale 
of the questionnaire was administered folloii ng the presentation of 
the second speech. After each speech subjects used the FT to rate the 
degree of fear they experienced at the beginning and end of the speech.
They were told to equate 1 with calm relaxation, 5 with moderate fear 
and 10 with extreme fear.
(iii) Physiological Measure:
Heart rate (bpm) was recorded for the ten-second period prior 
to the presentation of each speech and for the duration of each
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of the two minute speeches. A baseline heart rate was also recorded 
for thirty seconds, ten minutes after the completion of the 
second speech.
Procedure;
Subjects arrived at the test-room for the first of the 
two sessions unaware of the nature of the study; they had simply 
volunteered to take part in an experiment. Upon arrival subjects 
were reminded of their response to the’Speaking in Public' item 
on the FSSIII and asked to appraise it; responses for all subjects 
were the same as their initial FSSIII responses. They were then 
given the following instructions :
"I would like you to speak into the camera you see in front of 
you (it was placed fifteen feet away from the desk at which they 
were sitting) on a given topic for two minutes; you will have no 
time to prepare your speech. The film of your presentation will 
be shown at a later date to an audience of people from outside the 
college. These people will have no knowledge of the topic I will 
ask you to talk about, so direct your speech to them. Is that 
clear ? Do you wish to proceed ?"
None of the subjects refused to take part. The procedure for 
the first speech presentation was then as follows : subjects
were first of all given an explanation of the purpose of the finger 
plethysmograph which was attached to the desk top at which they 
were sitting. In order to allay any unnecessary anxiety they were 
told that it measured 'blood flow' and were given a brief 
description of how this was achieved. No mention was made of heart- 
rate recording. A microphone was then clipped to a suitable 
item of the subjects' clothing and at the same time they were 
given an explanation of its purpose. Subjects were then asked to 
complete the S.T.A.I. State scale. Having done so they were asked
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to place their left forefinger in the finger-plethysmograph and 
then given the following instructions;
"On the card on the desk is printed the topic^ on which I 
want you to speak, please read it." When the subjects had read 
the card, the instructions continued; "I will give you three 
signals. I will say ’Ready’ and then ten seconds later I will 
say ’Now'. You will start then and stop when I say ’Stop’.
In the ten second period prior to each speech presentation 
and throughout the two minute speech, heart rate was monitored 
and recorded by the experimenter who remained in the test-room 
sitting in a corner behind the subject. A technician, who remained 
out of sight in an adjacent equipment room, operated the recording 
equipment and synchronized (using the signals given to the subject) 
a digital timer which was superimposed on the film.
Following their speech presentations subjects were asked to 
use the fear thermometer to rate the fear they experienced at the 
beginning and end of the speech.
After the first presentation, appointment times were confirmed 
for the second session, which was the following day. Arrangements 
were made to meet the subjects in another part of the college in 
order to allay any suspicions about the nature of the second session. 
They were also asked not to talk to anyone about the study.
The second session proceeded as follows : Subjects were met
at the pre-arranged place and then taken to the test-room. There 
they were told that the second half of the study, as in the first, 
involved presenting an impromptu two minute speech which would be
1 For the first speech the topic was; 'What I expect to get out of 
college life... in both social and academic terms.' For the second 
speech the topic was; 'Describe what Bedford College has to offer in 
terms of social and academic facilities.'
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recorded and shown to a live audience at a later date. When 
asked, all subjects agreed to proceed. Subjects then sat at the 
desk in front of the video camera and completed the S.T.A.I. State 
scale. The procedure was then exactly the same as for the first 
session apart from the following additions; after their speeches 
subjects were asked to complete the S.T.A.I. Trait scale. They 
were then told that the final part of the experiment involved taking 
a baseline recording of their 'blood flow' via the plethysmograph.
They were told to relax and then ten minutes after the completion 
of the S.T.A.I. a baseline recording of their heart rate was taken 
for a thirty second period.
Subsequently subjects were asked for their permission to show 
the recording to a live audience; their questions about the experiment 
were answered and finally they were asked not to discuss the study 
with anyone.
RESULTS
Behavioural Measures ;
Word Count (WC) and duration of silence (s) were scored for 
the three forty-second periods of each two minute speech. Both of 
these measures were scored by the experimenter. Silence was scored 
with the aid of the digital timer superimposed upon the video-tape 
and word count with the aid of a hand counter. Each recording was 
scored twice for each measure and where discrepancies existed between 
these scores the recording was scored a third time. The scores for 
each of these variables were subjected to an ANOVA  ^ for a four factor 
experimental design; Group (2 ; High Fear vs Low Fear) x Locus of Control 
orientation (internal vs External) x Speech (2) x Period (3), with 
repeated measures on the last two factors. (P ratios are presented in 
Table 25 and complete ANOVA summary tables in Appendices 12 and 13).
1 For all measures the ANOVAs were for a split-plot experimental design 
with repeated measures on one or more factors.
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(a) Word Count;
Analyses of word count scores revealed a statistically 
significant main effect of Group (f = 16.22, df 1, 16, p.^.Ol).
The group means show that the Low fear group spoke significantly 
more words per speech period than High fear subjects; they were 
for the Low and High fear groups respectively: Mean = 94.18,
SD = 17.01; Mean = 64.52, SD = 32.83. This finding is consistent 
with the results of Experiment 3 in this series and provides 
further support for the notion that the number of words spoken 
when a speech is impromptu is an index of speech anxiety.
All other main effects failed to reach statistical
significance :  ^ Locus of Control (F = 1.26, df 1, 16, p >.05);
Period (? = 2.99, df 2, 32, p>.05).
Of the first order interactions the expected Group x Locus
of control interaction reached statistical significance (f = 4.54, 
df 1, 16, p ^  .05), while the others failed to do so: Group x Speech
(f = 0.6 4, dfl, 16, p > . 05); Group x Period (F = 2.55, df 2, 32, p >  .05); 
Speech x Locus of control (f  = 0.45, df 1, 16, p >.05); Speech x 
Period (f = 0.66, df 2, 34, p >.05); Locus of control x Period (F =
0.17, df 2 , 32, p > . 05).
The means reflecting the Group x Locus of control interaction 
are presented in Table 25 and represented in Diagram 4 . This 
diagram illustrates, as expected, a superior performance by internals 
in the Low fear group and in contrast a superior performance by 
externals in the High fear group. However, planned comparisons of 
these means (see Winer, 1971; p 385) revealed that only the difference 
between High fear internals and externals was statistically 
significant (t.975 = 2.12, d f 16, SED^ = 10.42).
1 The 0 .05 rejection region was used in all statistical evaluations.
2 SED = Standard Error of Differences of means.
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DIAGRAM 4
Word count means as a function of Group and Locus of control 
orientation
ê
oo
'gs
a
03
CDS
SO
70
60
50
Locus of 
control;
Group;(n = lo)
Internal External 
Low Fear
Internal External 
High Fear
-  243 -
The analyses also revealed that all second order interactions 
were statistically non-significant: Group i Locus of control x 
Speech (f = 0.25, df 1, 16, p >  .05); Group x Locus of control 
X Period (F = 3.21, df 2, 32, p >.05); Locus of control x Speech 
X Period (F = 0.51, df 2, 34, p ;> .05).
(b) Silence :
Analyses of silence scores revealed statistically significant 
main effects of Group (f = 51.40, df 1, 16, p ^  Ol) and Period 
(F = 8.1, df 2, 32, p ^ ‘0l). The means reflecting the main effect 
of Group illustrate the superior performance of the Low fear groups 
they are for the Low and High fear groups respectively: Mean = 1.60 
(secs), SD = 2.91; Mean = 14.95 (secs), SD = 11.30. This finding is 
consistent with the results of Experiment 3 and reinforces the notion 
of silence as an index of fearfulness when the speech is impromptu.
The Period means illustrate a general intra-speech trend of 
increasing periods of silence, for periods 1 to 3 respectively:
Mean = 6,26 (secs), SD = 8.19; Mean = 8.25 (secs), SD = 10,90;
Mean = 11.31 (secs), SD = 11.89. However, this main effect of Period is 
more readily interprétable in terms of a significant Group x Period 
interaction discussed below. The other main effects failed to reach 
statistical significance: Locus of control (f = 4.09, df 1, 16, p >*05); 
Speech (f = 0.09, df 1, 16, p >  .05).
Of the first order interactions the following v.ere statistically 
significant: Group x Locus of control (f = 5.93, df 1, 16, p 4.05);
Group X  Period (F = 4.32, df 2, 32, p .05). The means reflecting 
the expected Group x Locus of Control interaction are presented in 
Table 26 and represented in Diagram 5. This diagram illustrates the 
expected differences between the groups, i.e. the superiority of Low
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Diagram 5
Silence Means as a function of Group and 
Locus of control orientation.
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fear internals compared to Low fear externals and the 
superiority of High fear externals compared to High fear 
internals. However, similar to the analysis of the word count 
data, planned comparisons of these means revealed that only the 
difference between High fear externals and internals was 
statistically significant (t .99 = 2.58, df 16, SSD = 2.63).
The Group x Period interaction means are presented in Table 26 
and illustrate intraspeech increases in silence for both groups 
although this trend is greater for the High fear group.
All other first order interactions failed to reach 
statistical significance; Group x Speech (? = 0.10, df 1, 16, p >  .05);
Locus of control x Speech (f = 0.69, df 1, 16, p>.05); Locus 
of control x %riod ( F = 0.40, df 2, 32, p >  .05); Speech x Ibriod 
( F = 1.05, df 2, 34, p >  .05).
Similarly, all second other interactions were statistically 
non-significant; Group x Locus of control x Speech ( f = 0.58, 
df 1, 16, p >. .05); Group X Locus of control x Period (f = 1.11,
df 2, 32, p 1> .05); Locus of control x Speech x Period (F = 0.37,
df 2 , 34, p >  .05).
Summary;
In summary it is possible to make the following points on the 
basis of these analyses; firstly, the significant main effects of 
Group show that both word count and silence distinguished between High 
and Low fear speakers therefore suggesting that these measures index 
speech anxiety when the speech is impromptu.
Given that these measures do index speech anxiety, the second 
point to note is that both of the Group x Locus of Control interactions 
show, as expected, that High fear externals were significantly less 
anxious (i.e. they spoke more words and produced less silence) than 
High fear internals. In contrast, the expected differences between
Low fear internals and externals were small and statistically non-significant,
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Thirdly, it is interesting to note that these behavioural 
indices were not significantly influenced by repeated exposure 
to the phobic stimulus, i.e. presenting a second speech.
Table 27. F ratios emerging from the analyses (ANOYAs ) of 
Word count and Silence scores
Measure
Source of variation DF Word Count Silence
F ratio F ratio
Group 1 16.22** 51.39**
Locus of control 1 1.26 4.09
Group X Locus of control 1 4.54* 5.93*
Residual 16
Speech 1 0.09 0.09
Group X Speech 1 0.64 0.11
Locus of control x
Speech 1 0.45 0.69
Group X Locus of
control X Speech 1 0.25 0.58
Residual 16
Period 2 2.99 8.09**
Group X Period 2 2.55 4.32*
Locus of control x
Period 2 0.17 0.40
Group X Locus of
Control X Period 2 0.50 1.11
Residual 32
Speech x Period 2 0.66 1.05
Group X Speech x
Period 2 3.21 2.39
Locus of control x
Speech x Period 2 0.51 0.37 •
Residual 34
** p ^ .01
* P <  .05
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Subjective Reports of Fear;
(a) S.TJL.I. State anxiety scale scores;
Spearman correlation coefficients (see Table 28) suggest 
a positive linear relationship between Trait anxiety and 
Locus of control orientation, (i.e. externals tended to report 
higher levels of general anxiety), and between Trait anxiety 
and State anxiety. However, the majority of the coefficients 
are of only moderate magnitude and statistically non-significant. 
Therefore, State anxiety scores were analysed without 
statistically controlling for variations in Trait anxiety.
They were subjected to an ANOVA for a three-factor experimental 
design with repeated measures on one factor: Group (2) x Locus 
of control (2) x Speech (2). (P ratios are presented in Table 
30 and complete ANOVA summary tables in Appendix 14).
This analysis revealed a statistically significant main 
effect of Group (F = 9.86, df 1, 16, p <  .01). The Group means, 
(which are for the Low fear and High fear groups respectively;
Mean = 37.45» SD = 8.04; Mean 51.01, S.D. = 12.15) show that 
the High fear group reported significantly more anxiety in 
anticipation of presenting their speeches than Low fear subjects.
The other main effects failed to reach statistical significance:
Locus of control (F = 0.71, df 1, 16, p >  .05); Speech (f = 4.20,
df 1 , 16, p > . 05).
Similarly, all first order interactions were statistically 
non significant; Group x Locus of control (F = 0.06, df 1, 16, p 
> . 05); Group X Speech (f = 0.70, df 1, 16, p >  .05); Locus 
of control x Speech (f = 1.69, df 1, 16, p >.05). However, 
analysis of these scores did reveal a statistically significant second 
order interaction; Group x Locus of control x Speech (F = 6.31,
df 1 , 16, p < . 05).
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The means reflecting this interaction are presented in Table 29 
and plotted in Figure 10 . This Figure illustrates the fairly 
constant levels of anticipatory anxiety from Speech 1 to 2 for 
Low fear externals and High fear internals, and an int=r-speech 
reduction in anxiety for Low fear internals and High fear externals. 
However, cornea risons  ^ of means revealed that only the inter-speech 
reduction in scores for the High fear externals was statistically 
significant, (p <,0l).
(b) Fear Thermometer (FT) Ratings of Subjective Fear:
Fear thermometer ratings of fear were subjected to a 4-way 
ANOVA with repeated measures; Group (2) x Locus of control (2) x 
Speech (2) x Rating (2).^ (F ratios are presented in Table 30 
and complete ANCVA summary tables in Appendix 15).
The analyses of these ratings revealed significant main effects 
of Group (f = 11.15, df 1, 16, p <,.01), Speech (f = 10.37, df 1,
16, p < . 01) and Rating (F = 5.48, df 1, 16, p <.05). The means 
reflecting the effect of Group (High Fear group; Mean = 5.58; S.D. 2.57; 
Low fear group: Mean = 3.07, S.D. = 1.12), show that High fear subjects 
reported significantly more fear than Low fear subjects, while the 
Rating and Speech means suggest an overall intra- and inter-speech 
reduction in subjective fear. (Means and S.D.s for Rating 1 and 2 
respectively are 4.65(2.29); 3.80 (2.22). Means and SDs for Speech 1 
and 2 respectively are ; 4.68 (2.4O); 3.78 (2.O9). )•
The main effect of Locus of control failed to reach statistical 
significance (F = 0.19, df 1, 16, p ^ .05).
1 Comparisons were made using the Hewman-Keuls procedure (described 
by Winer, op cit.).
2 Ratings 1 and 2 refer respectively to the subjective fear experienced 
at the beginning and end of each speech.
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FIGURE 10 State Anxiety means as a function of 
Group, Locus of control orientation and 
Speech
LU
X
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40-
SPEECH 1 SPEECH 2
o 4] LOW PEAR INTERNALS
(n = 5)
H IG H  FEAR INTERNALS
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iH iGH FEAR EXTERNALS
(n = 5)
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Of the first order interactions only the Group x Speech 
interaction was statistically significant (F = 11.55» df 1, 16, 
p <  .01. ), The High fear group ceans and SDs for speech 1 and 2 
respectively are: 6.50 (2,20) ; 4.45»(2.63). The Low fear group 
means and SDs for speech 1 and 2 respectively are : 3-05,(1.19)» 
3.10,(1.07). These means suggest that High fear subjects experienced 
significant inter-speech reductions in subjective fear, while the 
subjective reports of fear for the Low fear groups were almost 
constant across speeches. The expected first order interaction 
between Group and Locus of control was statistically non-significant 
(f = 0.01, df 1, 16, p >  .05), as were the other first order
interactions; Locus of control x Speech (F = 0.29, df 1, 16, p>*05);
Group X Rating (f = 2.73, df 1, 16, p >  .05); Locus of control 
and Rating (f = 1.21, df 1, 16, p >.05), Speech and Rating (F =
3.0 6, df 1, 1 6, p >  .05).
All second order interactions also failed to reach statistical 
significance; Group x Locus of control x Speech (F = 1.15» df 1»
16, p > .05); Group X Locus of control x Rating (F = 0.17» df 1,
16, p >  .05); Group X Speech x Rating (f = 1.19» df 1, 16, p >  05);
Locus of control x Speech x Rating (f = 1.19, df 1, 17» p ^  .05). 
SUMMARY:
In summary the results of the analyses of the subjective measures 
of fear suggest that High fear subjects were significantly more 
fearful than Low fear subjects both before (indexed by State Anxiety 
Scale scores) and during (indexed by F.T. ratings) their speeches.
The analyses of the F.T. ratings also suggest that the High fear 
subjects experienced significant intra- and inter-speech reductions 
in subjective fear.
The expected interaction between fear level (i.e. High vs Low) 
and Locus of control orientation failed to emerge: there were no 
statistically significant differences in reported fear between 
High fear internals and externals and Low fear internals and externals.
- 25U -
Interestingly however. High fear externals did respond to 
repeated exposure with significant reductions in anticipatory 
anxiety, while anxiety levels for High fear internals were roughly 
constant from Speech 1 to 2.
Table 30 F ratios emerging from the analyses (ANOVAs ) of Fear 
Thermometer ratings and State Anxiety scores
Measure Fear Thermometer 
Ratings
State Anxiety
Source of Variation DF F ratio F raiio
Group 1 11.15** 9.86**
Locus of control 1 0.19 0.71
Group X locus of control 1 , 0.01 0.06
Residual 16
Speech 1 10.37** 4.20
Group X Speech 1 11.55** 0.70
Locus of control x speech 1 0.29 1.69
Group X Locus of control
X speech 1 1.15 6.31*
Residual 16
Rating 1 5.48*
Group X Rating 1 2.73
Locus of control x Rating 1 1.21
Group X Locus of control
X Rating 1 0.17
Residual 16
Speech x Rating 1 3.06
Group X Speech x Rating 1 1.19
Locus of control x Rating 1 1.19
Residual 17
*♦ p <  .01
* P < . 0 5
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Heart Rate Measures :
Pearson correlation coefficients were computed for baseline 
heart rates and heart rates recorded in the 10 second period 
prior to each speech ('Anticipatory Heart Rate'), and baseline 
heart rates and heart rates recorded during speech presentations. 
The coefficients, which are presented in Table 31» suggest a 
positive linear relationship between these two sets of scores. 
However, the majority of the coefficients are of only moderate 
magnitude and statistically non-significant. For this reason 
heart rate scores were analysed without statistically controlling 
differences in baseline heart rates.
Table 31 Pearson correlation coefficients for baseline heart 
rates correlated with heart rates recorded before 
('Anticipatory heart rate') and during speech presentations
Group Low Fear High Fear
Speech 1 2 1 2
Measures correlated:
Baseline with
Anticipatory HR 
(n = 10)
.23 .26 .37 .60 *
Baseline with 
HR recorded during
.32 .26 .09 .60 ♦
Speeches 
(n = 10)
* p <;.05 (l-tail)
— 256 —
(a) Anticipatory Heart Rates;
Heart rates recorded in the 10 second period prior to the 
presentation of each speech were subjected to an ANOVA for a 
3 factor experimental design with repeated measure; Group (2)
X Locus of control (2) x Speech (2). (P ratios are presented 
in Table 34 and Appendix 16),
The analyses revealed a statistically significant main effect 
of Group (f = 6.2 5, df 1, 16, p <  .05). The Group means show that 
Anticipatory heart rates for the High faar group were significantly 
higher than those for the Low fear group. (Means and standard 
deviations for the High and Low fear groups respectively; 104.85 bpm 
(I8.24); 81.15 bpm (10.72), ). The main effects of Locus of control 
(F = 0.09, df 1, 16, p >  .05) and Speech (F = 1.93, df 1, 16, 
p >  .05) failed to reach statistical significance.
Of the first order interactions only the Group x Speech interaction 
(P = 11.82, df 1, 16, p<.0l) was statistically significant. The 
means, which are presented in Table 32,were compared using the 
Newman-Keuls procedure (described in Winer, op. cit.). These 
comparisons revealed that prior to Speech 1 heart rates for the 
High fear subjects were significantly higher (p <  .Ol) than those 
of the Low fear group. However, heart rates for the former group 
evidenced a significant (p <  .Ol) inter-speech reduction and prior 
to the second seepch were not significantly different (p )> .05) 
from the Low fear group.
The expected Group x Locus of control interaction was not 
statistically significant (F  = 0.09, df 1, 16, p .>,05) and similarly 
the Locus of control and Speech interaction (P = 2.27, df 1, 16, p ^
.05) failed to reach statistical significance.
The second order interaction was also statistically non-significant; 
Group X Locus of control x Speech (P = 0.07, df 1, 16, p ^  .05).
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(b) Heart rates recorded during speech presentations:
Heart rate scores recorded during speech presentations were subjected
to an ANOVA for a 4 factor experimental design with repeated measures:
Group (2) X Locus of control (2) x Speech (2) x Period (3). The analyses 
revealed statistically non-significant main effects of Group (P = 2,66, 
df 1, 16, p >  .05), Lqcus of control (F = 0.12, df 1, 16, p >.05) and 
Speech (F = 3.89, df 1, 16, p >  .05). However, a significant main effect 
of Period (F = 12.29, df 2, 32, p < .Ol) did emerge from the analysis; 
the means illustrating an overall intra-speech reduction in heart rate: 
deans and standard deviations for Periods 1, 2 and 3 respectively - 
103.93 bpm (14.75); 99.176 bpm (15.O3 ); 96.27 bpm (14.84).
All first order interactions failed to reach statistical significance 
Group X Locus of control (f .= 0.01, df 1, 16, p >.05); Group x Speech
(F = 3 .08, df 1, 16, p >  .05); Group x Period (F = 0.13, df 2, 32, p >  .05);
Locus of control x Speech (F = 0.07, df 1, 16, p>.05); Locus of control 
X Period (F = 1.43, df 2, 32, p >  .05); Speech and Period (F = 0.22, df
2 , 3 2, p >  .05).
Of the second order interactions only the Group x Locus of control 
X Period interaction (P = 3.77, df 2, 32, p <  .05) was statistically 
significant. The means reflecting this interaction are presented in 
Table 33 and graphically represented in Figure 11.Comparisons  ^ of these 
means revealed, consistent with expectations, significant intra-speech 
reductions in heart rate for both High fear externals and Low fear 
internals (t .99 = 2.46, df 32, SED = 3.12). For the Low fear externals 
heart rate also showed a reduction, although this decrease was statistically 
non-significant (p >  .05). Similarly, the observed reduction for High 
fear internals was statistically non-significant (p >.05), being on average 
little more than one beat per minute. All other second order interactions 
were statistically non-significant: Group x Locus of control x Speech 
(F = 0.24, df 1, 16, p > . 05); Group i Speech x Period (F = 0.25, df 2,
34, p > . 05); Locus of control i Speech i Period (F = 0.28, df 2, 34, p>*05). 
1 Comparisons were made between heart rate means for Periods 1 and 3 for
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F IG U R E  11 Heart Rate means as a function of Group, Locus of control 
orientation and Period
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Table 34 F ratios emerging from the analysis (ANOVAs ) of heart rates
Measure
Source of Variation DF
>
Heart rate Anticipatory Heart
rate
F ratio F ratio
Group 1 2.66 6.25*
Locus of control 1 0.12 0.09
Group X Locus of
control 1 O.CO 0,29
Residual 16
Speech 1 5.89 1.95
Group X Speech 1 1.08 11.82**
Locus of control x
speech 1 , 0.07 2.27
Group X locus of
control X speech 1 0.24 0.07
Residual 16
Period 2 12.29**
Group X Period 2 0.15
Locus of control x
Period 2 1.45
Group X Locus of
control X Period 2 5.77*
Residual 52
Speech x Period 2 0.22
Group X Speech x Period 2 0.25
Locus of control x
Speech x Period 2 0.28
Residual 54
** p <.01
♦ p <.05
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DISCUSSION
Consistent with the findings of Experiment 3 in this series, 
the results of this study show that anticipatory heart rates, word 
count, silence and fear thermometer ratings distinguished between 
High and Low fear speakers, and therefore, provide further support 
for the notion that these measures index speech anxiety when the 
speech is impromptu. The above results also suggest, consistent 
with the findings of the previous study, that State Anxiety (s.T.A.I.) 
scores were sensitive to significantly different levels of subjective 
anxiety experienced by these groups prior to speaking.
In addition, and again in accord with previous findings (i.e. 
those of experiment 3) the heart rate data suggest that heart rate 
does not distinguish between high and low fear speakers when they 
are presenting an impromptu speech. Therefore, the observed increases 
in heart rate above baseline for both groups cannot be assumed to 
simply reflect anxiety.
Given that these various behavioural (i.e. word count and silence),
i
physiological (anticipatory heart rate), and subjective measures 
(i.e. F.T. ratings and S.T.A.I. scores) do index speech anxiety, it 
is interesting to note that they provide an inconsistent picture of 
the comparative levels of anxiety experienced by internals and 
externals; especially within the High fear group. The pattern of 
results for Low fear internals and externals is less complex and 
therefore will be considered first.
Contrary to expectations all of the indices of anxiety suggest 
that internals and externals within the Low fear group experienced 
comparable levels of anxiety both before and during their speech 
presentations. In short, the results fail to support the hypothesis 
that internals express lower levels of anxiety than externals in
-  263  -
response to stimuli which are perceived  ^ as being only minimally 
frightening.
Given that a real difference in anxiety levels does exist 
between low fear internals and externals and this was the 
suggestion of the results of the previous study, perhaps the 
simplest interpretation of this failure to illustrate it is 
that the various indices were not sensitive to differences between 
subjects who were experiencing general ly low levels of anxiety.
In short this failure may reflect a ’floor’ effect.
Intriguingly, the only significant difference between Low fear 
internals and externals was in terms of heart rate recorded 
during speeches. Consistent with the expectations that internals 
would express less anxiety than externals, the results show that 
the former group experienced significant intra-speech reductions 
in heart rate, while intra-speech trends for externals were not 
statistically significant. However, given that this measure does 
not appear to simply index anxiety, this finding is difficult to 
interpret.
The pattern of responses for the High fear subjects, as 
suggested above, was more complex. The analyses failed tosupport 
the prediction that internals would experience greater levels of 
anticipatory anxiety than externals, or more subjective anxiety 
while speaking. However, the behavioural data may be interpreted 
to suggest, consistent with predictions, that internals experienced 
more anxiety while speaking than externals: as expected externals 
produced significantly more words and less silence in thei r speeches 
than internals. The heart rate data recorded during speech 
presentations are also consistent with expectations: externals 
experienced significant intra-speech reductions in heart rate,
1 Based upon their responses to the item 'speaking in public' on 
the FSS III (Wolpe, 1975).
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while for internals intra-speech changes were not statistically 
significant. Again however, because heart rate did not distinguish 
between High and Low fear speakers an interpretation of this data 
in terms of differences in anxiety levels is not justified.
When inter-speech trends in anxiety for the High fear 
groups are considered the various indices similarly present 
an inconsistent picture. Subjective reports (s.T.A.I. scores) 
suggest that externals experienced significant inter-speech 
reductions in anticipatory anxiety, while levels of anticipatory 
anxiety for internals remained almost constant from speech 1 to 2. 
However, anticipatory heart rates may be interpreted to suggest 
a significant inter-speech reduction in anxiety for both groups, 
although it should be noted that the greater reduction was 
experienced by externals: externals experienced an inter-speech 
reduction of 16,8 bpm compared to a reduction of 7.86 bpm for 
internals.
Analyses of the behavioural data suggest that levels of anxiety 
experienced by internals and externals while speaking did not differ 
significantly from speech 1 to 2. Although consistent with the 
above findings the latter group showed the greatest improvement 
in performance, i.e. more words and less silence in their second 
speech. In contrast, subjective reports of fear experienced while 
speaking, suggest that both internals and externals experienced 
comparable and statistically significant intra- and inter-speech 
reductions in anxiety.
In conclusion, the results indicate that only the behavioural 
measures support the hypothesis that high fear internals express 
more anxiety than high fear externals when presenting an impromptu 
speech. However, although the data from the other measures failed 
to do so, they are not inconsistent with this hypothesis.
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In addition, there is some evidence (S.T.A.I. scores) to suggest 
that externals and internals experienced significantly different 
inter-speech reductions in anxiety. Specifically, externals 
experienced a reduction in anticipatory anxiety from Speech 
1 to 2, while internals failed to do so. Again, although the 
other measures failed to illustrate this difference, the data 
are not inconsistent with this interpretation.
The most immediate questions to arise from these observations 
are as follows : Firstly : "If a real difference in anxiety levels
does e:;ist between high fear internals and externals, then why did 
some of the indices fail to illustrate it ?” Secondly; "Why was 
this difference apparent in the behavioural response system, 
rather than in terms of subjective anxiety as in the previous 
study ?” Thirdly, "Why do differences between high fear internals 
and externals exist ?"
In response to the first question it is possible that the 
observed discordance between the various indices of anxiety simply 
reflects the nature of speech anxiety as a 'Three-Systems’ construct 
(Lang, 1967)  ^ of loosely coupled and partially independent 
responses, which may also change in a desynchronous fashion with 
repeated exposure. Indeed, the observed desynchrony between 
measures for the high fear group was expected. Given such a model 
of speech anxiety, we can then speculate that some of the measures 
failed to distinguish between high fear internals and externals 
because in particular response systans differences do not actually 
exist. So for example, it is possible that these groups differ 
in terms of the expression of behavioural anxiety but not in terms
1 This conceptualisation of fear has been discussed at some length 
in Chapter 1 of this thesis and in the literature (e.g. Hughdahl, 
1980).
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of subjective anxiety experienced while speaking. Furthermore, 
it is possible within such a model to expect not only different 
rates of change of anxiety between groups (i.e. High fear internals 
vs High fear externals) but also different rates of change for 
different expressions of anxiety within groups.
However, the results of this and the previous study suggest 
that this pattern of discordance is not a consistent one. In the 
previous study subjective anxiety distinguished between high fear 
internals and externals while in the present study it was the 
behavioural measures. It would seem possible then, that real 
differences between these groups may be reflected in different 
response systems, depending u;'on the nature of the phobic stimulus 
(i.e. a live audience vs a video camera) and its anxiety-provoking 
potential.
It is alternatively possible that some of these indices were 
insensitive to real differences in anxiety levels between these 
groups. Such insensitivity may be a function of the nature of the 
measure; subjects use of the measure (i.e. when responses such as 
subjective reports are under voluntary control); the nature of the 
experimental paradigm, or indeed an interaction between these three 
variables. So for example, the fear thermometer may be a crude and 
insensitive index of anxiety especially under conditions which may evoke only 
moderate amounts of subjective fear, thereby reducing the range of 
scores. In addition, it is possible that such an instrument is 
susceptible to the response biases of different subject groups.
For instance, some researchers (e.g. Houston, 1972; Phares, 1976 
pp 130 - 132) have suggested that internals may be reluctant to • 
report anxiety and may even deny feeling anxious. Indeed, for these 
subjects it seems plausible to suggest that one possible way in
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which they may cope with the presumed incongruence  ^ between their 
general expectations of control and the experience of the uncontrollable 
effects of fear, is to deny that fjar. Such a tendency may be 
reflected in the failure to find differences between internals and 
externals in this study in terms of subjective anxiety experienced 
while speaking.
It is also possible that the S.T.A.I. is a more sensitive 
index of speech anxiety when subjects are experiencing high,rather 
than moderate levels of fear and therefore distinguished between 
High fear internals andexternals in the last study, but failed to 
differentiate these groups in the present study. Similarly, 
the reverse may be true for the behavioural measures ; they may be 
a more sensitive index of speech anxiety when the speakers are 
experiencing moderate rather than high levels of anxiety.
Clearly these speculations need to be pursued empirically.
At present the most cautious conclusion that can be drawn from this 
study is that high fear internals and externals differ significantly 
in terms of behaviourally expressed anxiety when the speech is 
impromptu and experience significantly different reductions in 
subjective anticipatory anxiety with repeated exposure to the 
speaking task.
Given such a conclusion the next question to be considered is 
"Why do these subjects differ in their expressions of anxiety ?"
At a descriptive level these findings are consistent with the 
congruency hypothesis which was discussed in the introduction to 
the previous study. Specifically, this hypothesis stated that the 
expression of anxiety is a function of the degree of congruency 
between general (i.e. Locus of control orientation) and situational
1 The argument is presented in the introduction to the previous 
study.
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expectations of control: the greater the incongruency, the 
greater the anxiety.
On the basis of this hypothesis it was argued that high 
fear internals would experience more anxiety than high fear 
externals when exposed to a phobic stimulus because an internal 
locus of control is incongruent with the experience of fear which, 
in terms of physiological arousal, implies a loss of control.
Indeed, the results of the previous study do suggest that high 
fear subjects perceive the physiological concomitants of fear 
to be beyond personal control. However,it cannot be concluded 
from this finding that a causal relationship exists between such 
perceptions and the expression of fear. Further research is 
needed to examine this possibility.
In addition, to examine the relationship between the expression 
of fear and the perception of physiological arousal, future research 
might also focus upon actual differences between internals and 
externals in terms ofphysiological responding. It is possible that 
such differences mediate the observed differences in the subjective 
and behavioural expressions of fear. Indeed, in the present study 
differences in heart rate were observed between internals and 
externals while they were speaking, although these differences are 
difficult to interpret given that this measure did not index speech 
anxiety. However, it is conceivable that with a different experimental 
procedure  ^ heart rate would more clearly index speech anxiety and 
therefore this procedure could be used to examine differences between
1 Such a procedure might involve minimising the effort required to 
produce a speech (i.e. when it is rehearsed) and maximising the 
anxiety inducing the potential of the speaking task (i.e. presenting 
a speech to a large live audience).
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internals and externals.
A further point for future research concerns the differences 
between high fear internals and externals in terms of their 
responses to repeated exposure. The general trend for the High 
fear externals from Speech 1 to 2 was one of fear reduction, 
while for internals the behavioural and subjective (anticipatory) 
expression of anxiety remained roughly constant. A clearer picture 
of the possible differences between these subjects might emerge 
if they were asked to present three or four speeches.
A final area of enquiry that might also be fruitfully 
explored concerns fearful subjects' self-statements. For example, 
fearful subjects might be asked to report their self-statements 
prior to speaking and their attributions of causality for their 
success or failure to perform a speaking task. Within a cognitive 
model (i.e. Keichenbaum, 197?) of fear we might expect that the 
differences between internals and externals would be reflected 
by different mediating cognitions. So for example, we might 
speculate that internals may entertain cognitions or produce 
self-statements which suggest that they are focusing upon the 
effects of the fearful stimulus and not the speaking task, hence 
their poorer performances. Following the presentation of speeches 
high fear internals and externals may differ in their perceptions 
of success or failure and the causal attributions of that success 
or failure. Such perceptions may predict levels of anxiety on 
subsequent tasks. So for instance, consistent with his expectations 
an externally-oriented subject may attribute his failure on a 
speaking task thus "I could not help being afraid when the task 
was 80 difficulty." Such an externally oriented attribution 
(see Metalsky and Abramson, 1981 for a full discussion of 
'Attributional styles') may be less inhibiting to the reduction
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of anxiety with repeated exposure than an internally-oriented 
attribution such as "I am useless at public speaking, I just 
can't stop myself panicking."
Summary and Conclusions;
The results of this study suggest that in terms of behaviourally 
expressed anxiety, high fear internals (defined by self report) 
are more fearful while presenting an impromptu speech than high 
fear externals. In addition, the latter group experienced a 
significant inter-speech reduction in anticipatory anxiety, 
while the former group reported similar levels of anxiety prior to 
both speeches. Differences in anxiety between low fear internals 
and externals did not emerge.
It is proposed that the reasons for the observed differences 
are open to speculation and further research. Speculatively, it 
is considered that they may be related to the degree of congruency 
between subjects' locus of control orientation and their perceived 
control over the physiological concomitants of fear. In addition, 
it is considered that these differences may be mediated by actual 
differences in physiological arousal and/or different fear-evoking 
cognitions.
Possible implications of these findings for theories of fear 
and therapeutic interventions are considered in the concluding 
chapter.
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CHAPTER 5
INTRODUCTION TO EXPERIMENTS 7 and 8
In carrying out the preceding experiments a good deal of 
data were collected which was not directly relevant to the 
hypothesis tested and, therefore, was not reported. However, 
the data has a bearing upon the findings reported above and, 
in addition, adds to our knowledge of speech anxiety and fears 
generally. Therefore, they are presented in the following 
studies. Experiment 7 investigated the relationship between 
locus of control orientation, trait anxiety and self-reported 
fears of FSS-III items. Experiment 8 examined observers' 
perceptions of the non-verbal cues of fearful and non-fearful 
public speakers.
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Experiment 7
AN INVESTIGATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LOCUS OF CONTROL 
ORIENTATION, TRAIT ANXIETY AND SELF-REPORTED FEARS:
A considerable amount of evidence has been accumulated which 
demonstrates that externality, as measured by Rotter’s (l966) 
Internal-External Locus of Control scale (l - e ) is strongly 
associated with various types of maladjustment. For instance, 
it has been found that externals tend to report higher levels 
of anxiety and depression than internals and also manifest a 
higher incidence of schizophrenia. (See Phares, 1976 for a 
discussion of this evidence). Recently, Wright and Pihl (l98l) 
have also found that externals tend to think more irrationally.
Following Rotter, Levenson (1973) constructed three new 
scales - Chance, Powerful others and Internal - in order to 
measure locus of control orientation. Internality, the degree 
to which individuals perceive that they control events in their 
lives, is measured by the Internal scale while the concept of 
externality is sub-divided and measured by the Chance and Powerful 
others scales. The Chance scale measures the degree to which 
individuals perceive that events are determined by chance or fate, 
while the powerful others scale measures the degree to which 
individuals perceive that events are determined by Powerful other 
people. Levenson's rationale for sub-dividing externality into 
these two components was simply that people who believe that events 
are determined in an ordered way by powerful others, should 
logically be expected to behave differently f ro m those people 
who believe that unpredictable external forces, such as chance 
or fate, determine events*
The purpose of the s tudy reported below was to examine the 
relationships between Locus of control orientation, measured by
-  273 -
Levenson's scales, trait anxiety, measured by Spielberger 
et al's (1970) S.T.A.I. and self-reported fearfulness of the 
items on Wolpe's (l973) Fear Survey Schedule (FSS III). On the 
basis of previous findings (see Phares, 1976, p 121) it was 
predicted that externality, measured by both the Chance and 
Powerful Others scales would correlate positively with Trait 
anxiety, while internality, measured by the Internal scale, 
would correlate negatively with this variable. Consistent with 
these predictions it was also expected that externality would 
correlate positively with, and internality negatively with 
Total Fear Scores (TFS) on the FSS III (i.e. the sum of scores 
for each item on the schedule) and scores for each of the 88 
items. However, given that there is some evidence (see Phares, 
1976, P 32 - 34) to suggest that an unpredictable aversive 
stimulus can be more anxiety-evoking than a predictable one, 
it was also expected that a tendency to believe that events 
are both beyond personal control and unpredictable, as indexed 
particularly by the Chance scale, would correlate most strongly 
with fearfulness of the potentially aversive items on the FSS 
III. Finally it was predicted that TFSs would correlate 
positively with Trait anxiety.
METHOD
Subjects:
A total of 85 university students (70 females and 15 males), 
completed Wolpe*s (1973) Fear Survey Schedule (FSS-IIl) and 
Levenson*s (1973) Locus of Control questionnaire. kS o f these 
students (3I females and 14 males), also completed both of these 
questionnaires and Spielberger et al*s (l970) State-Trait Inventory 
(s.T.A.I.).
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Questionnaires ;
An 88-item version of the FSS III (WoIpe, 1973) was 
administered, either individually or in class, with assurances 
of confidentiality. The written instructions which accompanied 
the schedule explained that the items were commonly associated 
with fear or other unpleasant feelings and that subjects should 
rate them according to their current reactions to the objects 
or situations denoted by the items. Responses were made using 
a 5 pointLikert type scale ranging from 'Not at all' (l) to 
'Very much' (5).
Levenson's (l973) Locus of Control questionnaire was 
posted or circulated to individual subjects; again with 
assurances of confidentiality, (sixty of the 85 subjects who 
completed it subsequently took part in one or other of the 
studies reported above).
The questionnaire consists, of three scales which can be 
scored independently of each other. These scales are labelled: 
Internal, Chance and Powerful Others. The Internal scale measures 
the degree to which individuals perceive that they determine or 
control events in their lives while the other two scales measure 
the degree to which individuals perceive events as being 
determined by external forc&s such as chance, fate or powerful 
other people. Each of the scales is comprised of eight questions 
although they are presented to subjects as a single questionnaire 
of 24 items. The questions are answered on a 7 point Likert-type 
scale ranging fran 'Strongly agree' to 'Strongly disagree'.
High scores on the Chance and Powerful Others scales reflect 
greater externality while h i ^  scores on the Internal scale reflect 
greater internality.
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Research (Levenson, 1973) has indicated that these scales 
have good reliability and validity.
Spielberger et al.’s (l970) State-Trait Anxiety Inventory 
(s.T.A.I.) was also posted or circulated to individual subjects, 
or completed by subjects during their participation in one 
or other of the studies reported above. The Trait-scale of the 
S.T.A.I. consists of 20 items designed to measure a more 
enduring level of anxiousness that is less influenced by external 
events than State anxiety. Subjects respond to each of these 
items by rating themselves on a four-point scale ranging from 
'Almost Never' to 'Almost Always '.
The S.T .A.I. test manual (Spielberger et al, 1970) gives 
extensive reliability and validity data for both the State and 
Tr&it scales.
RESULTS
A Total Fear Score (TFS) for each subject was determined 
by summing their scores for each of the 88 items on the FSS III. 
Spearman rank correlation coefficients were then computed for 
the inter-correlations between TFSs, Trait anxiety scores and scores 
on the Internal, Chance and Powerful Others scales. These 
coefficients, which are presented in Table 35 are all statistically 
significant, indicating linear relationships between all of 
these variables.
More specifically, these correlations indicate that those 
subjects who reported higher levels of Trait anxiety tended to 
report higher levels of fearfulness, indexed by TFSs (r =*69» n = 41» 
p <.00l), and also tended to be more externally-oriented, as 
indicated by the positive correlations between Trait anxiety and 
Chance scores (r ='61, n = 45» P <.OGl); Trait Anxiety and
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Powerful others scores (r =*69» n = 45 » p ^  .OOl) and by 
the negative correlation between Trait anxiety and Internal 
scores (r = -.42, n = 45» p ^.Ol). Similarly, subjects who 
reported higher levels of fearfulness, indexed by TFSs, also 
tended to be more externally-oriented as indicated by the 
positive correlations between TFSs and Chance scores (r = .65, 
n = 78, p <.00l); TFSs and Powerful others scores (r = .57» 
n = 78, p ^  .OOl) and by the negative correlation between 
TFSs and Internal scores (r = -.42, n = 45 » p .Ol).
Table 35:
Coefficients of correlation between Total Fear scores. Trait 
Anxiety, Chance, Powerful Others, and Internal scores
1
Trait anxiety Total fear scores
Trait anxiety 
Locus of r Chance
control J Powerful others 
scales
Internal
.6l***(n = 45) 
.69***(n = 45) 
- .42** (n = 4 5)
.69*** (n = 41 )^  
.65*** (n = 78)1 
.57*** (n = 78)1 
-. 34*** (n = 78)1
* p < .05; * *  p<'.01, *** p <  .001 (one-tailed tests)
1 Total fear scores could not be calculated for seven of the 
subjects because they failed to check one or more of the items 
on the FSS III. Hence the reduced Ns.
Coefficients of correlation between subjects' scores for each 
of the items on the FSS III and their scores on the three Locus 
of Control scales were also computed. These Spearman rank 
correlation coefficients, which are presented in Table 36, indicate 
significant positive correlations between chance scores and scores 
for 62 of the items (31 ps .001; 21 ps <C .01; 10 pa <[.05)» 
and between Powerful Others scores and scores for 46 of the items 
(14 ps <  .001; 14 ps .01; 18 ps <'.05). In addition these 
coefficients indicate significant negative correlations between
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Internal scores and scores for 40 of the items (5 ps .001:
16 ps <  .01; 19 ps .05). Thus in terms of the number of 
significant correlations, fearfulness was most strongly 
associated with a tendency to perceive that events are determined 
by chance. However, in order to determine whether the relationships 
between fearfulness and the locus of control scales were 
significantly different, sign tests were used to compare the 
Chance by item coefficients with the Powerful others by item 
coefficients and also these latter coefficients with the Internal 
by item coefficients. Coefficients were only compared in these 
analyses when one of the pair was statistically significant.
These tests revealed a statistically significant tendency 
for the Chance by item coefficients to be larger than the 
Powerful others by item coefficients (z = 4.26, p <^.00l), and 
a significant tendency for these latter coefficients to be larger 
than these for internal and item scores (2 = 2.01, p <  .05).
Thus for these items which correlated significantly with any of 
the three scales, fearfulness was most strongly associated with 
Chance scale scores.
Turning to the small and statistically non-significant 
correlation coefficients, it must be considered possible that 
some of them partly reflect the degree of dispersion of item 
scores. Table 36 shows that the standard deviations of scores 
for some items were relatively quite small (e.g. Journeys by 
Train, Weapons), therefore indicating relatively less dispersion.
It is possible that with a greater dispersion of scores the 
hypothesised relationship between fear of these items and locus 
of control would become evident. However, it is also apparent 
from Table 36 that not all of the non-significant coefficients 
are associated with small standard deviations for item scores.
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(For examples consider the following items  ^ : Worms, bats, 
snakes, crawling insects, mice, spiders). Therefore, it seems 
reasonable to conclude that fear of such items is unrelated 
to locus of control orientation.
Table 36
Listed below are the coefficients of correlation between subjects’ 
(n = 85) scores on each of Levenson's (1973) Locus of Control 
scales and their scores for each of the items of the FSS III. 
Standard deviations (sd) for items scores are also listed
Locus of Control Scale
Item
1
Chance Powerful
Others
Internal SD
Feeling different .58*** .32** - .20* 1.08
from others
Tough looking people . 5 1 * * * .48*** -.30** 0.93
Angry people .55*** .27** -.26** 1.09
Looking foolish .51*** .50*** -.29** 1.10
Being ignored .51*** .49*** -.21* 1.11
Responsible for a decision .51*** .27** -.30** 0.98
Feeling angry .51*** .19* -.40*** 1.07
Feeling disapproved of .49*** .49*** -.33** 1.11
Sick people .48*** .54*** -.26** 1.06
Feeling rejected by others .48*** .51*** -.34** 1.15
Being touched by others .48*** .30** -.29** 0.77
Making mistakes .46*** .49*** -.23* 1.00
Darkness .46*** .43*** -.04 0.97
Strange shapes .45*** .48*** .09 0.78
Speaking in public .45*** .29** -.31** 1.22
Losing control .45*** .28** -.33** 1.24
Prospect of a surgical
operation .45*** .19* -.28** 1.24
Being with a member of
theopposite sex .44*** .24* -.11 0.69
People in authority .42*** .44*** - . 2 1 * * 0.92
One person bullying
another .42*** .18 -.37*** 1.12
Being criticised .41*** .26** -.23* 1.12
People with deformities .41*** .25* - .1 3 0.97
Being teased .41*** .23* -.24* 0.95
A lull in conversation .39*** .57*** -.20* 1.01
’Crowds
— ------------------------------------------ ---------.—
.39*** .42*** -.33** 1.07
1 Interestingly, one of the factors to emerge from a factor analysis 
of responses to the FSS III consisted of these items (Kartsounis, Mervyn- 
Smith and Pickersgill^l983) •
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Locus of Control Scale
Item Chance Powerful
others
Internal SD
Ugly people .38*** .22* -.15 0.79
Dead animals .37*** .32** -.40*** 1.13
Entering a room where
others are seated .37*** .28** -.23* 1.00
Sudden Noises .37*** .23* -.15 0.95
Flying insects .36*** .17 -.20* 1.11
Partirg from friends .34** .27** -.03 1.14
Sight of deep water .34** .14 -.13 0.87
Dead people .33** .44*** -.24* 1.33
Strangers .33** .34** -.04 0.85
Doctors .33** .17 0.79
Witnessing surgical
1.36operations .32** .26** -.41***
Sight of knives or
sharp objects .32** .23* -.18 0.87
Taking written tests .32** .18 -.15 1.12
Premature heart beats .31** .25* -.20* 0.99
Journeys by Bus .31** .11 -.30** 0.50
Dull Weather .30** .28** -.23* 0.89
Enclosed places .30** .19* -.16 1.11
Seeing other people
injected .29** .43*** -.33** 1.17
Sight of fighting .29** .21* -.18 1.17
Becoming nauseous .29** .15 -.23* 1.21
Loud Voices 1.29** .15 -.11 1.05
Dirt .28** .24* -.24* 1.01
Falling .28** .21* -.06 1.11
Fai lure .28** .18 -.19* 1.12
Open wounds .28** .15 -.22* 1.10
Human blood .26** .16 -.23* 1.15
Looking down from high
places .25* .14 -.08 1.02
Fainting .25* .14 -.08 1.02
Aeroplanes .22* .24* -. 06 0.99
Being in an elevator .22* .19* .05 0.88
Fire .21* .28** -.12 1.25
Medical odours .20* .04 -.35** 0.86
Being watched working .19* .21* -.25* 1.02
Becoming mentally ill .19* .18* -.02 1.53
Being alone .19* .16 .00 1.02
Animal blood .19* .11 -.25* 1.07
Crawling insects .18 .16 -.15 1.15
Journeys by train .18 .02 —. 05 0.34
Automobiles .17 .11 —#01 0.72
People who seem insane .15 .17 .08 1.03
Lightning -.15 -.02 .16 0.87
Weapons .14 .18 —. 18 1.15
Imaginary creatures .14 .17 .17 0.61
Spiders .14 —. 16 -.17 1.33
Being in a strange place .12 .03 .03 0.48
Dentists .11 .08 —. 05 1.28
Thunder -.11 .03 .14 0.76
Large open spaces .10 —. 18 .13 0.44
Crossing the street .10 . 16 —. 05 0.63
Cemeteries .09 .10 -.07 0.93
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Locus of control scale
Item Chance Powerful
others
Internal SD
Dogs .09 —. 09 .03 0.77
Bats .08 .13 —.09 1.24
Worms -.08 .00 -.05 0.91
High places on land .05 .15 .03 1.02
Journeys by car .05 -.03 .03 0.57
Birds .03 .21 .03 0.49
Sirens .02 .19* .02 0.87
Snakes .00 .11 .00 1.20
Mice .00 .02 .00
,
* p ^'05; ** p <.01; *** p <  .001 (one-tailed tests)
DISCUSSION
The above results indicate that Locua of control orientation 
as measured by Levenson’s Locus of Control scales, is strongly 
associated with trait anxiety and self-reported fearfulness. More 
specifically, the results show that significant positive 
correlation:-exist between externality (measured by the Chance 
and Powerful Others Scales) and both trait anxiety and fearfulness 
(indexed by TFSs), while significant negative correlations exist 
between internality and these variables. In short these correlations 
suggest that a tendency to perceive that events are beyond control 
is significantly associated with higher levels of trait anxiety 
and self-reported fearfulness.
The coefficients of correlation between subjects’ scores for 
the three locus of control scales and their scores for each of 
the FSS III items,indicate significant positive correlations between 
the Chance and Powerful Others scale scores and scores for 62 and 
46 of the items respectively, while significant negative correlations 
exist between Internal scale scores and scores for 40 of the items.
In addition, a comparison of the coefficients for these items also
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revealed a significant tendency for the Chance by item 
coefficients to be larger than the Powerful others by item 
coefficients which, in turn, tend to be significantly larger 
than those for Internal and item scores. Therefore, consistent 
with expectations, these comparisons suggest that a tendency to 
perceive that events are both beyond personal control and 
unpredictable, indexed by the Chance scale, is most strongly 
associated with fearfulness. This finding also adds validity 
to Levenson’s sub-division of the concept of externality into 
the Chance and Powerful Others dimensions.
It is possible that sane of the small and statistically 
non-significant coefficients to emerge from this analysis partly 
reflect the degree of dispersion of item scores : the standard 
deviations for some item scores were relatively small indicating 
relatively less dispersion or spread of scores. It is conceivable 
that with a greater spread of scores the hypothesised correlations 
between fearfulness of these items and locus of control orientation 
would become evident. However, it must be noted that indexed by 
standard deviations, scores for some items were reasonably dispersed 
relative to other items, but nonetheless unrelated to locus of 
control scale scores. Therefore, it seems reasonable to conclude 
that fear of these items is unrelated to locus of control orientation. 
Interestingly, these items include: crawling insects, spiders, bats, 
worms, snakes and mice, all of which load on the fourth factor to 
emerge from a factor analysis of responses to the FSS III 
■(Kartsounis, Mervyn-Smith and Pickersgill, 1983)0
When considering these findings and their interpretation it must 
be considered a possibility that the observed correlations between 
externality (measured by the Chance and Powerful Others Scales), 
internality and both Trait Anxiety and TFSs, reflect externals
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greater willingness to report on these aspects of their lives, 
rather than real differences in anxiety and fear between 
these subjects. (See Phares, 1976, p 142, for a discussion 
of this point in relation to other findings). However, such 
an explanation cannot readily account for the observed correlations 
between externality, internality and reported fearfulness of the 
FSS III items. A greater willingness on the part of externals 
to report fear could account for the significant correlations 
but many of the correlations were not significant, indicating 
that for sane items internals and externals did not differ in 
terms of reported fearfulness. It is of course possible that 
internals reponded to some of the FSS III items in a defensive 
way and underscored their fearfulness but were more willing to 
admit their fear of other items, although why this should be so 
is open to speculation and further research. An examination of 
the relationship between externality and other indices of fear 
may help to determine whether internals and externals simply 
differ in terms of reporting fear of some stimuli or whether their 
reports reflect real differences in fearfulness.
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EXPERIMENT 8
AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE DECODING OF THE EMOTIONAL EXPRESSION 
OF PUBLIC SPEAKERS :
The ability to judge the meanings of nonverbal cues of emotion
has been the focus of a good deal of research conducted over the
course of many years. (See Ekman, 1979»for a review of the main
findings of this work).
In one of the studies in this literature Geer (1966) examined
the decoding of the emotional expressions of subjects who were
either high  ^ or low in their fear of public speaking. Specifically,
these subjects were asked to present an impromptu speech and then
judges were asked to rate recorded segments from each of the speeches
for their emotional content. These ratings were made on four 7-point
rating scales, the poles of which were labelled: ’Tense - calm’,
’Bored - interested’. Pleasure - anger’, a n d ’Accepting - rejecting’.
Interestingly, Geer found that the ratings on the ’Bored - interested’
and ’Pleasure - anger’ scales distinguished between the groups, with
the high fear speakers being perceived as significantly more angry
and bored than the low fear subjects. However, contrary to expectations
the ratings on the ’Tense - calm’ scale did not, even though other 
2
indices had suggested that the high fear group were significantly 
more fearful.
This finding is interesting given that recent research (Ekman,
1979) strongly suggests that people are quite good at recognising 
the nonverbal expression of fear and distinguishing it from other 
emotions, especially when the subject, or sender, shares the same 
or similar culture as the judge.
1 This distinction was made on the basis of their response to the item 
’speaking in front of a group* on Geer’s (1965) Fear Survey Schedule (f SSII).
2 Speech anxiety was indexed by subjective reports and the duration of 
silence in the speeches.
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One possible interpretation of this finding is that it 
reflects the fact that the judges only heard the speeches they 
rated and did not see the speakers. While some contradictions 
exist within the literature, most experiments (see Ekman, 1979) 
have found that the face compared with voice or speech, is more 
accurately judged, produces higher agreement or correlates better 
with judgements based upon full audiovisual input. Thus it is 
possible that the judges in Geer’s study accurately decoded 
differences between the groups in terms of expressed anger and 
boredom  ^ but were unable to detect differences in tension because 
of the absence of visual cues. Alternatively, it is possible that 
under such conditions non-verbal cues of tension are inaccurately 
decoded in terms of anger and boredom.
An additional factor which may have influenced Geer’s findings 
was the sex ratio of his judges (36 males and 24 females). In 
a recent review of the literature Hall (1978) concluded that females 
are significantly more accurate than males at decoding non-verbal 
cues of emotion, i.e. distinguishing one expression of emotion 
from another. Thus it is unfortunate that Geer did not look at 
possible sex differences as it is conceivable that his findings were 
influenced by the decoding inaccuracy of the larger number of male 
judges.
Lastly, it must be noted that Geer expected that the differences 
in fearfulness between high and low fear speeikers would be reflected 
in significantly different ratings of ’tension*. Hence, he appeared 
to be equating fearfulness with tension. However, it is possible 
that presenting an impromptu speech is a stressful task for both, 
high and low fear speakers which produces tension indpendent of fear.
1 Unfortunately, Geer did not take independent measures of these 
emotions (e.g. speaker’s subjective ratings of boredom and 
anger) with which to test this hypothesis.
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Thus, it is possible that while the groups differed in terms of 
fearfulness they did not differ in terms of tension. Therefore, 
the judges’ failure to perceive a difference between the groups 
in terms of the 'Calm - tense’ dimension may reflect their accurate 
decoding of the relevant emotional cues. Alternatively, of course, 
it may simply reflect their random use of this scale.
The purpose of the present study was to extend Geer’s work 
by providing a further investigation into the decoding of the 
emotional expressions of high and low fear public speakers.
However, because of the points discussed above it differed from 
Geer’s study in several important respects. Firstly, the judges 
in the present study were asked to rate the speakers they observed 
on the dimension ’Calm - fearful’ in order to provide a test of 
the primary hypothesis that fearful speakers are perceived as being
more afraid, when speaking, than fearless speakers. Specifically,
1 2 
it was predicted that naive judges would rate high fear speakers
2
as being significantly more fearful than low fear speakers on a 
7 point scale ranging from ’calm’ to ’fearful'. Secondly these 
judges observed audio-visual recordings of subjects presenting 
impromptu speeches, rather than listen to audio-recordings as the 
judges did in Geer’s study. Thirdly, an adequate examination of 
the effect of sex upon decoding accuracy was precluded by the 
unavailability of a sufficient number of suitable male judges
1 Judges unaware of the experimental hypothesis.
2 Subjects were assigned to these groups on the basis of their response 
to the item ’Speaking in Public* on Volpe's (1973) Fear Survey 
Schedule (f SSIII). This procedure is described in the Method 
section.
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and therefore in order to control for possible sex effects 
all of the judges in this study were female.
In addition, the present study explored the possibility that 
a specific observer characteristic, i.e. their degree of public 
speaking anxiety, influences the perception of the non-verbal 
cues of emotion expressed by public speakers. Hall (1978) and 
Ekman (1979) concluded in their reviews of the literature that the 
only personality variable to be found to influence observers' 
decoding accuracy with significant consistency was their sex; as 
noted above females are significantly more accurate than males 
when it comes to distinguishing one expression of emotion from 
another. However, it is conceivable that while individuals of the 
same sex are comparable in terms of decoding accuracy, they vary 
in a systematic way, in terms of their perceptions of the intensity 
of another's emotional experience; this variability correlating with 
personality and/or stimulus (e.g. sex of speaker) variables. Thus, 
female observers may be able to accurately decode fearful speakers' 
nonverbal cues of anxiety, and therefore distinguish between high 
and low fear speakers (this was the primary hypothesis) but vary 
sys tematically in their perceptions of the intensity of fear experienced 
by public speakers. The hypothesis tested in this study was that this 
variability is a function of observers' degree of public speaking anxiety, 
More specifically, it was predicted that observers (judges) with a 
high 1 level of public speaking anxiety themselves, would rate high 
fear speakers as being significantly more anxious than observers with 
1 High and low fear judges wereselected on the bais of their response 
to the item 'Speaking in Public' on Volpe's (1973) Fear Survey 
Schedule (f SSIII). The details of this selection procedure are 
described in the Method section.
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a low level of speech anxiety.
The judges in the present study were also asked to rate the 
speakers they observed on two other scales: 'Bored - interested' and 
'Pleasure - anger'. As noted above, Geer's study found that judges 
perceived that high and low fear speakers differed in terms of 
their nonverbal expressions of anger and boredom. Therefore, it 
was not considered a contradiction to expect that ratings of 
more than one decoded emotion would distinguish between the high 
and low speakers in this study. Although Geer's study differed 
from this one, his results were the only ones available on which 
to base predictions and therefore consistent with his findings it 
was predicted that judges would rate the high fear speakers as being 
significantly more angry and bored than the low fear speakers.
No specific predictions were made about the effect of judges' 
level of speech anxiety (i.e. high or low) upon their ratings on 
these scales.
METHOD ,
Subjects :
The ten female judges were selected from a medical student 
population. They had completed Volpe's (1973) Fear Survey Schedule 
(FSSIII) at least one month prior to their pariticipation in the 
following experiment. They were selected on the basis of their 
response to the item 'Speaking in Public' on the schedule: five had 
indicated their fear to be 'Much' or 'Very much' (High Fear Judges) 
and five had checked the column 'Not at all' in response to this 
item (Low Fear
They were selected from a medical student population in order 
to minimize the possibility that they would know any of the speakers 
they were to rate, all of whom were university undergraduates. It
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was considered that such knowledge might influence their ratings
and therefore be an unwelcome source of error*
Equipment and Materials;
The judges watched, on a television monitor, an audiovisual
recording of ten 30-second segments of speech presented by ten
different speakers. These segments were selected from the twenty
impromptu speeches, each of two minutes duration, which had been
recorded  ^ in Experiment 3 of this series.
The procedure for selecting these segments was as follows ;
a segment was taken frcm each of the speeches of the five high
fear speakers with the highest ratings of subjective fear experienced
at the beginning of the speeches. (The mean rating on a 10-point
fear thermometer was 8.7)• In addition, a segment was taken from
each of the speeches of the five low fear speakers with the lowest
ratings of subjective fear for the same phase of their speech, i.e.
the beginning. (The mean rating was 2.4). Consistent with this
criterion the segments were taken from the first 60 seconds of each
of the speeches. Furthermore, in order to control for the possibility
that judges' ratings would be a response to long periods of silence in
the high fear speakers' speeches (this measure distinguished between
the high and low fear speakers in Experiment 3 ), the re-recorded
segments taken from the first 60 seconds of each speech were 30
2
seconds of uninterrupted speech.
1. Details of this procedure are described in the Method section 
of Experiment 3.
2 Specifically, no single silence or pause was longer than two 
seconds in duration.
- 289 -
Procedure ;
The judges volunteered to take part in an experiment, the 
nature of which was kept from them until they arrived at the 
test room. Upon arrival, the judges were seated at a desk in front 
of a television monitor and given the following instructions which 
were typed on a sheet of A4 paper ;
"I am going to show you a video recording of ten people
talking about college life. You will see each person 
separately, talking for thirty seconds. After each 
person’s talk there will be a sixty second pause. During 
this pause I want you to rate the person you just saw in
terms of the emotion you think they were experiencing while
they were talking. I want you to do this by circling the 
number you feel is most appropriate on each of the three 
rating scales you will find on the attached pages. Please 
ensure that you encircle a number of each of these three 
scales for each of the ten people you see. Please remember 
that you are not rating the content of the speech but the 
emotion you think the speaker is experiencing. If these 
instructions are not clear, please ask for clarification. 
Finally, if you know any of the people you see on the tape 
please inform me.”
After ensuring that the judges were clear about their task the 
video tape was played to them. The ten segments of speech had been 
recorded on to the tape in a random order and this order was fixed 
for the presentation.
After each speech the judges completed a set of three rating 
scales which were typed on sheets of A4 paper. The 7-point scales were 
Bored 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Interested
Calm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Fearful
Pleasure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Anger
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Following this procedure the judges were debriefed: they 
were told the nature of the experiment and any questions they had 
were answered. In addition, they were asked not to divulge the 
nature of the study to anyone.
RESULTS
A judges' ratings on each of the scales were averaged for the 
five high fear and five low fear speakers she observed. Thus the 
ratings were reduced to a mean rating from each judge on each 
scale for both the high and low fear groups of speakers. These 
mean ratings for each of the scales (n = 20) were then subjected 
to a two way analysis of variance (ANOVA); Judge (High Fear vs 
Low Fear) x Speaker (High fear vs Low fear). (F ratios are presented 
in Table 39 and ANOVA summary tables are presented in Appendix 18 )• 
'Calm- Fearful' Scale:
The analysis of judges' ratings on the 'Calm - fearful' scale 
revealed a statistically significant  ^ main effect of Speaker 
(f = 76.95» df 1, 8, p<.00l). Consistent with expectations the 
means (which are presented in Table 37 )» show that the High fear 
speakers were rated as being more fearful than the Low fear speakers.
This analysis also revealed that the main effect of Judge 
(F = 1.10, df 1, 8, p > .05) and the Speaker x Judge interaction 
(F = 1.78, df 1, 8, p > . 05) failed to reach statistical significance. 
Therefore the prediction that the High fear judges, compared to the 
Low fear judges, would rate the High fear speakers as being more 
fearful was not supported.
'Pleasure - Anger' scale :
The analysis of ratings on the'Pleasure - angei* scale revealed 
a statistically significant main effect of speaker (^ F = 5.37, df 1, 8, 
p <  .05 ). The mean ratings which are presented in Table 37 suggest 
1 The .05 rejection region was used in the evaluation of all statistical 
analyses.
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that the judges perceived that the High fear spakers experienced 
less pleasure during their presentations than the Low fear speakers.
The main effect of Judge (f = 1.66, df 1, 8, p <  .05) and the 
Speaker x Judge interaction (F = 0.91, df 1, 8, p <.05) failed to 
reach statistical significance.
Table 37 Means (m ) and standard deviations (Sh) for the ratings of High and 
Low fear speakers by all judges on each scale.
SPEAKER
HIGH FEAR LOW FEAR
SCALE M SD M SD
'Calm - fearful' 5.06 1.41 3.22 1.62
'Bored - interested' 3.96 1.44 4.40 1.64
'Pleasure - anger' 3.86 1.05 3.52 1.25
Table 38 Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) for the ratings of High and 
Low fear speakers by High and Low fear Judges on each scale.
' ' - - ........... ' ■ ■■
SPEAKER
HIGH FEAR , LOW FEAR
SCALE JUDGE M SD M SD
'Calm - fearful High fear 5.12 1.13 3.56 1.56
Low fear 5.00 1.66 2.88 1.64
'Bored - interested' High fear 3.64 1.32 4.52 1.50
Low fear 4.28 1.51 4.28 1.79
^Pleasure - anger' High fear 3.76 0.83 3.28 1.14
Low fear 3.96 1.24 3.76 1.27
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.Table 39
F ratios emerging from the analyses (ANOVAs) of all measures
SCALE
* Calm-fearful' "Bored - interested" "Pleasure - anger’
Source of 
Variation
DF F ratio P* F ratio P* F ratio F*
Judge 1 1.11 >.05 0.35 >.05 1.66 >.05
Residual 8
Speaker 1 76.95 <001 1.39 >.05 5.37 <.05
Speaker i judge 1 1.77 X05 1.37 >.05 0.91 >.0 5
Residual 8
1 Complete ANOVA summary tables are presented in Appendix 
* The .05 rejection region was used in the evaluation of all 
statistical analyses.
"Bored - Interested* scale;
The analysis of ratings on the "bored-interested" scale 
revealed statistically non-significant effects of speaker (P =
1.38, df 1, 8, p >  .05) and Judge (p = 0.35, df 1, 8, p >.05). 
Similarly, the Speaker x Judge interaction failed to reach 
statistical.significance (P = 1.37, df 1, 8, p >.05). (Mean 
ratings are presented in Tables 37 and 3S}. Therefore, the 
expectation that the judges would perceive the High Fear speakers as 
being more bored than the Low Fear speakers was not supported.
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DISCUSSION
Consistent with expectations the judges in this study 
rated the high fear speakers they observed as being significantly 
more fearful than low fear speakers. Therefore, the result 
supports the hypothesis that female observers can accurately 
decode the nonverbal cues of fear expressed by fearful public 
speakers and hence perceive them as being more fearful than 
low fear speakers.
However, the findings fail to support the hypothesis that 
an observer's own degree of public speaking anxiety influences 
her perception of the intensity of fearfulness experienced by 
the speakers she observes. Contrary to expectations the high 
and low fear judges did not differ significantly in their 
ratings of fearfulness for the high fear speakers.
As expected and consistent with Geer's (1966) findings, 
the judges ratings on the 'Pleasure - Anger' scale distinguished 
between the high and low fear speakers. However, the mean 
ratings do not readily suggest, as predicted, that the high 
fear speakers were perceived as being more angry than the low 
fear speakers. While the mean rating for the former group 
(i.e. X = 3.86)  ^ was the closest of the two to the 'anger' end 
of the scale, it was still below the mid-point of the scale 
and therefore nearer to the 'pleasure' end of the scale.
1 Unfortunately Geer did not present means for inspection in 
his report and therefore a comparison of means was not 
possible.
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Thus, it might be more accurate to suggest that
the low fear speakers were perceived as experiencing more pleasure 
while talking. However the possibility that the judges decoded 
non-verbal cues of anger cannot be discounted, or indeed, the 
possibility that they decoded and rated cues of anger in the 
high fear speakers and pleasure in the low fear speakers. In short 
it is apparent that while the ’pleasure - anger' rating scale was 
sensitive to perceived differences between the speakers, firm 
conclusions about the nature of these perceptions cannot be made.
A more illuminating examination of observers' perceptions of 
these emotions in public speakers, and indeed other emotions, 
could be achieved in future research by having judges use separate 
rating scales for each emotion. So for example, they could be asked 
to rate anger on a 7-point scale ranging in intensity from 'not at 
all' to 'very much' rather than use scales the extremes of which are 
labelled by words presumed to reflect opposite ends of an emotional 
continuum, i.e. 'pleasure - anger '.
In contrast to Geer's (1966) findings, ratings on the 'bored - 
interested' scale did not distinguish between the high and low fear 
speakers. The reason for this discrepancy is not altogether clear 
although several interpretations are possible. Firstly, if it is 
assumed that real differences exist between high and low fear speakers 
in terms of the experience and expression of boredom/interest, then 
it follows that the judges in Geer's study accurately decoded these 
differences while the judges in the present study did not. This may 
have been a function of the mode of presentation of the speakers. 
Specifically, Geer used an auditory presentation which may result 
in judges attending to those cues of emotional expression pertinent 
to the accurate decoding of boredom and interest. In contrast.
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judges who observe an audio-visual presentation, as they did 
in this study, may selectively attend to cues in the visual channel 
and not decode those cues presented in the auditory 'channel'. However, 
it must be noted that to date (Ekman, 1979), there is no evidence 
to suggest that judges selectively attend to different 'channels' 
when decoding emotional expressions.
A second, and perhaps more plausible interpretation of these 
discrepant findings assumes that the perceived difference between 
the high and low fear speakers in Geer's study was not veridical
and reflects the inaccurate decoding of nonverbal cues. In contrast
to this study Geer did not match high and low fear speakers on 
the basis of the duration of silence in their speeches and therefore
the judges in his study heard groups of speakers who differed
significantly in terms of this variable. It is conceivable that 
this difference was decoded in terms of boredom and/or interest, 
with the low fear speakers being perceived as more interested because 
they talked more.
If these speculations are to be examined in future research 
(or indeed any investigation of observers' perceptions of the 
emotional expressions of public speakers) it is apparent from this 
discussion that there is a need for seme criterion - independent of 
judges ratings - for establishing which emotions are experienced 
while people are presenting speeches. A criticism of this study is 
that while several measures established the fearfulness of the 
speakers independently of the judges ratings, there were no 
independent measures of pleasure or anger. Thus, there is no real 
basis for arguing whether or not the judges' ratings were accurate 
perceptions of real differences between high and low fear speakers.
This is not to say that indpendent validation is easily achieved. 
Indeed, Ekman (l979) has suggested that the 'problem of independent
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validation has been the greatest obstacle to research on decoding 
accuracy' (p 541.) In his discussion of the literature he 
critically evaluates the use of subjective reports and moreover 
concludes that since there is no single infallible way to determine 
a person's 'true' emotional state researchers should use multiple 
convergent measures to gain a more reliable index of the emotion 
experienced*
Two studies which have used multiple measures were conducted 
by Kleck and his colleagues,(Kleck, Vaughan, Cartwright-Smith, Vaughan, 
Colby and Lanzetta, 1976; Lanzetta, Cartwight-Smith and Kleck, 1976). 
These researchers found that a positive relationship existed between 
indices of facial expressiveness, physiological response (skin 
conductance) and subjective ratings of pain in subjects given 
electrical shocks. Indeed, it seems intuitively obvious that at 
times indices in these three channels (i.e. facial, physiological, 
subjective) will be strongly associated; one can imagine many potent 
emotional happenings in which this would be the case. However, there 
is an increasing literature (e.g. Buck, Miller and Caul, 1974;
Notarius, Vemple, Ingraham, Burns and Kollar, 1982) which suggests 
that the relationship between facial expressiveness and other 
indices of emotion can, under certain circumstances,be a complex 
one. For example. Buck et al (ibid) found that less facially 
expressive subjects,as determined by judges patings, responded to emotive 
slides with greater heart rate acceleration and skin conductance 
responses. Similarly, Ngtarius et al (ibid) found that the less 
facially expressive subjects in their study responded to an 
interpersonal stresser with a significant increase in heart rate and, 
in addition, appraised the stressful situation as more threatening 
and reported feeling more guilt than facially expressive subjects.
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In short, these findings suggest that under some conditions an 
inverse relationship exists between facial expressiveness and both 
physiological reactivity and self-report of emotional state. 
Consequently, these findings are not consistent with the idea 
that emotion is a unitary phenomenon which predicts a positive 
relationship among the components of an emotional reaction. Instead 
they suggest a more complex conceptualisation of emotional 
expression which necessarily complicates Ekman's plea for the 
independent validation of judgements of emotional expressions: 
if a person is judged, from their facial expression, to be afraid , 
but shows little physiological reactivity and reports low levels 
of fear,do we assume that the judgements are inaccurate ?
Similarly, if a person responds to a particular stimulus with 
marked physiological arousal and reports subjective fear but is 
perceived by other judges as being unafraid, do we assume that they 
cannot detect nonverbal cues of fearfulness ?
Perhaps the best way forward is to incorporate these and 
similar findings into the 'Three-Systems-Model'  ^ of fear and 
emotion originally proposed by Lang (1968), Specifically, Lang 
suggests that in humans emotional behaviour should not be regarded 
as a unitary phenomenon but is best conceptualised as comprising at 
least three imperfectly related components; subjective report, 
behavioural response and physiological disturbance, which, as 
research shows (Bachman and Hodgson, 1975 can co-vary, vary 
inversely, or vary independently. If facial expression is considered 
as a fourth response system or component of an emotional reaction, 
then we might expect that it too would co-vary, vary inversely 
or vary independently with the other components.
If such a model is adopted then researchers can attempt to 
1 This 'Three-Systems-Model* is discussed more fully in the opening 
chapter of this thesis.
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determine the situational parameters and the idiographic 
dispositional characteristics that produce these variable 
relationships. Such research may give us some insight into why 
these patterns of response occur and hence the nature of emotions.
To date. Buck et al. (1974) have found several personality 
correlates of facial expressiveness. Specifically, they found 
that subjects who responded to emotive slides with low facial 
expressiveness and large physiological responses (internalisers), 
tended to be higher in introversion and lower in self-esteem than 
those individuals high in facial expressiveness and less physiologically 
reactive (externalisers). In addition, they found that internalisers 
tended to be male and extenalisers tended to be females. Using 
the experimental procedure employed in this study for producing 
& recording spontaneous facial expressions, future research might 
determine if these relationships hold for fearful public speakers.
It is also possible that facial expressiveness is a function 
of situational as well as personality variables. Buck (l980), for 
instance, argues that facial expressions seem to be subject to 
strong personal monitoring and voluntary control and serve as a 
'controlled readout' of central affective processes. Thus we might 
expect them to vary as a function of the display rules operative 
in any given situation. So, for example, we might expect that some 
fearful speakers are more facially expressive when addressing one 
type of audience rather than another because of the emotional 
display rules associated with audiences. B y using the experimental 
procedure used to produce the recordings judged in this study, 
it might be possible to examine the influence of audience variables 
(e.g. size and composition) upon facial expressiveness. The 
manipulation of these variables might effectively be achieved by 
varying the instructions given to the speakers about the type of
- 299 -
audience that will see the recording of their speech.
Interestingly, however, if facial expressiveness is modified 
by situational variables, then according to the 'discharge' model 
of emotional expression (Notarius et al, ibid), we might also 
expect concomitant changes in physiological responding.
Specifically, this model states that when 'an emotional reaction 
is directly expressed through the facial musculature or other 
overt expressive channels, physiological reactivity is attenuated'. 
Conversely, when these direct channels of expression are controlled 
or inhibited, Notarius and his colleagues suggest that an emotional 
reaction is discharged somatically, i.e. in terms of increased 
physiological response. To date the results of a few studies 
(e.g. Buck et al, 1974; Notarius et al, 1982) offer indirect support 
for this model by demonstrating an inverse relationship between 
facial expressiveness.and physiological responses to emotive stimuli. 
However, those studies which have directly manipulated facial 
expressiveness have reported findings inconsistent with this model 
(e.g.Lanzetta et al, 1976; Kleck et al., 1976; Colby et al. 1977). 
Typically in these studies subjects who were given electric shocks 
were asked to conceal the emotion they experienced by controlling 
their facial expressions. Interestingly, this control was 
accompanied by decreases, rather than increases, in both skin 
conductance responses and subjective ratings of pain. Notarius 
et al (ibid) speculate that these findings may reflect the artificial 
manipulation of facial expression via instruction, although as yet 
there is no evidence to suggest that more natural changes in 
emotional expressiveness are accompanied, as they predict, by 
inverse changes in physiological responses. If it is demonstrated 
that the facial expressiveness of fearful public speakers varies 
as a function of the audience size or composition, then the
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maasurement of their concomitant physiological responses would 
provide a test of the prediction that an increase in facial 
expressiveness is associated with a decrease in physiological 
arousal. Conversely, it would be possible to determine whether a 
reduction in facial expressiveness is associated with an increase 
in physiological arousal and/or an increase in other indices of 
fearfulness, i.e. behavioural or subjective.
Snmmary and Conclusions:
In conclusion the results of this study suggest that observers 
can accurately decode the nonverbal cues of fear expressed by 
public speakers and therefore can distinguish between high and 
low fear speakers. The above results show that judges' ratings on 
the dimension 'pleasure - anger' distinguished between high and low 
fear speakers. However, it is not clear whether the former group 
were perceived as being more angry or the latter group as experiencing 
more pleasure.
Finally, it is proposed that the experimental procedure which 
was used to produce and record the spontaneous expressions of 
the fearful speakers judged in this study, may be used in future 
research to examine the relationshipsbetween facial expressions of 
fear, behavioural, physiological and subjective indices of fear 
and certain personality and sitia tional variables.
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CHAPTER 6
SUKllARY OF FINDINGS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORIES OF FEAR, 
TREATMENT INTERVENTIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH
The Effect of Copine: Strategies upon Fear:
A number of theories of fears and phobias have been proposed 
(e.g. Beck, 1976; Ellis, 1962; Meichenbaum, 197?) whose basic 
premise is that fear is mediated by cognitions. However, while 
this premise has some intuitive appeal, there is no direct empirical 
evidence to support it. (This point was discussed in Chapter 3)* 
Indeed, Meichenbaum (l977) has questioned whether it is possible 
to provide a direct test of this hypothesis. Nonetheless, cognitive 
behaviour therapy, which is theoretically underpinned by this 
premise, has received enormous interest from researchers and clinicians 
over the last two decades. In this time several variations of 
cognitive restructuring have been developed (e.g. Ellis, 1977;
Beck, 1976; Meichenbaum, 1977). They differ in their emphasis 
(see Chapter 3; Mahoney, 1974) but still adhere to the notion that 
thoughts generate emotions, including fear.
The initial focus of interest in this thesis was on the effect 
upon fear of a component common to several cognitive interventions 
(discussed in Chapter 4), namely coping self-statements (cSS).
Several researchers (i.e. Wine, 1970; Glogower et al. 1978) 
have suggested that CSS are the major fear-reducing component of 
these interventions. However, there is no consensus in the literature 
about the nature or definition of adaptive coping self-statements. 
Indeed, in the studies of cognitive restructuring reviewed in 
Chapter 4, most researchers had failed to adequately describe the 
CSS used by their subjects. However, two researchers (Evans, 1977; 
Meichenbaum, 197l) have described CSS which they consider to be 
adaptive. Both of them have argued that the maladaptive self-statements 
which mediate fear are based upon the individuals' perceptions of
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the physiological concomitants of fear. In simple terms, these 
self-statements are seen to reflect a fear of being physiologically 
afraid. Accordingly, the CSS these researchers devised encourage 
fearful subjects to cope with these concomitants, although 
interestingly in very different ways. Specifically, Evans' CSS 
encourage subjects to passively expect and accept this aspect of 
fear, while those devised by Meichenbaum encourage subjects to 
actively cope with physiological arousal by self-instructing to 
relax and keep calm.
In Experiment 4 in this series, the effects of these two 
coping strategies upon speech anxiety were examined. The results 
lend some support to the suggestion that CSS can have a significant 
fear-reducing effect and furthermore, support Meichenbaum's notion 
that effective CSS include those which encourage subjects to actively 
cope with the physiological concomitants of fear. Specifically, the 
subjects who rehearsed these CSS experienced a significant inter-speech 
reduction in fearfulness. In contrast, it was found that those subjects 
who rehearsed Evans' CSS experienced a significant inter-speech 
increase in fear (indexed by subjective report).
This latter finding is interesting, not only because it suggests 
that some self-statements can have a detrimental effect upon fear­
fulness, but also because it is apparently contrary to the findings 
of the first study in this series. Specifically, it was found in 
that study that these CSS had a significant fear-reducing effect, 
indexed by the approach behaviour of a group of spider-fearful 
students. It is possible that this finding reflects demand 
characteristics; the subjects receiving this treatment may have 
felt obliged to approach the spider despite the fact that,indexed 
by subjective report and heart rate,their fearfulness did not seem 
to change. However, it must also be considered possible that these
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subjects did experience reductions in subjective and physiological 
fear but that due to the method of measurement employed it was 
not detected. Until further research is done then, it must remain 
a possibility that Evans' CSS have a different effect upon these 
fears, i.e. a detrimental effect upon speech anxiety but a 
beneficial effect upon fear of spiders.
Returning to the findings of Experiment 4» it is considered 
that several mechanisms may have been responsible, singly or 
in interaction, for the observed changes in fearfulness. Firstly, 
it will be noted that both Evans' and Meichenbaum'a coping 
strategies focus upon subjects' perceptions of the physiological 
concomitants of fear. Thus it is possible that the observed changes 
were mediated by actual changes in arousal. Specifically, the 
increase in subjective fear for those subjects using Evans' CSS may 
have reflected an increase in arousal, while the reduction in 
fear for those subjects using Meichenbaum's CSS may have been a 
function of a decrease in arousal. However, it must be noted that 
the physiological measure (i.e. heart rate) recorded in this study 
does not sup^>ort this interpretation. It was found that the coping 
strategies did not have a significant effect upon heart rate. 
However, it must also be noted that this measure was restricted to 
only one of the two speeches and furthermore is considered to 
only reliably index anticipatory anxiety. Thus, unobserved changes 
in arousal may have occurred. This possibility might be examined 
in future studies.
Alternatively, it is proposed that the observed changes were a 
function of changes in subjects' perceptions of arousal rather than 
arousal per se. There is some evidènce from biofeedback studies 
(e.g. Gatchel et al. 1979) to suggest that perceived control over 
heart rate results in a reduction in subjective fear. Thus it is
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considered possible that those subjects who were encouraged to 
actively cope with the physiological concomitants of fear by 
self-instructing to relax etc. perceived a degree of control over 
this component of fear which mediated changes in subjective and 
behaviourally expressed fear. In contrast, those subjects who 
were encouraged to passively accept the physiological concomitants 
of fear may have perceived a lack or loss of control which mediated 
their increase in fear. Future research may evaluate this hypothesis 
by measuring subjects perceptions of control over physiological 
arousal in relation to their use of these two strategies.
A third mechanism which may have influenced the observed 
changes in fearfulness, is subjects' perceived control or self- 
efficacy (Bandura, 197?) in terms of their performances. Specifically, 
during the first speech the performances of the subjects who used 
Meichenbaum's CSS were significantly superior to those of the 
subjects who rehearsed Evans' CSS. It is possible that the 
performances of the former subjects increased their expectations 
of competence with regard to the speaking task and thus contributed 
to the reduction in fear they experienced during the second speech.
In contrast, the poorer performances of the latter subjects may have 
decreased their perceived self-efficacy to present a speech, and thus 
lead to an increase in fear during their second speech.
The behaviour of one of the control groups in experiment 4 
prompted the consideration of a fourth mechanism by which coping 
strategies may produce a reduction in fear. To reiterate, the 
subjects in this group were asked to devise and rehearse their own 
coping strategy. Interestingly, they expressed significantly less fear 
(indexed by the behavioural measures) than a no treatment control group 
during both of their speeches. An inspection of their strategies 
revealed that the majority of them had devised task-oriented CSS 
such as: 'Concentrate on what you have to say next.' It is possible
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that such CSS result in a reduction in fear by replacing those 
maladaptive self-statements which are presumed to mediate fear, 
or by distracting subjects' attention from the presumed (Meichenbaum 
1977) source of maladaptive self-statements, i.e. their physiologic 1 
arousal. Future research might fruitfully provide a more thorough 
examination of the effects upon fear of task-oriented coping 
strategies and the possible mechanisms of their effects.
Some Comments upon Cognitive Theories of Fear:
The suggestion that fearful individuals can use self-statements 
to effectively cope with their fears developed from a premise 
common to all cognitive theories of fear, namely that thoughts create 
emotions. The results of experiment 4 suggest that coping self­
statements do have a beneficial effect upon fearfulness. However, 
some of the observations of this study also highlight the theoretical 
inadequacy of the notion that a simple causal relationship exists 
between thoughts and fear. Specifically, it was observed that 
for all the groups of subjects in this study, to varying degrees, 
the indices of fear changed in a desynchronous fashion from the first 
of their speeches to the second. ^Uch observations are not new 
(see Bachman, 1978a), but importantly they demonstrate that complexity 
of fear. Indeed, it is widely accepted (Sartory et al. 1978) on 
the basis of such observations that fear cannot be regarded as a 
unitary phenomenon. This is the point. Cognitive models of fear 
which postulate a one-to-one relationship between thoughts and fear^ 
conceptualised as a unitary phenomenon, cannot account for such 
observations. If thoughts do mediate fear then these observations 
suggest that the relationship is far more complex. For example, 
it must be considered possible that some thoughts generate behavioural 
but not physiological or subjective fear, while others produce 
subjective and physiologically expressed fear which is not evident 
behaviourally... Without considering all the possibilities, it is
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evident that the simple, and intuitively appealing notion that 
thoughts cause fear, a unitary phenomenon, must be reconsidered.
Locus of Control Orientation and the Expression of Fear and Anxiety
The results of experiment 7 indicate that externality, as 
measured by Levenson’s (1973) locus of control questionnaire, is 
positively correlated with trait anxiety, while internality is 
negatively correlated with this variable.
It is possible that these correlations reflect real differences 
between internals and externals in terms of trait anxiety. Alterna­
tively, it is possible that they reflect externals greater willingness 
to admit to anxiety and conversely a tendency for internals to deny 
anxiety. As Phares, (1976, p ll+l) has pointed out, internals 
typically deny the common indicants of anxiety on most personality 
scales and verbally deny stress; denial which is belied by evidence 
of their greater concomitant physiological arousal (Houston, 1972). 
Indeed, it seems quite consistent with the concept of an internal 
locus of control, that internals attempt to control their emotions 
by denying them.
In addition, the results of experiment 7 indicate that externa­
lity is positively related to, and internality negatively related 
to reported fearfulness of many of the items on the FSS-III (Volpe, 
1973). These relationships were particularly strong when externality 
was measured by the Chance scale of Levenson's questionnaire, 
suggesting that fearfulness is most strongly associated with a 
tendency to perceive that events are determined by chance or luck. 
However, it must also be noted that reported fearfulness of some 
of the items (e.g. spiders, snakes, bats and mice) was unrelated 
to locus of control orientation, suggesting that internals or
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and externals do not differ in their fear of these stimuli.
One possible interpretation of these findings is that externals 
are more fearful than internals when actually exposed to some 
stimuli but not others. If this is the case then a number of 
related questions will arise. 'Does externality cause fear of 
some stimuli but not others or does a fear of some stimuli -
contribute to an external locus of control? Or is both externality 
and fear of some stimuli determined by a third variable?' Alternatively 
however, it is possible that these findings reflect a tendency 
for internals to deny some of their fearfulness of some stimuli 
but not others. If this is the case the question will arise:
'why do internals deny some fears but not others?' Hopefully 
future research will allow us to decide between these interpretations 
and shed some light upon the related questions.
The results of experiments 5 and 6 suggest that internals and 
externals who report high, but comparable levels of fear of public 
speaking, express significantly different levels of fear when actually 
presenting an impromptu speech. Specifically, it was found that both 
subjective and behavioural measures indexed higher levels of fear 
for externals, who also experienced significantly greater reductions 
in subjective fear with repeated exposure, i.e. presenting a second 
speech.
It was argued that these differences reflected the degree 
of congruency between subjects' locus of control orientation and 
the experience of fear. More specifically, it was suggested that being 
afraid implies a loss of inner control ( in terms of being 
physiologically aroused) and that such a loss is incongruent with 
an internal locus of control but congruent with an external locus 
of control. Futhermore, incongruency between situational and 
general ( i.e. locus of control orientation ) expectations of
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control has been found to be associated with higher levels of 
anxiety (e.g. Watson and Baume1, 1967). Therefore, it was 
expected that high fear internals would express more fear than 
high fear externals. The results of experiments 5 and 6 are 
consistent with this expectation.
However, while it was found that high fear speakers do 
expect to experience uncontrollable arousal while speaking 
(experiment 5)» research is still needed to demonstrate that 
the observed differences between high fear internals and 
externals are caused by such expectations interacting with 
their locus of control orientation.
Some Comments on Fear Reduction
If, as suggested above, high fear internals express more 
fear than high fear externals because the experience of the 
uncontrollable physiological concomitants of fear is incon- 
gruent with the locus of control orientation of the former 
group, but congruent with the locus of control orientation 
of the latter group^ then the question arises: 'Bo these 
groups respond differently to different therapies?' We 
might speculate that fearful internals derive most benefit 
from those therapies which, consistent with their locus of 
control orientation, increase their perceptions of personal 
control over the physiological concomitants of fear. So 
for example, it is possible that these individuals experience 
the greatest reductions in fear from interventions such as 
desensitization presented as an active coping skill, or the 
use of coping strategies like the active coping strategy 
examined in experiment 1»., both of which emphasise the active
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role of the individual in coping with, and controlling his fear. 
Conversely, fearful externals might respond most readily to 
those therapies which, consistent with their locus of control 
orientation, allow them to perceive change as being determined 
by an external agent or a powerful other (i.e. the therapist).
So, for instance, it is possible that externals experience the 
greatest reductions in fear from interventions such as flooding 
or medication, both of which allow the individual to perceive 
himself as the passive recipient of therapeutic change.
In short, the suggestion is that therapeutic efficacy may 
be increased if the therapy is congruent with the individuals 
locus of control orientation: therapies which emphasise personal 
control and self-efficacy may be more appropriate for internals, 
while therapies which emphasise external control may be more 
appropriate for externals. Hopefully, future research will shed 
some light upon these speculations.
The Nature and Measurement of Speech Anxiety
A number of observations were made in experiments 3» 5 and 8 
concerning the nature and measurement of speech anxiety.
In experiment 3i a procedure for investigating speech anxiety 
was described. Specifically, it consisted of having subjects 
present an impromptu speech to a video camera in the knowledge 
that the film of their performance would be seen by an audience 
at a later date. The results of this study revealed that 
behavioural subjective and physiological measures of anxiety 
distinguished between groups of high and low fear speakers.
More specifically, high fear speakers experienced higher heart 
rates and reported higher levels of subjective fear just prior
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to speaking. In addition, both the number of words spoken 
and duration of silence distinguished between the groups when 
intra-speech trends in these measures were considered; indexed 
by both measures, the high fear subjects produced significant 
intra-speech deteriorations in performance. Moreover, the 
high fear speakers reported (retrospectively) higher levels 
of subjective fear while speaking. Interestingly, speech 
disruptions and heart rates recorded during the speeches did not 
distinguish between the groups. It was argued that these 
measures may be more sensitive indexes of fear when speeches 
are prepared rather than impromptu. Indeed, the results of 
experiment 5 suggest that this is so for speech disruptions, 
although whether it is so for heart rate is a question for future 
research.
It is considered that the procedure employed in experiment 3i 
along with aforementioned measures of fear, would provide a use­
ful and practically convenient method for examining many aspects 
of speech anxiety.
Using some of the recordings made in this study, one aspect 
of speech anxiety, namely the recognition of anxiety by naive 
observers, was examined and reported in experiment 8. The 
results of this study suggest that observers are capable of 
decoding the non-verbal expressions of speech anxiety. Specifi­
cally, it was found that observers rated the high fear speakers 
they observed as being significantly more fearful than a group 
of low fear speakers. This finding also adds further validity to 
the use of video-recording as a method for examing speech anxiety. 
Interestingly, observers' ratings on the dimension 'Pleasure - 
Anger', also distinguished between the high and low fear speakers.
— 3 11 ”
However, a definitive interpretation of this result could not 
be offered in the absence of measures of the speakers' experi­
ences of pleasure and anger. Therefore, further research is 
needed to determine whether this result reflects observers' 
accurate decoding of speakers non-verbal expression of these 
emotions.
Another line of enquiry which might also be pursued using 
the procedure described in experiment 3 to record the spontaneous 
expressions of fearful speakers, is an investigation of the 
relationships between situational and personality variables and 
the expression of fear. For instance. Buck (I980) has argued 
that the facial expressions of emotion are subject to strong 
personal monitoring and voluntary control and serve as a 
'controlled readout of affective processes' (p 822), Thus we 
might expect them to vary as a function of the emotional display 
rules operative in any given situation. So for example, we 
might speculate that fearful speakers are more facially expressive 
when addressing one type of audience rather than another, because 
of the display rules associated with the audiences. It might be 
possible to examine such relationships by using the video­
recording technique and varying the instructions given to subjects 
about the composition and/or size of the audience who will see 
the recording of their speech.
Interestingly, if it can be shown that situational variables 
influence the facial expressiveness of fearful public speakers, 
then it would be possible to provide a test of the discharge 
model of emotional expression (Nortarius et al I982). Specifi­
cally, this model states that when an emotional reaction is 
directly expressed through the facial musculature or other
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overt expressive channels, physiological reactivity is attenuated. 
Conversely, when these direct channels of expression are controlled 
or inhibited, an emotional reaction is discharged physiologically. 
Thus, if the facial expressiveness of public speakers varies as 
a function of situational variables, then this model suggests 
that we can expect to observe concomitant but inversely related 
changes in physiological and possibly behavioural (as another 
overt channel of expression) expressions of fear.
In terms of personality variables, it is possible that a 
relationship exists between locus of control orientation and the 
expression of fear. It was suggested above that internals may 
tend to deny their fearfulness. If this is the case then all 
fearful responses within their voluntary control may be influenced 
by this tendency, including the facial expression of fear which 
as Buck (1980 ) suggests, is subject to voluntary control. 
Specifically, we might expect internals to be less facially 
expressive when afraid than externals. If they are, then we 
might also expect, on the basis of the discharge model, that 
internals would discharge their fearfplness physiologically or 
via some involuntary behavioural response, and with respect to 
these responses, be more fearful than externals. Again the 
procedure described in experiment 3 could be used to examine 
these possibilities.
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APPENDIX 1:, Experiment 1 : ANOVA summary tables for all measures
Measure: Approach scores
Source of variation DF
y ■
83 MS F
Group 1 1.231 1.231 0.098
Residual 24 301.538 12.564 11.598
Total 25 302.769 12.111 11.179
Assessment 1 9.308 9.308 8.592**
Assessment x Group 1 7.692 7.692 7.101*
Residual 24 26.000 1.083
Total 26 43.000 1.654
Grand Total 51 345.769
Measure; Subjective Fear rating
Group 1 8.481 8.481 2.337
Residual 24 87.077 3.628 2.802
Total 25 95.558 3.822 2.952
Assessment 1 0.942 0.942 0.728
Assessment x Group 1 0.481 0.481 0.371
Residual 24 31.077 1.295
Total 26 32.500 1.250
Grand Total 51 128.058
Measure: Heart Rate:
Group 1 35.56 35.56 0.104
Residual 24 8192.92 341.37 3.469
Total 25 8228.48 329.14 3.344
Assessment 1 76.33 76.33 0.776
Assessment x Group 1 196.17 196.17 1.993
Residual 24 2362.00 98.42
Total 26 2634.50 101.33
Grand Total 51 10862.98
* P < .05
♦* P < .01
**♦ P < .001
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Appendix 2. Experiment 1 ;
Spearman correlation coefficients for B.A.T, scores, 
subjective ratings of fear and heart rates (A post hoc 
analysis).
Group Experimental 
(n = 13)
Control
(n = 13)
Assessment Pre-treat
ment
Post-treat
ment
Pre-treat 
ment
Post-treat
ment
Measures
correlated
B.A.T. scores 
with subject­
ive fear 
ratings
— «36 - .31 — .20 .04
B.A.T. scores 
with heart 
rates -.10 .08 — .01 -.61*
* p <.05 (two-tailed test)
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Appendix ?
Experiment 2: ANOVA summary table for heart ratev
Measure Source of 
variation
DF SS MS F P
Baseline Group 3 1003.5 344.5 3.14 <  .05
heart Resid­ 44 4674.2 106.2
rates ual
Heart Group 3 360.0 120.0 .48 >.05
rat# Resid­ 44 10968.0 249.2
scores ual
-5 to 0
secs
Heart Group 3 2898.1 966.0 2.7 >  .05
rate Resid­ 44 15977.8 363.1
scores ual
10 sec Period 1 7.0 7.0 0.3 >  .05
periods Group X
prior to Period 3 175.13 58.4 2.2 )> .05
& after ^Residual 44 1151.8 26.2
presen­
tation
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Appendix 5 :
Experiment 3; ANOVA Summary tables for all measures;
Measure Source of 
variation
1.
DF SS
....... .
MS F
,---  ^
P
Silence Group 1 1037.50 1037.50 11.84 <.01
Residual 18 1557.96 87.66
Period 2 151.60 75.80 2.74 >.05
Group X
Period 2 340.03 170.02 6.16 ^.01
Residual 36 996.06 27.60
Word Group 1 5920.30 5920.30 3.90 >  05
count Residual 18 27370.40 1520.60
Period 2 786.70 393.35 4.41 <.05
Group X
Period 2 3653.90 1826.70 20.50 <.01
Residual 36 3212.20 89.30
Dis­ Group 1 3.20 3.20 0.20 >.05
ruptions Residual 18 254.20 14.12
Period 2 9.70 4.85 3.64 <.05
Group X
Period 2 13.80 6.90 5.20 < . 0 5
Residual 36 47.88 1.33
Heart ' Group 1 1250.35 1250.35 1.28 >.05
rate Residual 18 17545.31 974.74
Period 2 213.30 106.65 1.44 >.05
Group X
Period 2 122.43 61.21 0.83 >.05
Residual 36 2658.58 73.85
Subject­ Group 1 136.90 136.90 22.6 >.01
ive Residual 18 108.88 6.05
fear Rating 1 10.00 10.00 5.1 < . 0 5
ratings Group I
Rating 1 0.40 0.40 0.20 >.05
Residual 18 35.35 1.96
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APPENDIX 6. Experiment 4 : ANOVA summary table...for Word Count Scores
Source of Variation
. .... 
DF SS MS
Group 3 6993.3 2331.1 0.788
Topic order 1 1050.0 1050.0 0.355
Residual 24 71009.1 2958.7 13.158
Total 31 81564.3 2631.8 11.704
Speech 1 772.0 772.0 0.913
Speech x Group 3 1988.6 622.9 0.784
Speech i Topic order 
Speech x Group x
1 59.6 59.6 0.071
Topic order 3 2533.6 844.5 0.999
Residual 24 20299.0 845.8 3.761
Total 32 25652.8 801.7 3.565
Period 2 4829.2 2414.6 11.224**
Period x Group 6 6342.3 1057.0 4.913**
Period x Topic order 
Period x Group i
2 55.8 27.9 0.130
Topic order 6 923.2 153.9 0.715
Residual 48 10326.2 215.1 0.957
Total 64 22476.7 351.2 1.562
Speech x Period 
Speech x Period x
2 1356.8 678.4 3.017
Group 
Speech x Period x
6 964.3 160.7 0.715
Topic order 
Speech x Period x 
Group X Topic
2 91.2 45.6 0.203
order 6 549.0 91.5 0.407
Residual 48 10793.4 224.9
Total 64 13754.7 214.9
Grand Total 191 143468.5
♦* p
<  .05
<  .01 
*** p <  .001
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APPENDIX 7. Experiment 4 : ANOVA Summary, table for Silence scores
Source of variation DP S3 MS
1--------------- <
F
Group 3 1710.38 570.13 1.834
Topic order 1 181.16 181.16 0.583
Group X topic order 3 231.88 77.29 0.249
Residual 24 7461.51 310.90 9.478
Total 31 9584.93 309.19 9.426
Speech 1 1.98 1.98 0.015
Speech x Group 3 844.89 281.63 2.069
Speech x Order 1 1.60 1.60 0.012
Speech x Group x 
Topic order 3 412.90 137.63 1.011
Residual 24 3266.93 136.12 4.150
Total 32 4528.29 141.51 4.314
Period 2 1121.82 560.91 16.282**
Period x Group 6 563.98 94.00 2.729*
Period i Topic order 2 23.32 11.66 0.338
Period x Group x 
Topic order 6 167.98 28.00 0.813
Residual 48 1653.58 34.45 1.050
Total 64 3530.67 55.17 1.682
Speech x Period 2 ' 56.30 28.15 0.858
Speech x Period x 
Group 6 234.97 39.16 1.194
Speech x Period x 
Topic order 2 18.94 9.47 0.289
Speech x Period x 
Group X Topic 
order 6 108.71 18.12 0.552
Residual 48 1574.42 8.02 32.80
Total 64 1993.33 10.15 31.15
Grand Total 191
. _ It
19637.22
p <  .05
p <  .01 
**♦ p < . 0 0 1
*
♦ ♦
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appendix 8 Experiment 4s ANOVA Summary table for_Anticipatory 
Fear Ratings and Anticipatory Heart Rate;
Source of variation DF SS
'.........
MS F
Group 3 5.543 1.848 0.508
Topic order 1 0.879 0.879 0.242
Group X Topic order 3 6.324 2.108 0.580
Residual 24 87.219 3.634 3.458
Total 31 99.965 3.225 3.069
Speech 1 17.535 17.535 16.688**
Speech x Group 3 1.293 0.431 0.410
Speech x Topic order 1 0.191 0.191 0.182
Speech x Group x 
Topic order 3 1.637 0.546 0.519
Residual 24 25.219 1.051
Total 32 45.875 1.434
Grand Total 63 145.840
Measure : Anticipatory heart rate;
Group 3 1551.0 517.0 1.826
Topic order 1 722.0 722.0 2.550
Group X Topic order 3 1275.0 425.0 1.501
Residual 24 6796.0 283.2
Total 31 10344.0
Grand Total 31 10344.0
'
* p <.05
*♦ p <.01
♦♦♦ p < .0 0 1
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APPENDIX 9 Experiment 4 : ANOVA Summary table for Subjective Fear Ratings
Source of variation DF SS MS F
Group 3 13.422 4.474 0.559
Topic order 1 0.070 0.070 0.009
Group X Topic order 3 38.477 12.826 1.602
Residual 24 192.156 8.007 6.464
Total 31 244.125 7.875 6.357
Rating 1 4.500 4.500 1.890
Rating % Group 3 12.078 4.026 1.691
Rating x Topic order 1 0.070 0.070 0.030
Rating x Group x
Topic order 3 8.945 2.982 1.252
Residual 24 57.156 2.382 1.923
Total 32 82.750 2.586 2.088
Speech 1 5.281 5.281 3.377
Speech x Group 3 42.797 14.266 9.122**
Speech x Topic order 1 1.320 1.320 0.844
Speech x Group x
Topic order 3 10.820 2.35 2.306
Residual 24 37.531 1.564 1.262
Total 32 97.750 3.055 2.466
Rating i Speech 1 0.500 0.500 0.404
Rating x Speech x
Group 3 0.359 0.120 0.097
Rating x Speech x
Topic order 1 0.945 0.945 0.763
Residual 27 33.445 1.239
Total 32 35.250 1.102
Grand Total 127 459.875
♦ p <.05
♦* p <.01 
p <.001
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APPENDIX 10 Experiment 4 ANOVA summary table for heart rates
Source of variation DF SS
"
MS F
Group 3 3612.67 1204.22 1.485
Topic order 1 1190.04 1190.04 1.467
Group X Topic order 3 2501.71 833.90 1.028
Residual 24 19462.75 810.95 10.769
Total 31 26767.17 863.46 11.466
Period 2 119.07 59.53 0.791
Period x Group 6 417.16 69.53 0.923
Period x Topic order 2 242.41 121.21 1.609
Period x Group x Topic
order 6 497.78 82.96 1.102
Residual 48 3614.75 75.31
Total 64 4891.17 76.42
Grand Total 95 31658.33
* p <.05
** p <.01 
*♦* p <.001
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Appendix 10a. Experiment 3
Rating Scale for subjects* expectations of control over the 
physiological concomitants of fear while presenting a prepared 
speech
Question:
"Sow much do you expect to be able to control the 
physical effects of fear (e.g. sweating, palpitations, 
breathlessness) you may experience during the 
presentations of your projects ?"
Completely Not at all
L_________ L________J_________J________1________ I________ I-----------------1
( 1 )  ( 7 )
JRating Scale used to measure subjects' fear of speaking in public
Question: "Can you please use the scale below to rate your
degree of fearfulness of speaking in public ?"
Not at all Very much
J- - - - - - - 1- - - - - - - 1- - - - - - - 1- - - - - - - 1- - - - - - - 1_ _ _ _ _ _ 1_ _ _ _  I
( 1 )  ( 7 )
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APPENDIX 11. Experiment :
ANOVA  ^ Summary Tables for all measures
Measure Source of 
variation
Sum of 
squares
DF Mean
square
F
Expectation Group 42.33 1 42.33 14.75**
of physio­ Locus of control 0.14 1 0.14 0.05
logical Group I Locus
control of control 1 .72 1 1.72 0.60
Residual 59.70 21 2.87
State Group 828.38 1 828 .38 14.20**
Anxiety Locus of control 124.88 1 124.88 2 .10
(S.T.A.1.) Group I locus
of control 376.32 1 376.32 6.45
Residual 1165.60 21 58.30
Speech Group 180.80 1 180.80 11 .90 **
disruptions Locus of control 0 .7 0 1 0 .7 0 0.05
Group X locus
of control 87.50 1 87.50 5.76 *
Residual 319.20 21 15.20
* P <  .05
*♦ p <  .01
1 The Least Squares Solution described by Winer (1971» p 498).
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AFPr^ IJDIX 12, Experiment 6 * ANOVA Summary table
Measure• Word Count
Source of variation , DF
1 ■ ■ ■
S3 MS f
Group 1 26403.3 26403.3. 16.22 **
Locus of control 1 2050.1 2050.1 1.26
Group X Locus of control 1 7394.7 7394.7 4.54
Residual 16 26040.8 1627.6 8.95
Total 19 61889.0 3257.3 17.92
Speech 1 918.5 918.5 0.89
Speech x Group 1 116.0 116.0 0.11
Speech x Locus of control 1 4538.7 4538.7 4.39
Speech x Group x Locus of
control 1 3718.5 3718.5 3.60
Residual 16 16507.2 1031.7 5.67
Total 20 25799.0 1289.9 7.09
Period 2 1550.8 775.4 2.99
Period x Group 2 1322.8 651.4 2.55
Period x Locus of control 2 88 .6 44.3 0.17
Period x Group i Locus of
control 2 258.6 129.3 0.49
Residual 32 8289.4 259.0 1 .42
Total 40 11510.3 287 .8 1 .58
Speech x Period 2 201.8 100.9 0.55
Speech x Period x Group 2 1195.3 597.7 3.28
Speech x Period x Locus .
of control 2 309.0 154.5 0.85
Residual 34 6178.8 181.7
Total 40 7885.0 197.1
Grand Total 119 107083.3
*
**
p ^  .0 5
p <  .01  
p < .001
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APPENDIX 13, Experiment 6
Measure ; Silence
ANOVA Summary table
Source of variation 1 DF MS F
Group 1 5346.68 5346.68 51.39 **
Locus of control 1 425.63 425.63 4.09
Group X Locus of control 1 616.53 616.53 5.92 *
Residual 16 1664.50 104.03 4.75
Total 19 8053.34 423.86 19.37
Speech 1 104.53 104.53 0.99.
Speech X Group 1 97.20 97.20 0.92.
Speech x Locus of control 1 639.41 639.41 6 .1 0 *
Speech x Group x Locus
of control 1 594.07 594.07 5 .6 6 ^
Residual 16 1676.70 104.79 4.79
Total 20 3111.92 155.60 7.11
Period 2 328.09 164.04 8.09 **
Period x Group 2 174.99 87.49 4.31 *
Period x Locus of control 2 16.35 8.18 0 .40
Residual 32 648.40 20.26 0 .92
Total 40 1212.83 30.32 1.38
Speech x Period 2 81.78 40.89 1 .86
Speech x Period x Group 2 '105.11 52.56 2.40
Speech x Period x Locus
of control 2 75.53 37.76 1 .72
Residual 34 743.91 21.88
Total 40 1006.33 25.16 '
Grand Total 119 13384.42
* p <.05
<  .01  
♦** p < .0 0 1
♦* p
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APPENDIX 14. Experiment 6 *
Measure : State Anxiety
ANOVA Surmary table
Source of variation DF ss MS F
Group 1 1863.22 1863.22 9.85**
Locus of control 1 133.23 133.23 0.70
Group X locus of control 1 11.02 11.02 0.05
Residual 16 3024.00 189.00 6.30
Total 19 5031.47 264.81 8.83
Speech 1 126.03 126.03 4.20
Speech x Group 1 21.02 21.02 0.70
Speech x Locus of control 1 50.63 50.63 1.68
Speech x Group x Locus
of control 1 189.22 189.22 6.31 *
Residual 16 479.60 29.98
Total 20 866.50 43.33
Grand Total 39 5897.97
* 
♦ *
P <  .05
p <  .01  
p < .001
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APPENDIX 15' Experiment 6 2 ANOVA Summary Table
Measure : Subjective Fear Rating^s :
Source of variation ' DF
--------------
SS MS F
Group 1 105.80 105.80 11.15 **
Locus of control 1 • 1.80 1.80 0.19
Group X locus of control 1 0.05 0.05' 0 .0 0
Residual 16 151.80 9.48 9.06
Total 19 259.45 13.65 13.04
Speech 1 16.20 16.20 10.36 **
Speech x Group 1 18.05 18.05 11.55 **
Speech x Locus of control 1 0.45 0.45 0.28
Speech x Group i Locus of 
control 1 1.80 1.80 1.15
Residual 16 25.00 1 .56 1.49
Total 20 61.50 3.07 2.93
Rating 1 14.45' 14.45 5.47 *
Rating x Group 1 7 .20 7 .20 2.73
Rating z Locus of control 1 3 .20 3 .2 0 1.21
Rating x Gruup z Locus of 
control 1 0.45 0.45 0.17
Residual 16 42.20 2.63 2.51
Total 20 67.50 3.37 3.22
Speech z Rating 1 3 .20 3 .2 0 3.05
Speech z Rating z Group 1 1.25 1.25 ,1.19
Speech z Rating z Locus of 
control 1 1.25 1.25 1.19
Residual 17 17.80 1.04
Total 20 23.50 1.17
Grand Total 79 411.95
♦ p <  .05
** p <  .01  
*♦* p <  .001
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APPENDIX 16. Experiment 6 ; ANOVA Summary Table
Measure ; Anticipatory heart rate
Source of variation DF SS MS r
Group 1 2452.36 2452.36 6.24 *
Locus of control ' 1 34.60 34.60 0.08
Group I Locus of control 1 112.90 112.90 0.2&
Residual 16 6281.86 392.62 6.04
Total 19 8881.70 476.46 7 .20
Speech 1 125.32 125.32 1.93
Speech x Group 1 767.38 767.38 11.81 **
Speech x Locus of control 1 147.46 147.46 2.27
Speech x Group x Locus
of control 1 4.36 4.36 2.27.
Residual 16 1038.82 64.93
Total 20 2083.32 104.17
Grand Total 39 10965.02
*
♦*
p <  .05
p < .01  
p <  .001
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app e n d i x 17. Experiment 6 f
a sure : Heart rate
ANOVA Summary Table
Source of variation DF SS MS F
Group 1 1875.46 1875.46 2.66
Locus of control 1 82.67 82.67 0 .11
Group X Lq CUs of control 1 0.05 0.05 0 .0 0
Residual 16 11263.96 704.00 10.49
Total 19 13222.14 695.90 10.37
Speech 1 1374.99 1374.99 3 .8 8
Speech x Group 1 1088.42 1086.42 3.07
Speech x Locus of control 1 25.58 25.56 0.07
Speech x Group x Locus
of control 1 84.34 84.34 0.23
Residual 16 5660.61 353.79 5.27
Total 20 8233.93 411.70 6 .13
Period 2 1195.87 597.94 12.28 **
Period xGroup 2 12.97 6 .4 8 0.13
Period x Locus of control 2 138.89 69.44 1.42
Period x Group i Locus
of control 2 367.40 183.70 3.77 *
Residual 32 1557.55 48.67 0.72
total 40 3272.68 81.82 1 .22
Speech x Period 2 29.12 14.56 0.21
Speech x Period x Group 2 32.85 16.42 0.24
Speech x Period i Locus
of control 2 37.68 18.84 0.28
Residual 34 2280.67 67.08
Total 40 2380.31 59.51
Grand Total 119 27109.05
* P <  .05
P < .01
P <  .001
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Appendix 18 . üxperiment 7: AfJOVA sunmnr:,' tables for all measure;
Scale : 'Calm - Fearful'
Source of
variations DF ss MS f P
Judge 1 0.80 0.80 1 .11 .05
Residual 8 5.81 0.72
Speaker 1 16.93 16.93 76.95 < .0 0 1
Speakerx3^o&c 1 0.39 0.39 1.77 ^.05
Residual a 1 .76 0 .22
' Scale : 'Bored - Interested'
Source of
variations DF SS MS 1 F P
Judge 1 0 .2 0 0 .2 0 0.35 ^  .05
Residual 8 4.55 0.57
Speaker 1 0.97 0.97 1.39 >  .05
Speaker X
Judge 1 0 .96 0.96 1.37 ^  .05
Residual 8 5.63 0.70
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Appendix 18 (continued)
Scale ; 'Pleasure - anger'
Source of
variation DF SS MS F P
Judge 1 0 .5 8 0.58 1 .66 >  .05
Residual 8 2.80 0.35
Speaker 1 0 .5 8 0 .5 8 5.37 <.05
Speaker and
judge 1 0 .10 0 .10 0.91 >  .05
Residual 8 0.86 0.108
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Appendix 19.
Listed below are the 2I4 questions which make up Levenson’s (1973)
locus of control questionnaire* Each of the three scales of the
questionnaire, i.e. Internal, Powerful Others, and Chance, consists
of 8 questions. The questions comprising each scale are indicated by
the letter in the brackets which follow each question, i.e. Internal
scale questions - (l); Powerful Others scale questions - (P);
Chance scale questions - (C).
Subjects respond to each question on a 7-point Likert-type scale
ranging from 'Srongly agree’ to 'Strongly disagree'.
The following directions proceed the questions:
Below is a series of attitude statements. Each represents
a commonly held opinion. There is no right or wrong answer.
You will probably agree with some items and disagree
with others. I am interested in the extent to which you
agree or disagree with such matters of opinion.
Read each statement capefully. Then indicate the extent
to which you agree or disagree by putting a tick on
the scale to the right of each question. First impressions
are usually best. Read each statement, decide if you agree
or disagree and the strenght of your opinion and then tick
the scale.
GIVE YOUR OPINION ON EVERY STATEMENT.
The questions are as follows:
1. Whether or not 1 get to be a leader depends mostly on my ability. (l)
2. To a great extent my life is controlled by accidental happenings. (C)
3 . I feel like what happens in my life is mostly determined by 
powerful people. (P)
continued over...
Appendix 19 continued:
4. Whether or not I get into a car accident depends mostly on
how good a driver I am. (l)
5. When I make plans, I am almost certain to make them work. (l)
6. Often there is no chance of protecting my personal interests
from bad luck happenings. (c)
h 7. When I get what I want, it’s usually because I ’m lucky. (c)
8. Although I might have good ability, I will not be given leadership 
responsibility without appealing to those in positions of power. (P)
9. How many friends I have depends on how nice a person I am. (l)
10. I have often found that what is going to happen will happen. (c)
11. My life is chiefly controlled by powerful others. (p)
12. Whether or not I get into a car accident is mostly a matter of
luck. (c)
13. People like myself have very little chance of protecting our
personal interests when they conflict with those of strong
pressure groups. (P)
14. It’s not always wise for me to plan too far ahead because many
things turn out to be a matter of good or bad fortune. (c)
15. Getting what I want requires pleasing those people above me. (p)
16. Whether or not I get to be a leader depends on whether I ’m lucky
enough'to be in the right place at the right time. (c)
17. If important people were to decide they didn’t like me, I
probably wouldn’t make many friends. (p)
18. I can pretty much determine what willhappen in my life. (l)
19. I am usually able to protect my personal interests. (l)
20. Whether or not I get into a car accident depends mostly on the
other driver. (p)
21. When I get what I want, it’s usually because I worked hard for it. (l)
22. In order to have my plans work, I make sure that they fit in with
the desires of people who have power over me. (p)
23. My life is determined by my own actions. (l)
24. It’s chiefly a matter of fate whether or not I have a few friends
or many friends. (c)
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Appendix 20.
Listed below are the questions which comprise the State and Trait 
scales of Spielberger et al’s (1973) State-Trait Anxiety inventory (STAl).
State scale;
The questions on this scale are preceeded by the following directions:
A number of statements which people have used to describe themselves 
are given below. Read each statement and then blacken in the appropriate 
circle to the right of the statement to indicate how you feel right 
now, that is, at this moment. There are no right or wrong answers.
Do not spend too much time on any one statement but give the 
answer which seems to describe your feelings best.
The questions are answered with a response of: 'Not at all',
' Somewhat','Moderately so*, or 'Very much so*. They are as follows:
1 . 1  feel calm.
2. Ifeel secure.
3. I am tense.
i4. I am regretful.
5 . I feel at ease.
6. I feel upset.
7. I am presently worrying over possible misfortunes.
8. I feel rested.
9. I feel anxious.
10 .1 feel comfortable.
11. I feel self-confident.
12. I feel nervous.
13. I am jittery.
II4. I feel 'high strung'.
15# 1 am relaxed.
16. Ifeel content.
17# I am worried.
18. I feel over-excited and 'rattled*.
19. I feel joyful.
20. I feel pleasant.
continued over.
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Appendix 20 continued:
Trait scale:
The questions on this scale are preceeded by the following directions: 
A number of statements which people have used to describe 
themselves are given below. Read each statement and then 
blacken in the appropriate circle to the right of the 
statement to indicate how you generally feel. There are no 
right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time on any one 
statement but give the answer which seems to describe how you 
generally feel.
The questions are ^swered with a response of: 'Almost never', 
'Sometimes', 'Often', or 'Almost always'. They are as follows:
I . 1  feel pleasant.
2. I tire quickly.
3. I feel like crying.
I4., I wish I could be as happy as others seem to be.
5. I am losing out on things because I can't make up
my mind soon enough.
6. I feel rested.
7. I am 'calm cool and collected*.
8. I feel that difficulties are piling up so that I 
cannot overcome them.
9. I worry too much over something that really does'nt matter
10. I am happy.
II. I am inclined to take things hard.
12. I lack self-confidence.
13# Ifeel secure.
1i|. I try to avoid facing a crisis or difficulty.
15# I feel blue.
16. I am content.
17. Some unimportant thought runs through my mind and bothers me.
18. I take disappointments so keenly that I can't put them 
out of my mind.
19# I am a steady person.
20. I get in a state of tension or turmoil over my recent
concerns and interests.
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Addendum;
Issues related to the collection of heart rate data.
In tvo of the studies reported above data analysis revealed 
an expected difference between groups of subjects in terms of heart 
rate. Specifically, the high fear speakers in experiments 3 snd 6 
experienced significantly higher heart rates in anticipation of 
presenting a speech than low fear speakers. However, this measure 
failed to reveal predicted differences in all five of the studies in 
which heart rate was measured. Some possible interpretations for these 
failures were offered, although negative findings are always difficult 
to interpret. The present discussion considers a number of general 
problems associated with the collection and interpretation of heart rate 
data and, where relevant, the possibility that these problems contributed 
to the negative results reported above is noted. These problems are 
discussed in some brevity as lengthy,detailed discussions are available 
elsewhere (e.g. Siddle and Turpin, I96O). Moreover, solutions to these 
problems will not, for the most part, be considered. Again possible 
solutions to these problems are detailed elsewhere (e.g. Siddle and Turpin 
1580). These problems will be considered under the following headings: 
Subject Variables; Sxperimental/Environ_mental Conditions; Transduction; 
and Measurement and Quantification.
Subject Variables
There are a number of subject variables which may influence both 
heart rate level and responsivity and should therefore be considered by 
researchers collecting data on cardiac activity. For instance variation 
Ê^ong individuals can result from intrinsic variables such as sex, race 
and age. To date the studies examining the effects of these variables 
upon tonic and phasic cardiac responses have been few and the findings 
produced with regard to sex and euge equivocal (see Siddle and Turpin,
I98O; pp I55-I56). However, it seems reasonable to suggest that error
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variance will be reduced if these variables are controlled.
In addition, the effects of heart disease and drugs can have 
significant effects upon heart rate and common stimulants such as 
coffee and tobacco also have clear cardiovascular effects. Furthermore, 
degree of physical fitness can contribute to between-subjects variability. 
It has been suggested (Jennings et al, I98I) that such variance can be 
reduced by eliminating subjects or arranging experimental sessions to 
prevent the direct effects of menstruation and such agents as coffee, 
tobacco and alcohol,
Exnerimental/Environmental Conditions
Heart rate is sensitive to environmental change and therefore 
when recording cardiac activity care should be taken to control 
intrinsic variables such as temperature and humidity. Attempts should 
also be made to eliminate extraneous noise. Such variables, along with 
posture, are suggested to account for a substantial proportion of the
variance associated with measures of 'resting heart rate',
A number of researchers (e.g. Siddle and Turpin, I980) have also 
suggested thst time of day and time of last meal can alsoaffect the 
value of heart rate level. However, whether such factors affect phasic 
reactivity is difficult to assess since there have been no studies which 
have specifically addressed this question.
Body movements can both disturb heart rate electrodes, thus 
producing recording artifact, and physiologically induce heart rate
change. Therefore, where possible, subjects' movements should be
minimized. If the task involves the subjects moving, then electrode-: 
and cable movement artifacts may be reduced by appropriate placement 
e.g. chest electrodes. Other solutions to movement artifact also exist 
(see Siddle and Turpin, 1980; pp 157-158). Postural adjustments also 
affect breathing patterns which in turn can alter heart rate. Comfortable 
positioning of the subject can help to minimize these unwanted changes in 
heart rate.
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Pertinent to the speaking tasks employed in several of the 
studies reported above, is the fact that when subjects are speaking 
changes in muscle activity occur which influence heart rate: Obrist 
(l%8 ) has observed momentary 3-5 beat increases in heart rate in 
resting humans associated with such subtle activities such as mouth 
movements. Moreover, changes in respiration occur when subjects are 
speaking which also influence heart rate (Sayers, I980). The relevance 
of these points for the studies reported above,is that in some of them 
the experimental groups differed significantly in terms of measures of 
speech production (i.e. words spoken and silence). The effect of such 
differencesupon heart rate would confound the interpretation of observed 
differences thought to reflect differences in anxiety. A final point to 
note concerns subjects’ cognitive appraisal of the experimental setting: 
care should be .taken to allay any unnecessary (i.e. not a part of the 
experimental manipulation) anxiety - and concomitant physiological responses ■ 
which may result from the subject finding himself in a novel situation.
A more detailed discussion of the environmental requirements of a 
laboratory designed for psychophysiological experiments has been presented 
by Gale and Smith (1 98O).
Transduction:
In the measurement of heart rate the transducer usually takes the 
form of silver or stainless-steel surface electrodes or a photoplethysmograph 
(PPG). There are problems associated with both of these methods of 
transduction.
By definition these indirect methods of cardiac activity are made 
from the skin surface: movement of either the person or the device 
(electrode or PPG), due to being loosely attached, will invariably alter 
the signal being measured. In the case of the PPG any extraneous light 
allowed to impinge upon the light-sensitive-cell will produce artifical 
measurements. As noted above artifacts may also arise from the movement
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of the cable connecting the device to the preamplifier, thus care 
should be talien to minimize the movement of the subject and cable.
If electrode straps are attached too tightly blood circulation 
in the part of the limb distal to the strap will be reduced and muscle 
tremor may also occur, resulting in EMG artifacts. However, since 
this EfiQ activity is predominantly of a higher frequency than the 
components of the EKG, it can be filtered out. (Brener, I98O; p 182).
When photoplethysmographic techniques are used it must be noted 
that the common practice of taping a device to the skin or employing 
bulky housing units with spring tension (as was the case in the above 
studies), may produce significant alterations of the vascular bed 
(i.e. a change in the radii of the blood vessels), at the measurement 
site and such distortion may make interpretation of data impossible. 
Moreover, such attachments may prevent free air circulation at the 
measurement site thus exacerbating the problem of heat generated by 
the broad band (white) light lamp characteristically used in photoplethys­
mographic transducers - and used in the transducer employed in the studies 
reported above. Specifically, heat will tend to dilate the vasculature 
under study and create artificial measurements. For a detailed discussion 
of the problems and possible solutions associated with photoplethysmographic 
transducers see Jennings et al (1980).
Artifacts associated with recording the EKG also result from the 
improper nature and application of the recording electrodes. These 
points are discussed by Brown (1972).
With regard to photoplethysmographic transduction it must be noted 
that measurement variability can result from hydrostatic pressure variation 
due to the position of the transducer relative to the level of the heart: 
both posture and position of the measurement site must be constant.
An additional point that must be noted about PPG techniques is 
that pulse amplitude varies with the respiratory cycle and often changes
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with stimulation. As Siddle and Turpin (198O) have noted, this may 
raise difficulties in relation to the detection of interheat intervals.
With regard to this problem Stern (1975) has shown that stimulation 
produces little change in pulse amplitude at the ear lobe and has 
therefore suggested the use of lobe photoplethysmography for reliable 
signal detection.
Measurement and Quantification
The present discussion of the measurement and quantification 
of cardiac activity will be limited to a brief overview of the problems 
encountered and the decisions to be male by researchers, as detailed discussions 
of these issues have been presented elsewhere (e.g. Siddle & Turpin, 1930),
The basic unit of heart rate measurement is the interbeat interval 
(iSl). The 131 is reciprocally related to heart rate (l3l(s) = oO/HR 
(tpm)). Although it is often assumed that there is little difference 
between the two units, the transformation of IBIs to HR is a non-linear 
one and therefore both measures cannot have the same linear relationship 
with a third variable. The question arises: 'which measure is the more 
appropriate?’ This question has been discussed throughly in the literature 
and it seems that no clear consensus has been reached concerning which 
measure shall be followed and through which kind of time, i.e. for 
successive beats or for successive real time (Graham, 1980; p 193).
Either measure or either kind of time may be suitable depending upon the 
research problem and the resources available (Jennings et al, I98I).
However, there are restrictions upon the combinations of measure and time 
that are optimal (Graham I98O; pp 193-195)*
It must be noted at this point that photoplethysomography is considered 
(Jennings et al, I98I) to be an adequate procedure if pulse counts over a 
period of a minute or longer are the dependent variable. However they 
suggest that this procedure is less acceptable for beat-by-beat or 
second-by-second measures of heart ratel
367
’First detection of a standard point, e.g. peak, on the 
plethysmographic output is usually more difficult than detecting a 
standard point, e.g. R wave peak, on the EKG. Second, propagation 
of the pulse is influenced by peripheral vascular change. Thus, 
using the plethysmographic technique two beats with equal R to H 
wave times (that is with identical heart rate) will appear different 
if one is accompanied by significant vasoconstriction.’(p 22?)
With the measurement of tonic (on-going) cardiac activity a 
’major problem concerns the appropriate choice of statistic to 
represent such data.’ (Slddle and Turpin, I98O; p I60), A serious 
limitation of using mean measures of such activity is that they do not 
take into account the fact that cardiac activity is usually not 
monophasic but cyclical. Moreover, such approaches ignore the possibility 
that cardiac variability itself might be a useful measure. (Siddle and 
Turpin, 198O; p I60). The durations of these cycles vary from seasonal, 
menstrual, diurnal cycles to trends of relatively short periodicity 
known as sinus arrhythmia (SA). A detailed discussion of some of the 
methods available for analysing such variability havebeen presented by 
Sayers (I980).
The short-term (phasic) changes in heart rate that are typically 
recorded in laboratory experiments are superimposed upon these ongoing 
biorhythms. Siddle and Turpin (I98O) suggest that the most important 
cycle when it comes to quantifying phasic activity is sinus arrhythmia^ 
as several cycles may occur during the course of an analysis period. 
Furthermore, they describe the respiratory SA as usually being the 
most dominant, consisting of a resting cardiac wave -form with a 
periodicity of about 3-12 seconds and a peak-to-trough amplitude of 
2-20 bpm. As Siddle and Turpin (I980) point out the difficulty in 
quantifying phasic activity is that it represents the summation of 
phasic responses and such ongoing stimulus - irrelevant cardiac activity. 
Thus accurate measurement of phasic responses must try and take account
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of both prestimulus level (initial level) on post stimulus responses 
and the variability inherent in prestimulus cardiac activity.
In terms of the effect of initial level Wilder (1962) has 
posited the law of initial values (lIV) which proposes a relationship 
between prestimulus level (x) and either post stimulus level (y) or 
the difference score (Y-X), This view has been supported by numerous 
researchers (e.g. Graham and Jackson, 1970). Jennings et al (1931) 
suggest that initial data exploration should consider whether initial 
levels appear to be related to degree of change and whether these 
levels differ between groups and variables. In addition, they suggest 
that where a tonic-phasic relationship exists it may be corrected by 
either covariance analysis or by range correction procedures. However, 
they stress that care must-be taken to ensure that the assumptions of 
these techniques are met (see Winer, 1971; Turpin, Lobstein and Siddle, 
1980). It must also be noted that these techniques are not seen as being 
completely satisfactory. For a discussion see Turpin et al (l930).
In terms of the prestimulus variability of cardiac activity it 
could be considered (as was the case in the studies reported above) that 
the effects of such variability is averaged out when scores are collapsed 
across groups of subjects or trials. However, as Turpin and Siddle (1973b) 
have observed this does not appear to happen, even in the case of a 
pseudostimulus. It seems clear then, that methods which reduce the error 
variance of phasic responses by accounting for prestimulus variability 
are desirable. Three approaches have been adopted and are described in 
some detail by Turpin et al (1930, pp 210-217), along with the 
advantages and disadvantages of their use.
A final point to note with regard to the measurement of cardiac 
activity is the suggestion made by Jennings et al (1981) that data 
collection should include, whenever possible, measures of respiration and 
vascular activity, as they note:
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•Respiratory manoeuvers have clear effects on heart rate (e.g.
Sroiife, 1971 ; Levenson, 1979). Ideally respiration should he 
measured and quantified with the same accuracy and care as heart 
rate. Minimally, respiration should be maintained so that consistent 
respiratory maneuvers induced by experimental events'^  are identified,,, 
FsychophyBiologists commonly measure heart rate as an index of the 
activity of cardiac autonomic nerves. Blood pressure and flow changes 
in the peripheral vasculature can, however, affect heart rate independently 
of neural effects on the heart. Monitoring of both the cardio and 
vascular parts of the system can thus be important for adequate 
interpretation', (p 227)
 ^ Such as the speaking task employed in the studies reported above.
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